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ABSTRACT
The aim of the thesis is in Part One to give a critical exposi¬
tion of the foundations of Gadamer's philosophy, and in Part Two to
show how that philosophy can contribute to a Christian philosophy.
Part One outlines Gadamer's interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of
the 'fore-structure" of Understanding and the former's development of
that analysis with his own analysis of "effective-historical conscious¬
ness" and his positive understanding of prejudice. Gadamer understands
Understanding as a mode of experience and resists any attempt by reflec¬
tion to elevate experience into knowledge; he wants Hegel's "science
of the experience of consciousness" without his Absolute Knowledge. He
also wants knowledge and truth without the totality which would guarantee
them, and believes that Heidegger's "ontologically positive" understand¬
ing of finitude allows this. We try to show the difficulties of such a
position, and also of his attempt to guarantee truth with the "specula¬
tive structure" of language. Finally we question the grounding of his
philosophy in the aesthetic experience testified to by the "other side"
of the Platonic doctrine of Beauty. In Part Two we suggest that
religious experience provides a more adequate grounding for a philosophy
such as Gadamer's. We try to clarify the relation between Gadamer and
theology, and suggest that this relation is more intimate than he
admits. We then try to see whether the Christian understandings of
Eschatology and of Providence can shed new light on the questions
raised in Part One, and can hint at their resolution. Finally we
sketch a Christian philosophy which attempts to overcome the weaknesses
and ambiguities of Gadamer's philosophy by a more explicit and thorough¬
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INTRODUCTION
This introduction has two aims: first of all, to suggest why
it should be worth the while of a theological student to study in
some depth the philosophy of Gadamer; and secondly, to give a brief
indication of the way in which our study will proceed.
Gadamer, it might be supposed, is a relatively obscure German
"hermeneutician" whose philosophy, depending on your theological
stance, either has been assimilated by the so-called "New Hermeneutic"
theologians and their followers, or has been soundly refuted by
Pannenberg, or is a prime example of the tendency of bourgeois
We'stern European intellectuals to interpret the world rather than
to change it, or is just another example of the German philosopher's
chronic failure to know what he is talking about. To those who hold
the last view it might be suggested that Gadamer's discussion of pre¬
judice might help them to use their own prejudices creatively. The
third view represents a more serious charge; however unless theology
is to become absorbed into a Marxian philosophy that is "extremist,
abstract and revolutionary","1' it would do well to heed Gadamer's
2
stress on tradition as the source of "the quiet power of the possible".
Of course the world-order has to be criticized with reference to a
criterion that transcends it; but that transcendent criterion comes
to us (at least in the Christian view) only in history and tradition,
and these have to be interpreted. The first two views come from
1
cf. MM 26Uf; TM 2h9
2
cf. Heidegger's Uber den Humanismus, p.7f.
2
diametrically opposed theological positions, but they have in common
the assumption that Gadamer is now of at best marginal relevance;
what he has to say has either been said by Ebeling and Fuchs and
3
their followers, or else it is simply wrong, as Pannenberg has shown.
But rather than Gadamer's philosophy being something they can agree
to neglect, it can in the present writer's view be a middle ground
where these opposing theological positions can come together to dis¬
agree creatively. This applies primarily to the first two positions,
for Gadamer's attempt to mediate Hegel and Heidegger can provide,
even if it turns out to be unsuccessful, at least the starting point
for such a mediation and hence for the mediation of the modern theo¬
logies influenced by Hegel (e.g. Pannenberg and Moltmann) and those
influenced by Heidegger (e.g. Fuchs and Macquarrie). But Gadamer's
philosophy can also provide the common ground for a constructive
dialogue between all the position represented above, since not only
does his dialogue with Habermas (as well as with Hegel) open up his
philosophy in the direction of Marxian thought, but his references
to Wittgenstein open doors in that direction also. This is not to
suggest that Gadamer offers anything like a synthesis of all these
position, but merely that he has a gift for bringing opposed and
apparently isolated positions into play, for making the fixed
determinations of thought fluid, as Hegel might say (this is no
doubt connected with his inclination in politics towards "a balance
of powers"). If doing philosophy and theology consists in standing
in the crossfire of the philosophical and theological giants, then
O
cf. Pannenberg's article "Hermeneutics and Universal History" (for
details see Part One, Chapter l(e) note l).
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the present writer knows of no modern thinker who has done so as
conscientiously, as explicity and as consistently as Gadamer. There
is much to he learned simply by standing beside him.
As will by now be clear, Gadamer is in the present writer's
view much more than "merely a hermeneutician" . Gadamer»s concern
is not merely to tell us how to interpret texts in general and philo¬
sophical texts in particular, but is rather (if we may adapt the
subtitle of the Introduction to Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?)
to take "the way back into the ground of hermeneutics", that is, to
root the understanding operative in the human sciences in that pri¬
mordial Understanding which, as an existential of There-being, first
allows "World" to be at all. But Gadamer's project is more ambitious
than Heidegger's, for he is not content merely to till the ground of
hermeneutics j he wants also to tend and train the tree of knowledge
which grows from that ground, that is, he wants to carry over what
he takes to be the results of Heidegger's ontological investigations
into the logic of the human sciences. The extent to which this
project is successful will be the main theme of Part One of our
study. Whether successful or not, Gadamer's project is vast in
scopej his hermeneutics is, as he puts it, "universal-ontological",
so that it is no longer appropriate to call him "merely a hermeneu¬
tician" but rather "not less than a hermeneutician". His "outline
of a philosophical hermeneutics /Grundziige einer philosophischen
Hermeneutik7" (as Truth and Method is subtitled, though the English
translation omits this) takes up the most fundamental philosophical
questions of all and is a substantial contribution to general philo¬
sophy.
h
The breadth of Gadamer's erudition as well as the fundamental
nature of his enquiry mean that it is far beyond the scope and com¬
petence of the present writer to give a complete account of Truth
and Methodj let alone Gadamer's other writings. In fact this study
really only deals with the second half of Truth and Method (i.e.
Part Three and the second half of Part Two) and that only partially.
It has virtually ignored the contribution of Gadamer as a historian
of aesthetics and hermeneutics, and concentrates on what the present
writer talces to be the core of his philosophy. Part One of the
present study is devoted to the exposition and critical analysis of
that core. Part Two of our study attempts to treat more extensively
the results of our intensive survey in Part One. It attempts to
view Gadamer's basic philosophical project in the perspective of
some wider philosophical and theological issues, and to see what
contribution Gadamer can make to the discussion of these issues.
What these issues are will be evident from the chapter titles in
Part Two. The final chapter will first of all give a brief recapi¬
tulation of the main themes of the preceding chapters., and will
then try to weave these themes together into a consistent philoso¬
phical and theological position. This position, for which we will
venture to claim the name "Christian Platonism", will be presented
only in the barest outlineit is intended as a programmatic sketch
rather than as the condensation of an elaborated philosophical and
theological system.
No doubt most of the faults which this study contains derive
ultimately from the same, or from similar, fundamental assumptions.
It is perhaps as well to bring forward now two of these assumptions
5
which hind the study together (for better or for worse). Of course,
as Gadamer says, the writer cannot be fully aware of his own pre¬
suppositions or prejudices until the reader points them out to him.
Of the assumptions which the present writer is aware of, however, the
most important is this: he assumes that there is a sharp distinction
between ontology in Heidegger's and perhaps the Thomist sense, and
logic. The nature of the relation between ontology and logic is
precisely what is at stake for him in the following pages. That
they may be related by some sort of dialectic is not denied, only
that such a dialectic may merely be assumed. Perhaps the present
writer ought not to have embarked upon this study until he was more
familiar with Thomas Aquinas than he is. However at least it might
be for him a sort of preparation for the gospel of Thomas.'
The other major assumption that is made in this study is that
philosophy is always the philosophy of experience, and that the
philosophy of religious experience is the highest form of philosophy
(though not for that reason the highest form of reality, as Hegel
seems to have thought). The role and status of theology (if it is
different from the philosophy of religious experience) is very ambi¬
guous and uncertain for the present writer. In this he is probably
even more of a Liberal Protestant than he is aware. Of one thing he
is certain, however, and that is that he is not prepared to take the
"dogmatic" way (whether Protestant or Roman Catholic) out of this
impasse. He agrees with Gadamer that the true destiny of all human
beings is to experience "the openness of Being", and that such
experience means the end of all dogmatism.
PART ONE
THE FOUNDATIONS OF GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHY
7
CHAPTER ONE
GADAMER'S CONCEPT OF UNDERSTANDING
(a) Understanding in Being and Time
Heidegger's presentation of Understanding"^" in Being and Time is
fundamental to Gadamer's position. Gadamer describes in Truth and
Method how in his view Heidegger's concept of Understanding resolves
and at the same time goes beyond the apparently intractable set of
2
problems into which hermeneutical reflection had run. However for
Gadamer Being and Time was more than a solution to a contemporary
philosophical impasse; he sees it as going in a radically new
direction., and thus opening up new directions for hermeneutic s.
Truth and Method is devoted to the exploration of these new horizons.
("WM 2145; TM 2,3.0) In particular, Heidegger's analysis of Understanding
forms the basis of Gadamer's "theory of hermeneutical experience"
which he unfolds in Part Two Section II of Truth and Method. Hence
this section begins with a sub-section entitled "The elevation of
the historicality of Understanding to the status of hermeneutical
principle". Gadamer gives an account of the problems which haunted
reflection on the nature of hermeneutics (that is, reflection
on the Understanding operative in the human sciences /Geisteswissenschaften/
"Understanding" (capitalized) always refers to the philosophical
concept of Understanding /Verstehen/, especially as used by Heidegger.
It should not be confused with Understanding /Verstand7 as opposed
to Reason /Vernunft/ as in Kant and Hegel; "understanding" (without
a capital) refers to a particular understanding /Verst&dni_s7
arrived at as a result of the process of Understanding.
2
See WM 2lj.O-250; TM 22^-231;.
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and especially the historical sciences) in that part of Truth and
Method which is devoted to Dilthey's struggle to vindicate such
Understanding against the claims of the methods of the natural
3
sciences. In Gadamer's view Dilthey's project failed because he
remained too much under the spell of the methods of the natural
sciences, and tried to secure the status of the human sciences
alongside of, and in contrast to, the methods of the natural sciences,
thus creating a radical split between them. The beginnings of a
solution to these problems are to be found, Gadamer believes, in
Husserl's phenomenological researches.^ Husserl too had reckoned
that the application of the natural sciences' concept of "objectivity"
within the sphere of the human sciences was "nonsense". (WM 2ii7j
TM 231) The distinction of Husserl's approach was to go back behind
the natural sciences to the so-called "life-world"^ in order to
ground the rigorously scientific philosophy which was his goal.
In Gadamer's view Husserl's move was in the right direction, and
Heidegger's work was in one sense a continuation of Husserl's
approach inasmuch as he too goes back to the "life-world" prior
to the subject-object relation of the natural sciences. Although
Heidegger has very different aims from Husserl - which led to a
radical breach with Husserl's approach and aims - there is a sense
in which there is a continuity between Husserl and Heidegger and
through to Gadamer. Heidegger's existential analytic in general
3
See WM 205-228; TM 192-211;.
^ See WM 229-2l|£>; TM 21U-225.
b
For Husserl's "life-world", see Gadamer's essay "The Science of the
Life-World" (KS III 190-201; PH 182-197).
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and his analysis of Understanding in particular are transcendental
in nature; that is, Understanding is analysed as the structure of all
possible experience. In this sense there is a direct line of
descent from Kant through Husserl to Heidegger (and Gadamer).
(WM 21+9J TM 23U) Where the break with the Kantian tradition comes
f'/id.
is the fact^the examination of the structure of all possible
experience is focussed not in terms of the natural sciences, but
in terms of the "life-world", that is, in terms of experience prior
to the supervention of the natural sciences and the subject-object
relation operative in them. (WM 330; TM 311f)
This much Husserl and Heidegger have in common. The difference
is that whereas Husserl was concerned with founding philosophy as a
rigorous science and hence focussed on problems of "constitution"
or the grounding of the structures of meaning in a transcendental
subjectivity - an interest which lead him in the direction of some
form of transcendental idealism - Heidegger claims that his concern
in Being and Time is quite different. The aim of Being and Time is
to raise anew the question of Being as such which the Greeks asked.^
Heidegger's method of approaching this question is by giving an
•7
analysis of There-being /Basein7, Heidegger's name for man as the
being that understands Being. At "this point comes the real clash with
See BT 21ff. /Since the English translation includes the pagination
of the original, we omit references to Sein und Zeit.7
n
We follow the translators of Wahrheit und Methode (as well as
W.J. Richardson in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought)
in rendering Heidegger's technical term "Dasein" as "There-being".
In their translation of Sein und Zeit Macquarrie and Robinson prefer
to leave "Dasein" untranslated, cf. BT 27 note 1.
10
Husserl, for Heidegger wants to insist on the radical finitude of
There-being, in terms of which alone Being is. This finitude is
expressed by the term "facticity", hence Heidegger's interpretation
O
of There-being is termed a "hermeneutics of facticity". This is
in conscious opposition to the so-called "idealism" of Husserl's
concern with transcendental subjectivity. (WM 2lj.9f j TM 23k)
Tn fact the distinction between Being and Time and Husserl's
approach is not as clear-cut as all that. Gadamer notes "the ambi¬
guity that made Heidegger's Being and Time appear sometimes like
transcendental phenomenology and sometimes like its critique."
("WM 2ifL note 1; TM E>22 note 15>U) This ambiguity arises because,
among other factors, Husserl maintained the absolute historicity
of transcendental subjectivity and hence could claim "that the
meaning of facticity is itself an eidos, that it belongs essentially
to the eidetic sphere of universal essences." (WM 2lpL; TM 226) The
ambiguity of Being and Time in this regard is one of the factors
which contributes to the problem of the so-called "turn" in Heidegger's
work, that is, the problem of the relation of Being and Time to the
later work. Gadamer's position on this problem is that, while acknow¬
ledging the ambiguity of Being and Time and allowing that it could
be read as an exercise in transcendental phenomenology, he maintains
that the "turn" is already presupposed in Being and Time, but that
Heidegger was unable to make the turn from 'Being and time" to "time
Q
and Being" because of the terms in which Being and Time is couched,
On Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity", see Gadamer's essay
"Sein Geist Gott" (KS 17 7U~8f>), p.78. cf. Otto Poggeler's essay
"Being as Appropriation /Sein als Ereigni£7" in Heidegger and Modern
Philosophy, ed. M. Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978),
P^7.
9
See BT 6k; also Uber den Humanismus, p.17.
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that is, those of transcendental phenomenology."*"21 As Heidegger
himself would later say, the language of Being and Time is too
"metaphysical" For Heidegger "metaphysical" means much the
same as "subjective", and it is this "subjectivism" which Gadamer
claims is implicitly and in principle overcome already in Being
and Time. Heidegger's contention that the meaning of Being is to
be determined from within the horizon of time meant more than that
"the structure of temporality appeared as the ontological determina¬
tion of subjectivity" ("WM 2l|.3j TM 227f); it meant that Being itself
is time, (ibid.) And this thesis, Gadamer says, "burst asunder the
whole subjectivism of modern philosophy." (ibid.) Heidegger had
seen the subjectivism (or "metaphysics") at the heart of transcen¬
dental philosophy, including transcendental phenomenology. But
since Being and Time is couched to a certain extent in terms of
* »
transcendental phenomenology, this insight, and the critique of traditional
modes of thinking which it involves, are obscured. Heidegger gives
up the attempt to carry through the project of Being and Time and
looks for other ways of carrying throught the "turn". Hence the
"turn" which becomes explicit in the later writings is no new
venture but the carrying through of the "turn" which was already
12
apparent implicitly but in principle in Being and Time.
cf. Gadamer's essay "The Fhenomenological Movement" (KS III 150-
189; PH 130-181), esp. KS III 165 j PH lltf.
See Uber den Humanismus, p.17.
12
cf. KS I 7ki PH 50.
The importance for our present concern of Gadamer's position on
Heidegger's "turn" is that it allows him, he believes, to combine
elements from Heidegger's later writings, for example, the emphasis
on the work of art and on language, and the whole critique of sub¬
jectivism, with the analysis of Understanding in Being and Time. For
those -who hold that the"turn" involves a definite discontinuity and
even an about-face on the part of Heidegger, such a combination would
seem problematic. Discussion of how Gadamer can resolve the diffi¬
culties that might be supposed to be raised by combining elements
from the earlier and later Heidegger cannot be attempted here. However
it is arguable that the question as to the unity of Gadamer's position,
drawing as it does on all stages of Heidegger's work as well as on
other sources, is in principle different from, though perhaps in the
last resort not entirely independent of, the question of the unity of
Heidegger's work.
Gadamer makes it clear that his intentions are different from
those of Heidegger in Being and Time. (MM 2jq8, 250j TM 232f, 235)
Mhat leads Heidegger is the question of Being, and the analysis of
Understanding and the excursus into historical hermeneutics and
... 13criticism are steps towards answering that question. Gadamer on
the other hand is concerned with hermeneutics, and is interested in
the implications of the analysis of Understanding for the self-
understanding of the human sciences. Problems of ontology enter his
purview to the extent that particular understandings of Being hinder




text. It is with these rather different aims that Gadamer approaches
Heidegger's analysis of Understanding.
For Heidegger, then, Understanding is:
the original form of the realization of There-being, which
is Being-in-the world. Before any differentiation of
Understanding into the different directions of pragmatic
and theoretical interest, Understanding is There-being's
mode of Being, in that it is potentiality-for-Being and
"possibility" .Ik-
Understanding is an "existential", that is, one of the basic structures
of human existence. This original and basic Understanding, which pre¬
cedes and makes possible all subsequent and, as Heidegger would insist,
derivative kinds of Understanding, is concerned with There-being's
own possibilities. Heidegger calls this directedness of Understanding
towards There-being's own possibilities the "projective" character of
There-being. It is only through this projective activity of There-
being that there is "World" at all; "there is" anything at all only
to the extent that There-being "discovers" or opens up meaning through
its projective activity. However this opening up of "World" through
the projective activity of There-being only takes place as There-
being projects its own possibilities. Thus Understanding is essen¬
tially concerned with itself. All Understanding is self-understanding.
(WM 2ij.6j TM 231) Or as Gadamer puts it: "Thus it is true in all cases
that a person who understands understands himself and projects himself
according to his own possibilities."(ibid.)
li;
WM 2k5; TM 230.
1U
How this understanding of Understanding relates to other
philosophical traditions, for example to the various forms of
empiricism in the English-speaking world, is not Gadamer's primary
concern."'"'' He evidently sees Being and Time as a genuine philoso¬
phical breakthrough and is mainly concerned to defend the existential
analysis of There-being against being misunderstood as another stage
in the development of the transcendental phenomenology of conscious¬
ness, or as some form of moralistic "existentialism" in the manner
of Sartre. He himself goes on to develop the notion of Understand¬
ing in the light of Heidegger's "turn" and is, as we saw, convinced
that this development is not only not problematic, but is a natural
unfolding of the implications of the analysis of Understanding in
Being and Time. Whether it is so easy to move from an Understanding
which, as the projection of There-being's own possibilities, is in a
radical sense self-understanding to an Understanding which involves
a"loss of self"^ is a question we cannot go into here. What is of
more immediate relevance to the development of Gadamer's argument in
Truth and Method is the positive significance which the notions of
"circularity" and "pre-understanding" acquire in Heidegger's analysis
of Understanding.
This positive significance is rooted in the structure of There-
being as "thrown project" /geworfener Entwurf7. The projective
Id
Though Gadamer is keen to effect a rapprochement between Continental
European "phenomenological hermeneutics" and Anglo-Saxon empiricism
on the basis of a common interest in language, cf. KS I lij.6-llj.7j
PH 125-127j also KS III 185-189; PH 173-177; also the introduction
to PH, xxxiii-xxxix.
l6See KS I 75; PH 5l.
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activity of Understanding always operates on the basis of a preceding
understanding of what is to be understood. It is not the case,
(f (y ")
according to Heidegger, that There-being in fact^happens in every
instance to enter into the process of Understanding with some sort
of prior understanding. Finitude is not a regrettable contingency
that inevitably hampers the smooth operation of Understandingj on
the contrary, finitude is what makes Understanding possible at all.
Finitude determines the^structure of There-being. "Thrownness"
/Geworfenheit7 does not mean that consciousness happens as a matter
of fact to find itself here rather than there, now rather than then.
It belongs to the very nature of There-being to be there; it is
17
being there that constitutes human consciousness (or being).
This is one of the meanings that are contained in Heidegger's famous
18
phrase: "The essence of There-being lies in its existence." This
emphasis on "facticity" constitutes the real cleavage between
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's approach,
though as we saw above, Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity" is
not without its ambiguities.
Be that as it may, what interests Gadamer most of all about
the "thrcrwnness" or facticity of Understanding is that it throws
light on his own problem of how the historical sciences should
understand their own relation to their "objects". Not only does
Being and Time undermine the claim of the subject-object schema of
the natural sciences to paradigmatic significance, and hence call
17
We are using the term "consciousness" in this sentence in a loose
way, since Heidegger's use of the term "Dasein" for human beings




in question the idea that the "objects" of the historian are somehow
"out there", over against the "objective" neutrality of the historian
it also suggests the way in which the historian is related to his
"objects". This relation Gadamer characterizes as "belongingness"
or perhaps "participation" /Zugeh6rigkeit7."^ (WM 2k7; TM 232)
Gadamer takes the "thrownness" of There-being to imply that it
belongs to the very structure of There-being to be related to the
past, to tradition, (ibid.) Relating itself to the past is not
something There-being happens to do as one activity among others,
for instance if it resolves to be a professor of history. There-
being always already is related to the pastj what the historian
2Q
does is to make that relation explicit. (WM 23b} TM 2£l) No
doubt that process of making explicit may call for different tech¬
niques, including, some from the domain of the natural sciences.
Gadamer studiously avoids making any pronouncement on the relative
merits of the techniques the historian may use. What he is con¬
cerned to insist upon is that none of these techniques should be
used to define the basic relation of the historian to his subject-
matter. Above all he is concerned to refute the notion that because
the relation of the historian to his subject-matter does not easily
accommodate itself to the demands of the methods of the natural
sciences, it is therefore incapable of yielding knowledge or truth.
19
For a discussion of Gadamer's use of the term "participation"
see Chapter 8(b) below.
^
cf. Gadamer's essay "Was ist Wahrheit?" (KS I l±6-f>8), p.37-
17
Gadamer's aim is to overcome the distorting effects of the
application of an inappropriate yardstick to the historical sciences.
But his intention is not only this negative one of freeing the his¬
torical sciences from the methodological imperialism of the natural
sciences; it is also the positive one of emphasizing the positive
21
significance of "thrownness". "Thrownness" indicates for Gadamer
that relation to tradition in which There-being finds itself and
on the basis of which it is able to project new possibilities of
Being:
The general structure of Understanding acquires its
concrete form in historical Understanding, in that the
ties of custom and tradition and the corresponding
potentialities of one's future become effective in
Understanding itself. There-being that projects
itself in relation to its own potentiality-for-Being
has always "been". This is the meaning of the
existential of "thrownness".^2
Before proceeding to examine Gadamer's presentation of the fore-
structure and circularity of Understanding, it has to be noted that
Gadamer's positive estimate of "thrownness" is very much in accordance
with his own understanding and use of Heidegger. Of course "thrown¬
ness" as an existential or structural component of There-being is
supposed to be neutral and prior to any evaluation. Nevertheless
the role it plays and the emphasis it receives in any particular
system of thought will inevitably affect the significance which is
attached to it. In Being and Time "thrownness" indicates that it
belongs to the essence of There-being to be delivered over or
abandoned to a particular situation at a particular time. This
21
cf. KS I 73; PH k9 where Gadamer writes that "thrownness not only
specifies the limits of sovereign self-possession, but also opens
up and determines the positive possibilities that we are".
22
WM 2k9; TM 23U-
18
"thrownness" is disclosed to There-being in "mood" which always
accompanies There-being's Understanding. Understanding and mood
23
always go together. For the most part There-being attempts to
P)
evade the "thrownness" that is disclosed to it in mood. "Thrown¬
ness", "delivered over", "abandonment" may be structural terms, but
the role they fulfil and the ring they have suggest that what they
refer to is essentially burdensome to human existence. A grimly
Augustinian strain can be detected in Being and Time in which
existence is seen as the arduous task of discovering and remaining
23
true to oneself in a bleak and daunting situation. Without a
commitment to a particular interpretation of Heidegger, it is pcrb»ps
possible to characterize his development in a rough and ready way
as a move from presenting existence as a human task to seeing
existence as "grace", as sheer gift from a trans-human realm. This
move is called the "turn". As has been noted elsewhere, Gadamer
understands Being and Time in light of the "turn". This can be
clearly seen in his treatment of "thrownness" which he positively
characterizes in terms of "belongingness" to or "participation" in
tradition, a presentation which contrasts with Heidegger's association






cf. Heidegger's quotation from Augustine's Confessions X, 16
(BT 69). cf. also W.J. Richardson's discussion of "thrownness"
in Heidegger; Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962J, p.233, where he talks of There-being's
"indigence".
19
It is not the business of this study to attempt a "correct"
interpretation of Being and Time. Indeed from Gadamer's point of
view such an undertaking would be radically misconcieved, since
the ideal of one "correct" interpretation true for all time is in
his view a pernicious illusion generated by the misapplication of
scientific method. For Gadamer, presumably not even the interpre¬
tation of Being and Time by Heidegger himself in the late 1920's
would have paradigmatic significance. The mens auctoris no longer
has absolute precedence. What this means for the status of Truth
and Method itself and for Gadamer's protests against misunderstand¬
ings of his own work is a question which we cannot go into here.
Without a commitment at this stage to a particular view of this
complex of problems, it seems possible to allow that how a work
or a concept is interpreted (not excluding the interpretation of
J +
the author) will depend on his- historical situation and-his aimsoJ-fi&
In this case, how the term "thrownness" is interpreted will depend
upon the historical situation and aims of the interpreter; that is,
how the term "thrown project" is understood will depend precisely
on the situation of the interpreter as "thrown project".
We are on perhaps less controversial ground when we come to
Gadamer's appropriation of Heidegger's analysis of Understanding
and interpretation in terms of fore-structure and circularity.
Gadamer follows Heidegger closely at this point. According to
Heidegger, the fact that all Understanding and interpretation are
26
See BT sec. 32
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rooted in the existential of Understanding, which is a basic structural
component of There-being as "thrown project", means that all Under¬
standing and interpretation are characterized by what Heidegger calls
"the fore-structure of Understanding". There is no presuppositionless
27
apprehending of "what is there". All Understanding is grounded in
fore-having /Vorhab£/^ fore-sight /Vorsicht7, and fore-conception
/Vorgriff7. (ibid.) This means that Understanding is always in a
sense circular, since, as Heidegger says, "Any interpretation which
is to contribute understanding must already have understood what is
2 8
to be interpreted". Heidegger's argument at this point is of key
importance for Gadamer's overall aim, that is, the vindication of
historical enquiry as a source of knowledge and truth 5 for Heidegger
contends that, despite the insistence of logic that circularity in
historical interpretation necessarily represents a vicious circle
and excludes historical interpretation from the domain of rigorous
29
knowledge, nevertheless "the ontological presuppositions of his¬
torical knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigour held in
the most exact sciences".3<3 In other words, the circularity involved
in historical interpretation is not a lamentable defect in comparison
with the methodological purity and rigour of the "exact" sciences,









the fundamental structure of There-being. Hence the knowing of the
historical sciences is not merely another sort of knowing than that
of the "exact sciences". Because of its circular structure it comes
closer to the primordial knowing which constitutes There-being itself.
As Heidegger says, "In the circle is hidden a positive possibility
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of the most primordial kind of knowing".
The recognition of the circular nature of interpretation thus
does not mean that all historical knowledge is therefore "subjective",
"arbitrary", and "relative". Heidegger insists that it is "our first,
last and constant task never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and
fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular concep¬
tions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out
32
these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves." This
sentence takes on programmatic significance for Gadamer. Knowledge,
33
scientific knowledge, occurs when the interpreter risks his pre-
understanding in the encounter with "the things themselves" /die




"Scientific" /wissenschaftlich7 in the broad sense of the term,
rather than in the sense of "having to do with the natural sciences"
/naturwiss enschaftlich7.
J
It is important to distinguish the phenomenological "thing itself"
/die Sache selbst7 from the Kantian "thing-in-itself" /das Ding-an-
sich7* cf. WM Ii.21-l4.32j TM I4.03-I4lll.j_also the essay "The Nature of
Things and the Language of Things /Die Natur der Sache und die Sprache
der Dinge7" (KS I 59-69j PH 69-81), esp. KS I 62fj FH 72f.
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of the text. The initial understanding or projection of meaning is
revised in light of this encounter. Interpretation is a process, a
constant movement to-and-fro between the subject-matter of the text
and the interpreter's continually revised projections of meaning.
It is this "working out" of meaning in the interplay between text
and interpreter that offers in Gadamer's view the possibility of
scientific knowledge and "objectivity" in a rather different sense
from that of the natural sciences:
The working out of appropriate projects, anticipatory
in nature, to be confirmed by "the things themselves",
is the constant task of Understanding. The only
"objectivity" here is confirmation of a fore-meaning
in its being worked out. What characterizes the
arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-meanings if not
the fact that they come to nothing in the working out?
The "objectivity" of the circular process of interpretation
depends on both the pre-understanding of the interpreter and what the
text says in all its otherness coming into play. The interpreter
must put his own pre-understanding at risk. This goes against the
methodological demands of the exact sciences in two ways. First, the
interpreter's own pre-understanding is not to be rigorously excluded
in the interest of "neutrality" or "objectivity", but is to be
brought consciously and explicitly into play. Secondly, the inter¬
preter must in principle be open to accept as true that which may not
conform to his own criteria for truth, i.e. the interpreter may not
limit at the outset what may or may not be true by stipulating that
all truth-claims are subject to his rules of certainty. (WM 3ili+j TM 323)
33
WM 232 j TM 236f.
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In both cases Gadamer is attacking any attempt in historical inter¬
pretation to guarantee truth in advance by methodological rigour -
or alternatively any renunciation of truth in the absence of such
methodological guarantees. The guarantee of truth resides not in
some method established in advance of the Understanding process,
but in the process itself in which pre-understandings are worked
out in interplay with the subject-matter of the text.
The nature of this interplay must be explored later. For the
moment we will summarize Gadamer's indebtedness to Being and Time.
Heidegger's presentation of Understanding as an existential or basic
structural principle of There-being is fundamental to Gadamer's
theory of hermeneutical experience. Heidegger's presentation of
Understanding with its fore-structure and circularity means that
not only is historical interpretation different from, and independent
of, the methods of the exact sciences; it also offers the possibility
of "a more primordial kind of knowing". Thus in Gadamer's view the
attempt to vindicate the knowledge and truth of the human sciences
finds a firm basis in Being and Time. However Gadamer wants to
develop what he believes to be the implications of Heidegger's
analysis of Understanding. The historicality or "thrownness" of
There-being, the principle that its Understanding is always "thrown",
implies in Gadamer's view that There-being always stands in a
relation of "belongingness" to, or participation in, tradition.
The positive estimate of pre-understanding as the condition of all
Understanding leads, in Gadamer's view, to a re-appraisal of the
notion of "prejudice", and it is with this that the next section
will deal.
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(b) Understanding and Prejudice
Heidegger's demonstration of the fundamental role which pre-
understanding plays in the process of Understanding has, in Gadamer's
view, an implication of the greatest importance; it implies that the
notion of "prejudice" /Vorurteil7 stands in need of re-appraisal.
"Prejudice" has a negative connotation. The word itself, however,
means simply "an advance judgment" and only acquired its negative
connotation in the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment, Gadamer
contends, had a prejudice against prejudice, and he intends to expose
this prejudice and effect a rehabilitation of prejudice and the
closely related concepts of authority and tradition. This critique
of the Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice is the place at
which Gadamer's attempt to present an authentic historical hermeneu-
tics has its starting point. The overcoming of this prejudice against
prejudice opens the way, he believes, to an appropriate understanding
of the finitude to which our human existence as well as our historical
consciousness is subject. (WM 260; TM 2I4I4.)
The Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice is grounded in
its confidence in reason as the sole legislator of truth. Prejudice,
authority, tradition are set up as the counter-poles to reason, and
just as these had been rigorously excluded from the understanding
of the natural world, so they were to be excluded from the under¬
standing of the truth of historical, and especially Biblical, texts.
Truth or certainty was to be found in rigorous methodological self-
reflection, while all else was subject to doubt. In the case of
historical texts, and especially the Bible, the truths they contained
were the truths of reason, and these were by their nature free from
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any connection with history. Understanding a text in terms of
history, that is, in terms of its historical context, was only to
be resorted to when what it said was not self-evidently true. And
in this case we were only concerned with the meaning of the text,
not with its truth. Gadamer cite as an example of this Spinoza's
method of interpreting scripture. (WM 169f} TM l59f) Though the
contrast between reason on the one hand, and, on the other, preju¬
dice, authority and tradition, might be presented in varying
degrees of sharpness (WM 257j TM 2I4.2), it nevertheless remained
fundamental to the Enlightenment outlook. The systematic conquest
of mythos by logos may not be in fact realizable, but it nevertheless
remained the ideal of the Enlightenment (ibid.).
However the prejudice against prejudice is not limited to the
Enlightenment period itself. By means of a "curious refraction"
caused by Romanticism (ibid.), it comes to dominate the historical
school of the nineteenth century and its influence can be felt to
the present day. By this "curious refraction" Gadamer means that
although it was a reaction against the Enlightenment, Romanticism
actually perpetuated the basic outlook of the Enlightenment in that
it did not call in question the whole idea of a conquest of mythos
by logos, but simply reversed the evaluation of this supposed process.
Logos and mythos, reason and tradition were still contrasted, only
the dominance of the former over the latter was seen as a baneful
effect of the detested modern civilisation. Rather than looking
for the interpenetration of logos and mythos, reason and tradition,
as Gadamer wants to do, the Romantics merely exalted tradition at
the expense of reason. But as Gadamer rather caustically remarks:
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"Primaeval wisdom is merely the inverse of 'primaeval stupidity'
/Die Urweisheit ist nur das Gegenbild der ,Urdummheit7". (MM 25>8;
TM 2I4.3) Mythos without logos is as much an abstraction as logos
without mythos.
The Romantic exaltation of the past and of "the exotic", that
isj of all that was not tainted by the modern Enlightenment, never¬
theless led to a remarkable expansion of the study of these areas,
and the flourishing of the historical school of the nineteenth
century is largely due to the impetus of Romanticism. However, as
we saw, Romanticism was in a fundamental way still rooted in the
Enlightenment schema, and this shows through in the historical school
of the nineteenth century. Historicism shares with the Enlighten¬
ment the view that tradition which is not "reasonable" can only be
understood historically. However what in the Enlightenment was
resorted to in exceptional cases only (i.e. understanding a text
in terms of its historical context), becomes for historicism the
general rule. (MM 260; TM 2ii.it) It is the rationally intelligible
meaning of a text that becomes the exception, while the "historical"
understanding extends its sway to embrace the whole of the past,
ultimately including the historian's own contemporaries, (ibid.)
Everything is seen in its own terms, that is, "only historically" :
Thus the romatic critique of the Enlightenment ends
itself in enlightenment in that it evolves as a
historical science and sucks everything into the
undertow of historicism. The basic discrediting of
all prejudices, which unites the experiential emphasis
of the new natural sciences with the Enlightenment,
becomes in the historicist Enlightenment universal
and radical.^
1
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Against this discrediting of all prejudices Gadamer wants to
rehabilitate the notion of prejudice. By prejudice, he does not
of course mean anything "subjective" or arbitrary, for example a
personal idiosyncracy. On the contrary, what for him is important
about prejudice is that it gives access to a dimension that pre¬
cedes and grounds all subjective activity, the dimension of history
itself. To locate meaning in history in the experience of the
individual, as Dilthey does, is to turn the real process of his¬
torical Understanding on its head. History does not as it were
belong to us as an accumulation of individual experiences which
we as historians must re-activate; rather we belong to it. (WM 261;
TM 2l|fj) We are there for history rather than vice versa. Thus the
am
prejudices or -unconscious assumptions as individual makes are far
more significant than his explicit and conscious self-awareness.
Playing on the literal meaning of the German word "Vorurteil" as
"pre-judgment", Gadamer says:
The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror.
The self-awareness of the individual is only a
flickering in the closed circuits of historical
life. That is why the prejudices /Vorurteile_7
far more than his judgments /Urteile/gConstitute
the historical reality of his being.
The real edge of Gadamer's attempted rehabilitation of preju¬
dices is however the contention that prejudices are not only the
carriers of the historical process, they are.also the bearers of
truth. This is where his sharp divergence from the Enlightenment
and its successors comes, because for the latter, prejudice is by
2
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definition antithetical to truth. Gadamer does not deny that the dis¬
tinction made by the Enlightenment between faith in authority and the
use of reason is a legitimate one. Faith in authority rather than
trust in the autonomous judgment does give rise to prejudice. The
point is that this does not automatically exclude the possibility that
prejudice may be in fact a source of truth - a point which the
Enlightenment failed to see. (WM 263; TM 2lf7) The concept of authority
is distorted by the Enlightenment and opposed to freedom and reason,
Gadamer claims. In opposition to such a polarization of reason and
authority, Gadamer argues that the bestowal of authority is itself
an act of reason. (WM 263f j TM 2l|8) One recognizes the superior
knowledge of someone else and thereby bestows authority on him or
her. Authority is thus to do with knowledge rather than obedience,
let alone blind obedience, (ibid.) Gadamer, then, resists the polar¬
ization of authority and reason, of tradition and reason. He calls
the Enlightenment extremist, abstract and revolutionary in this
3 ~
respect. (MM 26ij.f; TM 2lj.9) The Romantic reaction has value as a
corrective, but it too maintains the polarization, merely stressing
tradition at the expense of reason. Gadamer wants to undercut the
polarization as such. For him tradition and reason interpenetrate
one another. Tradition persists not out of its own nature but only
because it is affirmed, embraced and cultivated. In its essence
tradition is preservation /Bewahrung7 and preservation is, Gadamer
claims, an act of reason, albeit an inconspicuous one. CWM 26£f;
TM 2^0) It is an illusion that only what is new and planned is the
3
This is the basis of Gadamer's criticism of Habermasj see KS I 119ffj
PH 26ff.
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result of reason. In fact even in times of the most violent change
far more of the old is preserved than anyone knows, and this combines
with the new to create a new value, (ibid.) Preservation, Gadamer
claims, is as much a freely chosen action as revolution and renewal,
(ibid.)
Gadamer's argument at this point would seem to be open to
question. It is one thing for preservation as an act of reason to
be "inconspicuous" /unauffallig7 ; but for it to be by implication
unconscious - since even in times of radical change there is always
preserved "far more of the old than anyone is aware of" (WM 266;
TM 250) - is quite another. How this preservation can be described
as "freely chosen action" /ein Verhalten aus Freiheit7 is far from
clear. The concept of reason /Vernunft/ plays a shadowy but impor¬
tant role in Truth and Method. We have already been told that the
ideal of absolute reason is impossible for man and that:
Reason exists for us only in concrete historical terms
i.e. it is not its own master, but remains constantly
dependent, on the given circumstances in which it
operates.
On the one hand it is clear that Gadamer is following Hegel in
rejecting the Enlightenment concepts of reason and freedom as abstract,
and in presenting reason and freedom as dialectical concepts immanent
in the historical process. Thus he can speak of reason and freedom
that are not conscious of themselves. But for Hegel it was always
the case that reason and freedom at a given stage in history might
not yet be conscious of themselves. This "yet" is of crucial impor¬
tance since it is only on the basis of the total self-awareness or
self-mediation of reason and freedom in Absolute Knowledge that
^
WM 260; TM 2h$
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their presence in history could be asserted at all. Only in the
light of the end, that is, Hegel's own System, could the operation
of reason and freedom be seen in the process. But Gadamer explicitly
rejects in principle the possibility of any such Absolute Knowledge,
or total self-awareness. It seems he wants to appropriate the
immanent, dialectical, historical side of Hegel's thought without
the claim to Absolute Knowledge. But to what extent the dialecti¬
cal concepts of reason and freedom (and also truth) can still have
any claim to be recognized as such without being grounded in a self-
transparent totality is a crucial question for Gadamer's approach.
This question is complicated by the fact that in face of this set
of problems Gadamer has recourse to the work of Heidegger. Heidegger's
notion of language and his notion of play which Gadamer extensively
develops seem to Gadamer to offer a basis on which he can talk of
reason, freedom and above all truth in the context of radical his-
toricality and finitude. It is only from this wider philosophical
perspective that we can see what lies behind Gadamer's problematic
statements about the relation between tradition and reason. Mhether
these statements can be justified is another question, and one that
can only be tackled from within that wider perspective.
The rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice within the con¬
text of the dialectical interpenetration of reason and tradition marks
an advance in Gadamer's quest for a more authentic historical her-
meneutics. Human existence always stands within tradition; human
thought can never turn tradition into an object over against an .
^ cf. David E. Binge's introduction to PH, p.xl.
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isolated subjectivity. ("WM 266j TM 2^0) The significance of this
for historical hermeneutics is that the abstract opposition between
tradition and historical research /Historie/, between living histori¬
cal reality /Geschichte7 and knowledge, must be abandoned. ("WM 267j
TM 2^1) The attitude of the historian is not something radically
new; it is merely an explicit concentration on the relation to the
past, to tradition, which aH human existence has. And as in all
human Understanding, so also in the historian's relation to the
past, tradition plays an essential role. Tradition is a moment
(or structural element) of the historian's understanding of the
past, and this moment should be examined in terms of its hermeneuti-
cal productivity rather than excluded as "mere prejudice". ("WM 266f;
TM 250f)
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(c) Understanding and "the Classical"
Gadamer pushes forward this enquiry into the hermeneutical
productivity of the moment of tradition - or the positive contribu¬
tion of prejudice - in the activity of the historian with a further
attempt to clarify the role that tradition plays In Understanding.
He proceeds to this attempted clarification via a brief examination
of what is involved in the relation of a so-called "classical" work
to the successive generations that encounter it. This examination
need not detain us. 'What emerges, Gadamer claims, is that the term
"classical" does not in its real sense name a particular period or
style. It rather names a relation between work and its successive
audiences. The work is firmly rooted in its own world yet it con¬
tinues to speak authoritatively into subsequent worlds. The appro¬
priate attitude to the work is not - from some vantage point outside
the historical process - to label its form "classical" and perhaps
to derive an aesthetic frisson from the form, relegating the content
to relative insignificance. The appropriate attitude is rather,
from our standpoint within our world, to attend to what the work
says to us from out of its world. "Classical" designates the norma¬
tive status and authority of a work which demands our attention in
this way. To examine further Gadamer's presentation of "the classical"
would involve us in a discussion of his rather complex critique of
modern aesthetics, and this is beyond our present scope."'" For the
moment it is enough to note that Gadamer sees in "the classical" a
phenomenon that, far from being an exceptional case, expresses in a
""
But see Part Two, Chapter 2 below.
particularly clear way the relation that characterizes the
historian's attitude as such. ("WM 27k; TM 2J?8) Indeed the
mediation of past and present that characterizes "the classical"
is rooted in the structure of Understanding itself:
Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an
action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of
of oneself within aprocess of tradition /als Ein-
rucken in ein Uberlieferungsgeschehen7j in which
past and present are constantly mediated. This is
what must be expressed in hermeneutical theory,
which is too much dominated by the idea of a pro¬
cedure, of a method.2
2
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(d) Understanding and Time
We have already noted Gadamer's positive estimate of the exis¬
tential "thrownness" which characterizes all Understanding, and
which he interpreted to mean "belongingness to tradition". The
nature of this "belongingness to tradition" has now been elaborated
to some degree, and in light of this Gadamer proceeds to a closer
examination of the structure of Understanding. He begins by distin¬
guishing the circle of Understanding in Being and Time from the
hermeneutical circle of nineteenth century hermeneutics. This latter
circle was constituted by the to-and-fro movement between whole and
parts which characterized the process of understanding a text. But
according to Gadamer this mutual determination of whole and parts
was seen as a provisional process which was destined, so the nine¬
teenth century theorists believed, to disappear in the complete
understanding of the text. At least in principle, all that was
strange was ultimately to be resolved into perfect intelligibility
(WM 277TM 26l) In Gadamer's view this circle was essentially
methodological, that is, it was concerned with the procedures which
led up to Understanding. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the
circle is ontological, that is, Understanding is in its very nature
circular. Understanding is not the result of circular processj
Understanding is, and always remains, a circular process. Thus the
anticipatory movement of pre-understanding is not dissolved in per¬
fect Understanding but remains a permanent moment of Understanding,
(ibid.)
This pre-understanding is not something that derives from our
own subjectivity. As we have seen, it is tradition itself that pro¬
vides our pre-understandings or prejudices. Not that the tradition
which determines our pre-understandings or prejudices - which are,
as we saw, by nature unconscious - persists by its own momentum,
completely determining human consciousness. Gadamer has already
said that the continuance of tradition is dependent on affirmation,
on preservation. CWM 26£fj TM 2^0) He now asserts that inasmuch as
we understand tradition, we participate in its evolution and further
determine it ourselves. (MM 277j TM 26l) He means by this, as we
shall see shortly, that our meanings or horizon come together with
the horizon of the text we encounter to create a new horizon, or
"fusion of horizons". The question is however, whether his syste¬
matic exclusion of subjectivity from the domain of Understanding
allows of any over-againstness of text and interpreter. If self-
awareness is merely a flickering in the historical process (MM 26lj
TM 21j5), if we are completely dominated by the tradition we belong
to, how is that over-againstness possible which Gadamer presupposes
in his talk of the preservation and co-determination of tradition?
Hermeneutics may have its home in the "between" between the over-
againstness of tradition and the belongingness to tradition.
(MM 279j TM 263) But how, in Gadamer*s own terms, is this "between"
possible? Gadamer believes that the answer to this question is -
time. Following Heidegger, he turns to time as the transcendental
ground of the possibility of experience - in this case the her-
meneutical experience. Time is not to be viewed negatively as
something that separates, that carries off, that hinders and dis¬
rupts the process of Understanding. Time is to be viewed as
positive, as creative, as that which makes Understanding possible
at all:
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Time is no longer primarily an abyss /Abgrund/ to be
bridged because it separates, but is actually the
supportive ground of the process in which the present
is rooted /der tragende Grund des Geschehens, in dem
das Gegenwartige wurzelt/ ... In fact the important
thing is to recognize distance in time as a positive
and productive possibility of Understanding.1
Although Gadamer does not dwell at any length on the move he
makes at this point, but immediately proceeds to give an analysis
of the familiar phenomenon of the difficulty we experience in
evaluating an artistic production before a certain time has elapsed,
it is nevertheless worth bringing into relief the steps he takes
here. In fact Gadamer could be accused of playing down the radicality
of his position here. He says that distance in time is not really a
yawning abyss but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradi¬
tion. (ibid.) But is this not to diminish the force of his positive
view of time as the ground of Understanding - and hence to diminish
its effectiveness in coping with the problem it was introduced to
solve? Perhaps Gadamer is shrinking from the dialectical edge of
his position when he says that historical distance is productive
because it is secretely continuity, rather than insisting that it
is productive as difference, as discontinuity. It is not that time
is not really an abyss /Abgrund/, but that it grounds precisely as
the groundless abyss. In other words, any appropriation of Heidegger's
grounding of Understanding in time cannot evade Heidegger's insis¬
tence on thinking Being as Nothingness - an insistence that Gadamer
elsewhere draws attention to. (MM 2lj.3j TM 288) However much
Gadamer!s two great sources of inspiration, Hegel and Heidegger,
may disagree in their understanding of the phrase "identity -in-
1
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difference", they agree on this., that difference is productive
because it is difference, not because it is identity in disguise.
"Whether or not Gadamer presents his grounding of the movement
of Understanding in temporal distance or difference /der zeitliche
Abstand/ with as much dialectical sharpness as he might, he hastens
to consolidate his contention by drawing attention to the role which
temporal distance plays in evaluating a work of art. The difficulty
in discriminating between contemporary productions is notorious. It
seems that time itself sorts out the wheat from the chaff. Gadamer
is anxious that the significance of this phenomenon should not be
misinterpreted. He agrees that one of the reasons temporal distance
has the effect of discriminating is that it "filters out" those
inessential prejudices which, because they find a point of contact
in a contemporary work, "over-resonate" and as it were cause a
shoft-circuit in the process of Understanding. ("WM 28lf; TM 265)
While this phenomenon is genuine enough, Gadamer disagrees with the
interpretation given of it by historical research. The significance
of temporal distance is not that it extinguishes the life-relation we
have to a work of art or a text, and thus allows us to be disinterested
and "objective". It is rather that it allows the appropriate life-
relation - and indeed new life-relations - to emerge. It is not the
case, Gadamer insists, that time fixes the meaning of a work; on the
2
Such "inessential prejudices" must be distinguished from the con¬
temporary references within a work of art, its "occasionality",
which Gadamer is concerned to defend against what he calls
"aesthetic differentiation" with its devaluation of the role of
content in the work of art; see Part One of Truth and Method
passim, especially the section entitled "The ontological founda¬
tion of the occasional and the decorative".
contrary, it first opens the work to its possibilities of authentic
meaning. The meaning and, as Gadamer irants to say, the truth of a
work are not some fixed entities-in- themselves which we can gain access
to by the rigorous exclusion of our prejudices. The meaning and
truth of the work only exist in the interplay between, on the one
hand, the subject-matter of the work and the horizon or set of
prejudices in which this is setj and on the other hand, the inter¬
preter's concern with that subject-matter within the horizon or set
of prejudices in which he or she is set.
The nature, or as Gadamer wants to say, the logic of this
interplay is complex and will be explored at a later stage. Our
concern here is the role that temporal distance plays in the inter¬
play or circular process that is Understanding. It is clear that
for Gadamer temporal distance is a negative factor which has the
positive function of "opening up" the stream of tradition so that
the over-againstness occurs that allows the process of Understanding
to come into play. The basic relation of the historian to his
objects is one of over-againstness, but this is not the over-
againstness of the subject-object relation of the natural sciences.
This over-againstness is not due to the objectifying activity of
subjectivity or consciousness. It is prior to any subjective
activity, and is rooted in the activity of time itself. Human
understanding is the place, the "there", where the horizons of
meaning or prejudices that have been opened up by the elapse of
time come into play. These prejudices can come properly into play
only to the extent that they become conscious. But for a prejudice
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to become conscious means that it no longer has unquestioned, self-
evident validity} for a prejudice to come into play /ins Spiel
gebracht werden/ it has to be risked /auf dem Spiele gesetzt werden/.
("WM 283} TM 263) For Understanding to take place, our own pre¬
judices have to be suspended, called in question, (ibid.) But this
suspension of prejudice is not in the control of a methodologically
rigorous subjectivity. It is brought about by time itself which
breaches the opacity of unbroken prejudice and opens it to the
claim of the other which addresses it across the creative void of
temporal distance.
However time not only has the function of opening up, as
temporal distance, a space where Understanding may take place. As
we saw above, Gadamer also wants to say that it has the effect of
providing Understanding with the "true" prejudices which allow
authentic meaning to occur:
It is only this temporal distance that can solve the
really critical question of hermeneutics, namely of
distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we
understand, .-from the false ones by which we mis¬
understand.
This sentence raises questions which go to the heart of Gadamer's
philosophical enterprise, and which will recur throughout our study.^
Gadamer seems to be saying here that an ontological principle (i.e.
time or temporal distance) which allows Understanding to be at all
is also in some sense a logical principle in that it is involved in
^ DM 282} TM 266 (Gadamer's italics).
^ See especially Chapter 7 below ("Language, Truth and Correctness").
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the decision about the truth or falsehood of particular prejudices.
But while the present writer can see how temporal distance can open
up the space where that decision may be worked out, he is unable to
see how temporal distance could be involved in the actual process
in which that decision is worked out, since an ontological principle
is strictly neutral with regard to the determinate content of that
which it lets be.
However while it may be difficult to see how time can affect
the determinate contents and the particular (ontic) understandings
that are the result of the (ontological) Understanding process, that
process is nevertheless effected by time and remains a thoroughly
temporal or historical process. History is always at work /wirkt7
in Understanding; it is a real /wirklich/ and potent /wirksam7
moment in Understanding. Hence Gadamer writes:
In appropriate hermeneutics would have to show the
reality /Wirklichkeit/ of history within Understanding
__
itself. I call this "effective-history" /Wirkungsgeschichte7?
Understanding is in essence an effective-historical process.
We will further explore this "effective-historical process" in the
next section.
^ WM 283; TM 267
la
(e) Understanding and "Effective-History"
Effective-history is at work in all Understanding. This is so
whether we are aware of it or not. A "naive" faith in method which
tries rigorously to exclude the effect of history on Understanding
may succeed in distorting Understanding, but even when the historical
moment is explicitly denied., Gadamer claims, it nevertheless prevails.
(WM 28^j TM 268) As a structural moment of Understanding, history
cannot fail to be at work in Understanding. Nevertheless it is
imperative that scientific self-awareness should attain to an
explicit consciousness of effective-history, (ibid.) But effective-
history can never wholly be brought to consciousness. It will be
recalled that in contrast to the pretensions of nineteenth century
hermeneutics Gadamer insisted on the fact that the circle of Under¬
standing cannot be dissolved (even if only in principle) in perfect
intelligibility, but that the moment of pre-understanding remains
a permanent feature of the circular process of Understanding. (WM 277j
TM 26l) Another way of saying this is to say that "thrownness" -
as an existential - remains a permanent feature of human Understanding,
and that the polemical edge of Being and Time against Husserl's trans¬
cendental phenomenology was precisely its insistence on the impossi¬
bility of getting back behind one's own facticity or "thrownness"
into a sphere of ideal intelligibility. (WM 2^0 j TM 23i|.) Again, to
bring effective-history to consciousness in its entirety would be
to tread the path of Hegel's Absolute Knowledge. But Gadamer says
that the hermeneutics he is advocating would take the path of Hegel
in precisely the opposite direction. If in this context Hegel's
concept of■"substance" refers to the historical pre-givenness which,
U2
as the bearer of all subjective activity, prescribes and limits the
possibilities of Understanding a piece of tradition; then Gadamer
wants to reverse Hegel's path from substance to subject "until we
can show in all subjectivity the substantiality that determines it".
CWM 236; TM 269) In all this Gadamer is insisting on the radical
historicality of human Understanding. To know history in its
entirety would mean the end of history. To be historical means
for Gadamer not to transcend oneself in total self-knowledge /nie
im Sichwissen aufgehen7. (WM 289; TM 269) let this renunciation of
any sort of total self-knowledge or knowledge of the totality of
history, even if only in principle,does not mean that knowledge
of truth is unattainable by human beings. The fundamental claim of
Truth and Method is that truth is available to human finitude CWM 28i|f;
TM 268), that knowledge is a possibility for finite Understanding,
and that this truth and this knowledge are to be had in the openness
to that which works powerfully in human Understanding (i.e. effective-
history), and not in the closedness of the methods of the natural
sciences.
To achieve a strictly scientific hermeneutics means to recog¬
nize the inadequacy of the methods of the natural sciences here, and
to become conscious of the operation of effective history in Under¬
standing. This consciousness, as we have seen, can never be total.
This is what distinguishes Gadamer from, for instance, Pannenberg
and his claim for provisional knowledge of the totality of history;
see Pannenberg's article "Hermeneutics and Universal History",
trans. Paul J. Achtemeier in History and Hermeneutic (Journal for
Theology and the Church, IV), ed. Robert ¥. Funk (New York; Harper
and Row, 1967), pp.122-192. The original article (ZTE 69 (1963),
pp.90-121) is also translated by George H. Kehm in Pannenberg's
Basic Questions in Theology, I (London: SGM, 1970), pp.96-136.
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In order to express this, Gadamer introduces the concepts of the
situation and of the horizon. It belongs to the nature of being in
a situation that we cannot hare the sort of complete knowledge of it
that presupposes that we are already outside of it. (WM 283; TM 269)
Similarly "horizon" indicates the fact that thought is tied to its
finite determinateness. (WM 286; TM 269) The task for hermeneutics
is to show how the process of Understanding takes place when all
Understanding takes place within a horizon. Gadamer is suspicious
of any attempt to understand the horizon of the other as such. This
sort of "understanding" may hare its place in certain circumstances^
for example in an examination or in an interriew between doctor and
patient., where the aim of the "conrersation" is to discorer the
horizon of the student or patient as such. What is significant in
these pseudo-conrersations is that the standpoint of the person
attempting to understand is exempted from any part in the process of
Understanding. The consequence of this is that; in principle; what
the other says cannot be true. What he or she says is only a means
towards establishing his or her perspectire or horizon. Real Under¬
standing; according to Gadamer; is not the attempt to discover the
other's horizon as such; but is the coming to an understanding or
agreement /Verstandigung7 with someone about something.
Although understanding a historical text is only analogous to
a conversation; nevertheless it too must be protected from this type
of pseudo-understanding that is the great weakness of historicism.
Historicism falls into this trap when it attempts to understand a
2
On the above; cf. Part One; Chapter b below.
hh
text entirely in a text's own terms, within the text's "own historical
perspective". Then it thinks it understands what the text "means",
without itself agreeing with it /ohne dass man sich doch mit ihr und
in ihr versteht/. ("WM 287j TM 270) In these circumstances the text
cannot say anything true:
The text that is understood historically is formally
deprived of its claim to say anything true. When we
see tradition from the historicist standpoint, that
is, place ourselves in the historical situation and
try to reconstruct the historical horizon, we think
we understand. But in truth we have abandoned the
claim to find in tradition any truth which is valid
and intelligible for ourselves.3
The assumption that in Understanding a historical text we can dis¬
regard ourselves is fundamentally wrong-headed, Gadamer believes.
In placing ourselves in the situation of the other, who do we place
but ourselves? (WM 2885 TM 272) And we are who we are only within
our own horizon. Are we then faced with a series of independent self-
contained horizons in which the occupants are imprisoned? Gadamer
dismisses as an abstraction the notion of a closed horizon which
encloses a culture, as the cultural equivalent of solipsism. (WM 288;
TM 27l) In Gadamer's view, a horizon is not something fixed, static,
but is always already moving. It belongs to the historical!ty of
human existence that it is not bound to one standpoint, but is always
on the move. "For someone on the move, horizons shift." (WM 288;
TM 271) The real problem Gadamer faces, however, is not how to show
that horizons shift. The problem of the fixed horizon, like that of
solipsism, can be shown to be a pseudo-problem, an abstraction, by
3
WM 287; TM 270
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ail appeal to experience. The real question for Gadamer is how there
can be any continuity between these shifting horizons, how there can
be any unity in the undoubted diversity. Gadamer's solution is
language itself, or the "centre of language", which mediates all
intelligibility. Hence we must postpone our discussion of the
problem of the One and the Many in Gadamer until our chapters on
language.^
Understanding, then, involves two horizons, the horizon of the
text and that of the interpreter. Neither may be disregarded, either
by naive assimilation or by "objective" historicism. Neither stands
in splendid isolation, is "for itself" only. The horizon of the
interpreter, that of the present, is no more fixed than that of the
past 3 it is constantly being formed, and this formation /Bildung7
takes place precisely in the encounter with the past. (WM 289'} TM 273)
The horizon of the past is not accessible to us "in itself" (as
historicism would like to think, even if only as an ideal limiting
case) but always and only "for us". Thus it is not the case, according
to Gadamer, that there are first of all two distinct horizons, as it
were simply "given", which are subsequently related to each other.
Each horizon is recognized in its distinctness only by being dis¬
tinguished from the other, and this distinguishing is reciprocal.
(WM 289, TM 272) The work of Understanding is to bring together the two
horizons that have been thus distinguished. Gadamer calls this
process the blending or fusion of horizons /Horizontverschmelzung73
thus "Understanding is always the occurrence of the fusion of these
horizons which we imagine to exist 'for themselves'", (ibid.)
^ cf. especially chapter 8(a) and (b) below.
The adequate historical hermeneutics which Gadamer envisages will
be one which consciously develops the difference between its own
horizon and that of the text only to overcome this difference by
fusing these two together into a new horizon which contains both.
In Gadamer1s words :
The historical consciousness is conscious of its own
otherness and so distinguishes the horizon of what is
handed down from its own horizon. On the other hand,
it is itselfj as we tried to show, merely as it were
superimposed over a tradition continually at work,
and so immediately retrieves that which it distinguished
from itself, so that it may, in the unity of the his- ^
torical horizon thus acquired, mediate itself to itself.
*
MM 290; TM 273
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(f) Understanding and Subjectivity
In this attempt to sketch out the basis for an adequate historical
hermeneutics Gadamer tries to affirm what is true and expose what is
false in both the unselfconscious assimilation of the past by the naive
attitude to history, and the self-denying "objectivity" of historicism.
The naive attitude is true insofar as it relates the past to its present
horizon, that is, fuses the horizons of past and present into the unity
of one horizon^ it is false insofar as it fails to take into account
the difference between these horizons. Historicism is the reverse of
the naive attitude in that it rightly stresses the difference between
the horizons, yet fails to see that this difference only arises out of
the relation between these two horizons in the Understanding, which is
itself precisely the process of transforming this difference into unity.
To use Hegelian terminology, in which this section of Truth and Method
already abounds, the difference in horizons is posited only to be can¬
celled, transcended and preserved /aufgehoben7. In Gadamer's own words:
The projection of the historical horizon is thus only
a phase or moment in the fulfilment of Understanding,
and does not become fixed in the self-estrangement of
a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own
present horizon of Understanding. In the fulfilment
of Understanding there occurs a true fusion of horizons,
which, as the historical horizon is projected, simul¬
taneously cancels, transcends and preserves it.l
The main question at this point would seem to be how all this
dialectical activity on the part of the historical consciousness relates
to Gadamer's critique of subjectivism and his grounding of the process
of Understanding in a trans- or non-subjective activity. Gadamer has
1
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stressed the priority of tradition over any subjective contribution
to the process of Understanding. Tradition provides the horizons
or prejudices which are brought into play in the event of Understand¬
ing. Time first makes Understanding possible by opening up a space
where Understanding may take place. Time also, Gadamer would have
us believe, somehow selects which prejudices are to be brought into
play. Sometimes the impression is given that human Understanding
is merely the place, the "there", where tradition, as it were, plays
with itself. Yet now Gadamer seems to be saying that it is the
historical consciousness which projects the historical horizon, that
the historical difference is posited by the historical consciousness
in order to mediate itself to itself. To put this contrast crudely)
sometimes it seems as if man were there for history, and at other
times as if history were there for man.
Gadamer would probably counter these observations by saying
that the historical consciousness does not actively constitute the
horizons, nor the difference between them, nor their fusion. The
role of the historical consciousness is to bring to explicit conscious¬
ness that which happens of its own accord. Standing firmly in the
phenomenological tradition going back to Hegel, Gadamer would probably
claim to be describing the movement or activity of "the things them¬
selves", and not in any way contributing to that activity, except
perhaps in the negative way of preventing distorted interpretations
of this activity from hindering its smooth operation. Thus the
historical difference would not in fact be posited by historical
consciousness) the activity of the latter would consist rather "in
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not covering up the difference in naive assimilation but in consciously
unfolding it". (WM 290; TM 273) And yet the term "projection"
/lntwurf7 of the historical horizon raises the question of how it
conforms with the fact that according to Gadamer, it is the other
that asserts itself? These apparent difficulties are no doubt con¬
nected with the fact that Gadamer sees an essential unity in the
work of Heidegger, which would permit him to use a term like "projec¬
tion", which comes from the existential analytic of Being and Time,
in a context which receives its main inspiration from the writings
of Heidegger after the "turn". From this perspective any difficulties
of the sort we have mentioned would in the end be merely terminological.
The terminology of Being and Time may be ill-suited to express the
thought of Heidegger after the"turn" but there is no real conflict
here. Indeed, according to Gadamer, the so-called "turn" is already
implicit in Being and Time. As we have seen, Gadamer plays down the
differences between the earlier and later Heidegger. But the transi¬
tion from Being and Time to the later work may be more problematic
than Gadamer allows for. The dialectic of activity and passivity in
the Understanding process which R.E.Palmer finds in Gadamer and
2
prefers to the passivity which he says characterizes later Heidegger
may be more open to question than Palmer believes. However the
validity of Gadamer'S interpretation of Heidegger must remain for
2
See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1969), pp.2l6f. According to John Macquarrie the development
of Heidegger's thought as a whole constitutes a "massive dialectic";
see his Martin Heidegger (London: Lutterworth, 1968), pp.8ff; also
his article "Heidegger's Earlier and Later Work Compared" in Thinking
About God (London: SCM, 1975), pp.191-203- Such a dialectic is dif¬
ferent -from, though no doubt related to, a "dialectic of the Under¬
standing" in Palmer's essay.
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us an open question, the pursuit of which would take us too far from
our present task.
We may come at this question about the "subjective" dimension
of Gadamer's hermeneutics from a slightly different angle by asking
about the relation between the process of Understanding and the historical
consciousness's consciousness of that process. Gadamer tells us that
the historical consciousness does not cover up the difference between
text and interpreter in naive assimilation, but "consciously unfolds
it". What exactly does he mean by this latter phrase? Although
Gadamer would want to say, as we have seen, that historical con¬
sciousness does not have a constitutive role in the Understanding
process, but merely describes what takes place, it is difficult to
banish the impression that in fact it is only with the activity of
historical consciousness described here that the process of Under-
3
standing functions fully. Gadamer may give us to believe that the
only way historical consciousness contributes to the process of
Understanding is in the negative way of preventing distorted inter¬
pretations of the Understanding process from hampering that process.
But disguised in that negative is the positive implication that only
with this remedial activity of historical consciousness does the
Understanding process take place properly at all. Then we may legiti¬
mately ask: in what sense does bringing the historical difference to
consciousness make the difference effective for the first time? To
say that historical consciousness "unfolds" the difference strongly
3
cf. the essay "Hermeneutics and Historicism" where Gadamer stresses
the need for a consciousness of the pre-understanding that is always
in play, if we are to be serious about the scientific nature of our
work. (WM U95, note 2j TM 536, note lj.0. Gadamer's italics)
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suggests that it first brings the difference fully into play. The
fact that Gadamer resolves the opposite errors of the na'ive attitude
to history and of historicism with his own dialectical concept of
the fusion of horizons suggests that in some sense Understanding
does not come fully into its own until the appearance of Gadamer's
own description of Understanding. This is not to suggest that
Gadamer is proclaiming a new ideal of Understanding which prior to
him was in some sense non-existent5 the structure that Gadamer des¬
cribes is, he would claim, absolutely prior, in this sense trans¬
cendental, and immanent in all Understanding. Our suggestion is
that this immanent structure does not actually fulfil itself until
made fully conscious and that takes place for the first time in
Gadamer's description of Understanding.
The question then forces itself on us: is there implicit in
Gadamer's treatment of Understanding something similar to what Hegel
explicitly claimed - that reason, as the structure of reality, is
absolutely prior to the world and history, and yet is only fully
itself when it becomes conscious of itself through the development
of the cosmic process, specifically in Hegel's own description of
that development towards self-consciousness? Certainly Gadamer
would disclaim any such absolutization of his own position. He
constantly stresses the need to take seriously the finitude and
historicality of human thought. But at this point there is a temp¬
tation to make the move so beloved of Idealism, that is, to question
the relation of a statement of a principle to the principle which is
stated (e.g. the statement "there is no truth" presupposes that it
itself is true). Gadamer is wary of what he calls such "specious"
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logic. But how exactly does Gadamer's assertion of radical histori-
cality relate to radical historicality? It seems that for Gadamer
to say what he wants to say, that is, to take seriously both the
reality of history and the reality of reason (or intelligibility)
in history, he can hardly avoid (though he continually strives to
do so) some position at least analogous to Hegel's.
In response to such a suggestion Gadamer, as we have seen,
could claim with a certain degree of plausibility that in his des¬
cription of Understanding the historical consciousness does not
have any constitutive role. But in doing so he would merely be
fending off something analogous to "subjective idealism" (it is
perhaps significant that Being and Time is sometimes seen - mistakenly
Gadamer would assert - as propounding something akin to "subjective
idealism"). Hegel too rejected "subjective idealism",'' yet he is
accused of "subjectivism", for instance when Gadamer announces his
intention to reverse Hegel's move from substance to subject. (WM 286 j
TM 269) This "subjectivism" would consist in the fact that in the
development of the world culminating in art, religion and philosophy,
and ultimately in Hegel's own philosophy, the Idea mediates itself
to itself, that is, it becomes a Self or a Subject. Human thought,
human consciousness, is where reason fulfils itself. But this seems
not too far removed from Gadamer's own position. In his attempt to
overcome subjectivism via the concept of play, Gadamer himself calls
the work of art or the game the real "subject" of the play process.
^ WM 327; TM 308f. cf. MM U22f j TM l|.06f; see also our next'.chapter,
passim.
^ See J.N. Findlay's Hegel: A Re-Examination (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1958)* pp.22f, 289.
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(WM 98, 102; TM 92, 95f) The question which poses itself is this:
is Gadamer as much - or as little - a "subjectivist" as Hegel? That
Gadamer is sensitive to this issue can be seen in his essay "The
Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century" when he asks
whether the critique of the subject in our century is anything more
than a repetition - and an inferior repetition at that - of the
achievement of German Idealism. (KS I lip-j PH 119) However Gadamer
rejects such a suggestion on the grounds that modern thought differs
radically from German Idealism because of what he calls the latter's
naivete with regard to the assertion (see KSI ll|l-3;PH119-122), to
reflection (see KSI ll|.3-5 jFH 122-125), and to the concept (see KSI 115-7
PH 125-127). Gadamer's pages on the naivete of reflection will be
referred to in the following chapter which is devoted to the problem
of reflexive philosophy. However it is beyond our present scope to
describe and discuss all these various forms of Idealism's so-called
naivete. What in Gadamer's view they have in common is their failure
to recognize the radical historicality and non-subjective nature of
human existence and Understanding. We always are and understand
more than we know we are and understand. But is it necessarily so
naive to ask about the status of our knowledge of this ignorance?
And is it not the case that Gadamer's play of Understanding cannot
fully and properly take place until it is known as play? Perhaps it
is more difficult than it seems to purge all traces of "subjectivity"
and "consciousness" from the Understanding process. The human mind
has a tenacious tendency towards self-transcendence, towards becoming
aware of its own awareness. Gadamer's grappling with this tendency
will be the theme of the following Chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LIMITS OF REFLEXIVE PHILOSOPHY
The question which arose at the end of the previous chapter as
to the relation between the event or process of Understanding and the
explicit consciousness of that event or process could be formulated
in a more general and formal way as the question as to how Gadamer
can maintain his insistence on the radical finitude and historicality
of Understanding in face of the reflexivity which certain philosophers
would claim was inherent in all knowledge. Does not the characteris¬
tic of human thought to turn back on itself, to know its own knowing,
mean that human thought has an inherent tendency to self-transcendence
which can only come to rest when the knower, the known and the know¬
ing are so united that further differentiation is impossible? And
leaving aside the question of the attainability of this all-embracing
term of human thought, must we not ask whether the reflexive or self-
transcending nature of human thought does not mean at the very least
that the attempt to present Understanding as sheerly historical and
unsurmountably finite is self-refuting? Or as Gadamer himself puts
it, do not the immanent laws of reflexion dissolve the immediacy
of the effective-historical consciousness whose characteristic feature
is its dependance on, and determination by, history and tradition?
(WM 32kj TM 306) And if we insist on the immediacy of the effective-
historical consciousness, is not the very possibility of historical
Understanding undermined? Are we not forced to admit that Hegel was
right, and to accept that hermeneutics can only be grounded in the
absolute mediation of history and truth? (ibid.)
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It is with this clutch of questions that Gadamer begins his
analysis of the effective-historical consciousness in terms of the
concept of experience and the logic of the question. The latter
notions are in effect intended to provide an answer to precisely
these questions. They represent an attempt to work out a concept
of Understanding as effective-historical consciousness which will
take with full seriousness the claim of reflexive philosophy in
general, and of Hegel in particular, to have overcome dialectically
any attempt to impose limits on human thought. The analysis of
effective-historical consciousness begins with a section entitled
significantly (and perhaps a little ironically) "The Limits of
Reflexive Philosophy".
An important consideration which leads Gadamer to come to
terms with Hegel's reflexive philosophy is that although much of
nineteenth century post-Hegelian thought on the problems of his¬
torical Understanding more or less explicitly disavowed Hegel, and
tended to invoke Schleiermacher or Humboldt rather than Hegel
(VJM 32b; TM 306), in point of fact, Gadamer claims, it had not got
beyond Hegel at all; nor had it (nor had Schleiermacher or Humboldt
for that matter) attained a position which was independent of Hegel.
For it the miracle of historical Understanding was ultimately grounded
in the infinity of knowledge, in the Absolute where thought and
Being interpenetrate. CWM 32l4fj TM 306) According to Gadamer the
criticism of reflexive philosophy that applies to Hegel applies also
to the whole development of the historicist perspective from Schleiermacher
to Dilthey. For this reason it is important for Gadamer's proposed
approach to the problem of historical Understanding to wrestle with
the claim of reflexive philosophy as exemplified by Hegel. Gadamer
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wants to take to heart the criticism of Hegel by the Young Hegelians
(WM 325; TM 306) without taking flight into irrationalism (WM 325;
TM 307).
Despite his resolve to resist the lure of reflexive philosophy,
Gadamer nevertheless fully acknowledges the compelling power of Hegel's
thought. Hegel's critics have never really been able to break the
spell of his reflexive philosophy, he says, (ibid.) Hegel's presenta¬
tion of the self-mediation of the Absolute Idea, especially in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, is such that there can never be a fixed,
independent standpoint on the basis of which one could resist the
power of the Idea to draw all isolated entities into its dialectical
development towards total self-presence. There is no entity which is
so irreducibly immediate that it is not susceptible of being integrated
through the all-powerful movement of mediation into the developing
totality. The limits Kant had tried to impose on the infinite expan¬
sion of thought are swept aside with the critique of the "thing-in-
itself" and with the dialectic of the limit. The unknowable "thing-
in-itself" is only "in-itself" for consciousness, that is, it is merely
a moment in the development of consciousness; and to know a limit as a
limit implies that our knowledge goes beyond the limit. (MM 325f;
TM 307) It is vain to oppose some irreducible Other to the dialecti¬
cal process of mediation; for this process is precisely about dis¬
covering the self in the Other and thereby becoming reconciled with
the Other. The objections of Kierkegaard and Feuerbach are taken
care of in advance in the Phenomenology of Spirit. (WM 326; TM 308)
According to Gadamer such objections are always self-refuting:
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The insistence on immediacy - whether of bodily nature,
of the Thou which makes claims on us, of the impenetr¬
able factuality of historical chance, or of the reality
of the relations of production - is always self-refuting
insofar as it is no immediate attitude but a reflective
activity.^
Yet despite the apparent irresistibility of the reflexive argu¬
ment, Gadamer nevertheless wants to question its validity] does it,
he asks, correspond to "a factual truth" /einer sachlichen Wahrheit7?
(MM 326f] TM 308) In the end, he claims, it is impossible for the
arguments of reflexive philosophy to obscure the fact that the
criticism of speculative thought from the standpoint of finite human
consciousness contains some truth, (ibid.) That scepticism or rela¬
tivism are self-refuting to the extent that they claim to be true may
be an irrefutable argument. But what, Gadamer asks, is thereby achieved?
(MM 327] TM 308f) It is not the reality of scepticism or relativism
that is thereby called in question, but that of formal argument.
(MM 327] TM 309) This sort of argument is the descendant of the argu¬
ments of the Greek sophists. Their great critic Plato had already
seen that there is no way of distinguishing on the level of argument
between a genuinely philosophical use of language and a sophisitcal
one, Gadamer claims] the fact that an argument can be formally refuted
does not necessarily tell against its truth, (ibid.)
But Gadamer does not want to include Hegel in his condemnation
of sophistry. Hegel is, he claims, above such argumentative formalism.
(MM 328] TM 310) Hegel also opposed the empty arguments of the Under¬
standing /der Verstand7j which he called "external reflexion". His
1
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attempt to achieve a total mediation of history and the present is
not a matter of reflexive formalism; it is an attempt to think
through to the end the dimension of history which is also the matter
with which hermeneutics in general and Gadamer in particular is con¬
cerned. (ibid.) For this reason Gadamer's presentation of the
effective-historical consciousness must be worked out with constant
reference to Hegel, (ibid.) This elaboration will begin with an
examination of experience, since the way in which Hegel's Spirit
returns to itself is not through any merely formal "Aufhebung" of
its self-alienation, but through experience which experiences reality
and is itself real. ("WM 329; TM 310)
Gadamer's rejection of reflexive philosophy is not then intended
to be a refutation, since he is calling in question the "factual
truth" of reflexive philosophy despite the irrefutability of its
arguments. Is he then indulging in a form of stone-kicking, that is,
appealing to immediate experience despite his recognition that such
an appeal is, from a formal point of view, self-refuting? Gadamer at
this point does seem to be making an appeal to experience, to our
"sense of reality". And although he will not attempt to demonstrate
formally the truth of his rejection of reflexive philosophy, he will
nevertheless attempt in some measure to justify it by giving an
account of experience which will attempt to show, if not to demon¬
strate rigorously, that the finite structure of experience is the
authentic mode of human Understanding.
Before turning to this analysis of experience, it is perhaps
worth drawing attention to other references in Gadamer's published
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■writings to the problem of reflexive philosophy. In his essay "The
2
Phenomenological Movement" (1963)^ he suggests that Kant's insis¬
tence on the limits of human thought must be seen as in some sense
final:
It seems to me that it is essential for taking finitude
seriously as the basis of experience of Being that such
experience renounce all dialectical supplementation.
Certainly it is "obvious" /einleuchtend7 that finitude
is a privative determination of thought and as such
presupposes infinity., and also that "phenomenological
immanence" presupposes its opposite, transcendance, or
history, or (in another way) nature. Who will deny
that? I believe, however, that we have learned once and
for all from Kant that such "obvious" ways of thought
can mediate no possible knowledge to us finite beings.
Dependence on possible experience and demonstration by
means of it remains the alpha and omega of all respons¬
ible thought.3
It is unclear whether Gadamer thinks that Kant could be said to have
demonstrated the unsurmountable finitude of human thought, although in
view of what he says in Truth and Method this seems unlikely. What is
clear is that he does not dispute the "obviousness" of the reflexive
argument. But despite this "obviousness" he takes his stand with
Kant on the finitude of human thought. It is significant, however,
that he finds it necessary to re-introduce the idea of the infinite
in the following paragraph when he says that our thinking is based
on language which is "finite in an infinite way". What exactly
Gadamer means by "finite in an infinite way" will be examined at a
later stage. For the moment it is sufficient to note this example
2
KS III 150-1893 PH 130-181
KS III I8I4.5 PH 172. The English translation has missed out a line
of the original. For the definitiveness of Kant on this issue, cf.
WM xxii; TM xxiv.
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of the way in which the characteristic motifs of reflexive philosophy
tend to re-appear in Gadamer's writings - no doubt in a radically
modified form - despite his repudiation of such philosophy.
In the essay "The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth
Century" (1962Gadamer discusses what he calls "the naivete of
reflexion", which, as we saw in the previous chapter, along with the
naivete of the concept and the naivete of the assertion /des Setzens7
separates contemporary thought from that of German Idealism. This
passage is significant for our present concern because here Gadamer
does seem to offer some form of argument against reflexive philosophy.
He argues here that not all knowledge or consciousness is objectify¬
ing. For example, when I hear a musical note, I am also conscious
of my hearing of that note. But this consciousness is "non-
objectifying" 5 my hearing is not the object of subsequent reflection.
A note is always a "heard note", that is, my awareness of my hearing
is always an integral element of the note's being heard. Gadamer
claims that this is what Aristotle meant by calling every aisthesis
an aAsth.B'sis aisthBseos:
Every perception is perception of the perceiving and of
the perceived in one, and in no way contains "reflection"
in the modern sense. Aristotle gives the phenomenon as
it showed itself to him, namely, as a unity. Aristotle's
commentators were the first to systematize and to asso¬
ciate the perception of the perceiving with the concept
of koins" aisthBsis which Aristotle had used in another
connection.5
This idea found its way via Brentano into modern phenomenology, and
in particular is of fundamental importance to the work of Heidegger,
^ KS I 131-11*8; PH 107-129
* KS I Ilk; PH 123
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Gadamer says. Its importance lies above all in the fact that it
■undermines the movement of reflexivity before the latter gets underway.
The indubitable fact that we are aware of our own awareness is accounted
for by this theory without assuming that our awareness of our awareness
is of the same order as the original awareness.^ The idea that there
can be a consciousness which accompanies our consciousness but is of
a different sort (i.e. is "non-objectifying") would seem, if valid, to
prevent the self-transcending ascent of consciousness from getting off
the ground.
This idea of a non-objectifying consciousness which accompanies
consciousness was expressed by Heidegger, Gadamer tells us, in terms
of the actus exercitus in contrast to the actus signatus, a distinction
which Heidegger derived from scholastic philosophy and turned to his
7
own ends. As Gadamer writes in "Heidegger and Marburg Theology" (I96I4):
Heidegger was dealing with a scholastic distinction and
spoke of the difference between the actus signatus and
the actus exercitus. These scholastic concepts corres¬
pond roughly to the concepts "reflexive" and "immediate"
and mean, for example, the difference that there is
between asking/question and being able to direct atten¬
tion explicitly to questioning as questioning . . .
To cancel this transition from the immediate and
direct into the reflexive intention seemed to us at
that time to be a way to freedom. It promised a 0
liberation from the inescapable circle of reflection . . .
cf. WM b2hi TM U07 where Gadamer writes: "It is one of the prejudices (!)
of reflexive philosophy that it understands as a relationship of
propositions that which is not at all on the same logical level".
7 KS I 82-92j PH 198-211
8
KS I 8£j PH 202
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The consequence of this idea for Gadamer's concept of Under¬
standing as effective-historical consciousness is that in historical
Understanding (and for Gadamer all Understanding is in the end
historical) it is not our consciousness that is ultimately the deter¬
mining factor. Indeed in "Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth
Century" Gadamer doubts whether our usual notion of consciousness as
consciousness of something is an appropriate way of conceiving the
Understanding process at all (KS I 1bS, PH 125) What is determinative
in the Understanding process or event, Gadamer wants to say, is the
being-understood of the object that comes to language in the Under¬
standing event. Our awareness of this event of Understanding is not
consciousness of it in the sense of objectifying consciousness, that
is, not a consciousness that from a position of detached reflection
can take cognizance of this event. By analogy with the "heard tone",
the aisthesis aisthSseos of Aristotle according to Gadamer, our
awareness of the event in some sense inheres in the event itself.
No doubt we can subsequently turn the event of Understanding into an
object of detached reflection (as Gadamer arguably does in Truth and
Method) the actus exercitus may no doubt become the actus signatus j
but this is to engage in another event of Understanding -which cannot
contribute directly to the first. By making the object that comes
to language in the event of Understanding determinative, and by
granting us an awareness of that event only by participation in it,
Gadamer seeks to deprive reflexive consciousness of its autonomy
Vis-a-vis the object, and hence of its ability to elevate /aufhebery7
the isolated object into the developing totality of thought. Such
continuity as there is between events of Understanding resides in
the object, not in the dialectical development of consciousness.
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Understanding thus envisaged remains dependent on the object which
it cannot elevate into the dialectical play of infinite consciousness,
though human consciousness may be elevated into the dialectical play,
finite and historical through and through, of objects that have come
to be in language. In this latter case consciousness is what Gadamer
calls effective-historical consciousness. In his own words:
The "Understanding" that Heidegger described as the basic
movement of There-being is not an "act" of subjectivity
but a mode of Being. By proceeding from the special case
of the Understanding of tradition, I myself have shown
that Understanding is always an event. The issue here
is not simply that a non-objectifying consciousness
always accompanies the process of Understanding, but
rather that Understanding is not suitably conceived at
all as a consciousness of something, since the whole
process of Understanding_itself enters into an event,
is brought about by it /"von ihm gezeitigt wird" might
also have been translated, following Heidegger, "is
temporalized by it^7j and is permeated /durchwirkt/7 by
it. The freedom of reflection, this apparent self-
sufficiency /Bei-sich-selbst-sein7, does not occur at
all in Understanding, so much is Understanding deter¬
mined by the historicality of our existence.9
How much weight, then, is Gadamer prepared to lay upon what we
might for the sake of convenience refer to as the actus exercitus idea
Whether the fact that in the passage quoted above from "Heidegger and
Marburg Theology" Gadamer says that "at that time", that is, in
Heidegger's Marburg years (1923-8), it seemed to him to be "a way to
freedom" should be taken to indicate a subsequent waning of confidence
is not entirely clear. The fact that he does not make reference to
this idea in Truth and Method when he is explicitly concerned with
the refutation of reflexive philosophy is perhaps significant. On
9
KS I lh5>j PH 123
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the other hand, in "Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century"
he seems to attach considerable importance to this idea as a weapon
with which to attack reflexive philosophy. Perhaps the safest con¬
clusion to draw is that, while he thinks the idea makes a valid point,
he entertains doubts about its value as an argument, since he concedes
the impotence of all argument against the claims of reflexive philo¬
sophy. But in the end he holds, as we have seen, that this merely
shows the impotence of formal arguments as a means of establishing
truth.
If we take this latter stance, however, we are obliged to say
in what other ways we would go about establishing the truth of our
understanding of the nature of truth. Gadamer's response would pre¬
sumably be that we can only hope to convince in an honest fashion
(rather than by spurious sophistical argumentation) by a careful des¬
cription of experience. This is to go the way of the phenomenological
approach to truth, which, in the case of Heidegger at least, might be
said to presuppose the "truth" that it is the aim of the phenomeno¬
logical description to reveal. That his attempt to uncover "truth"
with his existential analytic of There-being could be accused of
"circularity" Heidegger openly admits."^ However such "circularity"
is not merely a logical short-coming, Heidegger claims, but is
grounded in the structure of There-being.To ground this "circularity"
in the circular structure of finite There-being is to offer uncompro¬






position by pointing to its "circularity". This petitio princpii is
not a logical shortcoming but is a direct expression of the fore-
structure of Understanding; it is rooted in the very structure of
There-being and ultimately of Being itself. We might perhaps express
the claim which Heidegger makes as follows : the fact that his attempt
to uncover truth presupposes itself does not mean it is self-refuting
as reflexive philosophy thinks; nor does it merely indicate the limits
of human knowledge as the Kantians think; rather it is the very mark
of its truthfulness. The finitude of human knowing is not a limit to
be transcended dialectically, nor a limit to be acknowledged with
modest self-restraint, but is rather the positive condition of that
knowing; far from denying access to Being and truth, it is what lets
them be. As Heidegger will make explicit later, un-truth is not
evidence of a one-sidedness which needs to be transcended towards the
Whole which is the truth; nor is it evidence of the unsurmountable
incapacity of the human mind for truth; rather it is the mystery
which witnesses to the presence of truth. Authentic un-truth is
neither isolated part, nor inevitable defect, but the home, the haven,
of truth.
Whether or not Gadamer is ultimately prepared to accept these
consequences of his position in all their radicalness is a question
we must ask later. Meanwhile we may conclude this chapter by sug¬
gesting that the question of the adequacy of the actus exercitus idea
as an argument against reflexive philosophy is, besides being beyond
the scope of this study, for us merely academic to the extent that
Gadamer chooses to rest his case elsewhere. It is important, however,
For a discussion of Heidegger's On the Essence of Truth, see
Richardson, op.cit., pp.211-25Uj cf. Mehta, The Philosophy of
Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper Torch books, 1971)> pp.97~10ij.«
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in that it offers a clue as to how Gadamer would answer the question
of the relation between his analysis of the Understanding process as
effective-historical consciousness and that process itself. But
although showing the direction in which Gadamer's answer would lie,
it nevertheless fails to satisfy in its present undeveloped form.
One need not be an exponent of reflexive philosophy to perceive
obscurities in the relation of the analysis of Understanding in
Truth and Method (or in Being and Time for that matter) to Under¬
standing itself.
We must now turn to Gadamer's analysis of experience both in
order to see how he makes good his case for the finitude of the
Understanding process against the claims of reflexive philosophy,
and also to see whether we are given any further illumination on
the relation between the formal analysis of the Understanding process
and that process itself.
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CHAPTER THREE
GADAMER'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE
The importance of the concept of experience for Gadamer's
analysis of Understanding in terms of effective-historical conscious¬
ness is that for him the latter has the structure of experience.
(WM 329 j TM 310) But according to Gadamer the concept of experience
is a most obscure one. (ibid.) The treatment it has received in con¬
nection with its important role in the natural sciences has tended,
Gadamer believes, to narrow the breadth and richness of the concept.
The principle deficiency which orientation towards the natural sciences
has brought about in the concept of experience has been its failure
to take adequate account of what Gadamer calles "the inner historicality
of experience". (WM 329; TM 31l) It is this dimension which Gadamer
wishes to restore to the concept of experience, thus fitting it for
the task of supporting his analysis of effective-historical consciousness
What Gadamer seems to see as the most significant departure of
his handling of the concept of experience from its traditional treat¬
ment is his intention to go beyond (or perhaps behind) the merely "teleo-
logical" interpretation of experience. By this he appears to mean,
roughly speaking, that his intention is no longer to view experience
merely as a stage in the development of knowledge or science, but as
a process worthy of attention in its own right. This will entail a
re-valuation of those aspects of experience which have been seen as
irrelevant to, or impediments to, the development of scientific knowledge
This latter phrase must be taken in its widest possible sense, since the
knowledge in the interests of which aspects of experience have been
suppressed covers both the "science" with which Aristotle was con¬
cerned as well as the body of knowledge amassed by the modern natural
sciences. Thus Gadamer's identification of the "teleological" inter¬
pretation of experience points to deep-seated tendency of human
thought which runs from Aristotle to the methodological ideals of the
modern natural sciences. This tendency is to subordinate experience
to knowledge, process to result, historicality to a timeless present.
The aspects of experience which tend to be suppressed are its his¬
toricality, as we have already noted, and its linguisticality. The
goal of science, so it is believed, is to liberate itself from the
snares set by these latter and to attain to a realm of pure intel¬
ligibility. For all the differences between the Greek Enlightenment
and the modern "scientific" age, they have these fundamental orien¬
tations in common. Thus Gadamer does not widh to locate the causes
of the truncated view of experience merely in the domination of the
modern world by natural science. Not only does the "teleological"
interpretation of experience have a long line of ancestors in the
history of ideas, it also has its roots in ordinary, non-scientific
experience. Moreover Gadamer has no wish to deny that it contains
an element of truth:
In analysing the concept of experience ... we cannot
limit ourselves to the teleological aspect, from which
until now the problem has been considered. This is not
to say that this aspect has not correctly grasped a
true element in the structure of experience. The fact
that experience is valid, so long as it is not contra¬
dicted by new experience ... is clearly characteristic
of the general nature of experience, no matter whether
we are dealing with its scientific form, in the modern
experiment, or with the experience of daily life that
men have always had.1
1
WM 332f; TM 31h
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In point of fact Gadamer has very little to say about the
"teleological" interpretation of experience in everyday life, nor does
he discuss the origin of this deep-seated tendency of human thought
which manifests itself both in the world of scientific research and
in everyday life. He limits himself to brief discussions of Aristotle,
Bacon and Husserl. These discussions are illuminating and convincing,
but some discussion of the question why these truncations of experience
should occur in life and in thought would have been helpful, especially
since these truncations parallel the truncations in the human sciences
which the concept of experience has been introduced in order to over¬
come. Clearly Gadamer's critique of the "teleological" interpretation
of experience parallels Heidegger's critique of thinking Being as
"present-at-hand" /vorhanden/7, as pure presence /Anwesenheit/, and
the latter's attempt to trace this "forgetfulness of Being" (Being
as historical, linguistic and finite) back to the Greeks. But for
whatever reason, Gadamer makes no reference to Heidegger at this
point (except in another connection). Perhaps Gadamer is, as he says
in the Foreword to the second edition of Truth and Method (WM xxiii;
TM xocv), less "radical" than Heidegger in the sense that he is less
inclined to go the roots of "forgetfulness of Being" and is more
inclined to document its symptoms. This more modest enterprise is
no doubt an important one; nevertheless at some stage we must ask
about that which grounds the history of ideas and, for that matter,
everyday life. The asking of ultimate questions may not be the only
human task, as Gadamer says (ibid.); but it is nevertheless the
characteristically human one.
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In whatever way Gadamer would answer the question as to the
origins of the "teleological" interpretation of experience, he believes
another important feature of the latter is its tendency to overlook
the negativity that characterizes experience. Since this interpreta¬
tion focuses attention on the result of experience (i.e. knowledge),
such negativity as is involved in the process whereby that knowledge
is reached tends to be overlooked. It is difficult to know with any
precision how far-reaching Gadamer intends this criticism to be. He
says :
If we look at experience in this way in terms of its
result, its real character as a process is overlooked.
This process is, in fact, essentially negative. It
cannot be described simply as the unbroken development
of typical universals. This development takes place,
rather, by continually false generalizations being
refuted by experience and^what was regarded as typical
being shown not to be so.
As it stands, this is merely a criticism of the Aristotelian road to
science via experience and induction. Presumably it is intended also
to embrace modern understandings of induction which see scientific
research primarily as the verification of generalizations, that is,
where the emphasis is placed on the positive establishing of generali¬
zations. How Gadamer would respond to the more recent view of scien¬
tific research which emphasises precisely the negative aspect and
sees research in terms of falsification rather than verification
(e.g. K. Popper) is not certain. The adherents of this view would
no doubt be in broad agreement with the above quotation from Truth
and Method. But Gadamer's critique of the "teleological" approach
2
WM 335; TM 316
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to experience would probably include even these latter since although
they emphasise the negative dimension of scientific research and
reject traditional notions of induction, they too in the last resort
are concerned with result rather than process, even if the result
can never be more than provisional. Whereas the negativity stressed
by the falsification approach to research may be seen as a matter of
the faulty adjustment of our cognitive apparatus to reality "in
itself", to "the facts", as a matter of an inevitable imprecision
3
which characterizes human knowing, for Gadamer the negativity of
experience is not the mark of our failure to attain to reality, but
is precisely the sign that we are encountering, that we are parti -
cipating in, reality. Reality is for Gadamer not some "things - in-
themselves", some really real "facts" to which human thought can
merely approximate. For Gadamer reality is a dynamic process
which involves human Understanding as an essential moment, and the
negativity which characterizes the movement of human Understanding
is not a matter of external adjustment but is that which enables
this process to keep moving and developing.
This emphasis on the negative element in human Understanding
as that which empowers the movement of reality itself brings Gadamer
close to Hegel, and indeed it is in dialogue with Hegel's account
of the negative or dialectical element in experience that Gadamer
proceeds to work out his own concept of experience. What interests
Gadamer in Hegel is the latter's insistence on the role of the
negative in the road to science. The negation which Hegel sees as
creative is not sheer negation which would fall away into nothingness,
^ cf. Bryan Magee's Popper (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), pp.26ff.
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but is the determinate negation which occurs when a specific concept
fails to measure up to reality, or is "negated". However the reality
that the concept fails to measure up to is not purely "in itself",
but is always "in itself" for consciousness. The perfect adjustment
or correspondence of subject and object which is the goal of science
and towards which consciousness moves, according to Hegel, is not
the adjustment of consciousness to some unchanging entity or entities
"out there" to which consciousness approximates more and more nearly.
Consciousness and the "in itself" are always for consciousness, are
moments of consciousness, and the process of adjustment as well as
the final perfect adjustment are always for consciousness. When con¬
sciousness is changed (or "reversed" as Hegel expresses it), the
object, the "in itself", does not remain unchanged, but it too is
altered:
If the comparison shows that these two moments /knowledge
and the object/7 do not correspond to one another, it
would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge
to make it conform to the object. But, in fact, in the
alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters
for it too, for the knowledge that was present was
essentially a knowledge of the object: as the knowledge
changes, so too does the object, for it essentially
belonged to this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for
consciousness that what it previously took to be the
in-itself is not an in-itself, or that it was only an
-jn-it.qfiTf for consciousness. Since consciousness thus
finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its ^
object, the object itself does not stand the test ...
^ PS Sk (HW II 67), Hegel's italics.
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This alteration of the object means that a new object, a new "in
itself", arises, and this event is said by Hegel to be what we mean
by experience:
Inasmuch as the new true object arises from it, this
dialectical movement which consciousness exercises
on itself and which affects both its knowledge and
its object, is precisely what is called experience . . .
This new object contains the nothingness of the first,
it is what experience has made of it /er ist die uber
ihn gemachte Erfahrung7-
What seems to attract Gadamer in all this is the presentation
of experience as a dialectical process which moves through the power
of the negative (i.e. it is the difference between the posited "in
itself" and our concept of it at any given stage which impels towards
a new concept with its correspondingly new "in itself"), and which is
purely immanent (i.e. there is no transcendent "thing-in-itself" to
which our consciousness merely approximates). We have already
remarked on the Hegelian ring of Gadamer's presentation of his notion
of the "fusion of horizons".^ Where Gadamer would sharply differ
from Hegel is over the latter's insistence that the movement of con¬
sciousness finally transcends the realm of experience, the realm of
the experience of the difference between our concept and the object
or "the other", into the realm of science, or Absolute Knowledge,
where all difference is overcome and known to be overcome, where
consciousness and the object are reconciled in and for consciousness.
Presumably Gadamer would hold (though he does not explicitly say so)
that Hegel too in the end falls victim to the "teleological" view of
^
PS 53 (HW II 67f), Hegel's italics,
^
See Chapter l(f) above.
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experience in that, for all the importance he attaches to experience
as the mode in which consciousness traverses the road to science,
experience is nevertheless finally superseded when the goal is
reached:
Of course according to Hegel it is necessary that the
road of the experience of consciousness should lead
to a self-knowledge that no longer has anything diffe¬
rent or alien to itself. For him, the perfection of
experience is "science", the self-certainty of know¬
ledge. Hence his criterion of experience is that of
self-knowledge. That is why the dialectic of
experience must end with the overcoming of all
experience, which is attained in Absolute Knowledge
i.e. in the complete identity of consciousness and
object.7
Gadamer continues a few lines later:
From the very beginning the nature of experience is
conceived in terms of that which goes beyond experience.
For experience itself can never be science. It stands
in an absolute /unaufhebbar7 antithesis to knowledge
and to that information which derives from theoretical
or technical general knowledge. The truth of experience
always contains an orientation towards new experience . . .
The dialectic of experience has its own completion not
in knowledge_but in that openness for experience which
is created /freigespielt7 by experience itself.®
In this last quotation it is difficult to say precisely at what point
Gadamer stops expounding Hegel's position and starts expounding his
own. This ambiguity is significant to the extent that it is not
entirely clear whether it is Hegel (according to Gadamer) or Gadamer
himself who is setting up experience in opposition to knowledge.
Presumably it is Gadamer himself, since for Hegel no opposition
would be "unaufhebbar". In which case we must wonder how this
passage relates to those in which Gadamer wants to say that the human
sciences, whose authentic mode of awareness is the hermeneutical
7
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experience, may legitimately claim that they are concerned with real
knowledge. One can only suppose that Gadamer has been led to attri¬
bute or deny the status of knowledge to the hermeneutical experience
depending on the context. Therefore the contradictions which arise
could be said to be more apparent than real. Nevertheless there
remains the suspicion that his polemic has led him to overstate his
case at times and to attribute or deny the status of knowledge to
the hermeneutical experience when what he really means is that the
latter mediates another sort of knowledge. And these contradictions,
though doubtless merely verbal, make it difficult to see clearly what
precisely is the relation between this other sort of knowledge and
what we ordinarily mean by knowledge.
At any rate it is clear in the passage under consideration that
Gadamer wants to oppose experience to a certain sort of knowledge
which he characterizes as "theoretical" and strongly resists any
attempt to turn experience into a mere precursor or servant of know¬
ledge. Experience is valuable for its own sake; indeed experience
is the authentic mode of human Being. Experience belongs to the
historical nature of man. (ibid.) And experience is essentially
negative: "Thus the historical Being of human beings contains as an
essential moment a fundamental negativity which comes to light in
the essential relation between experience and insight", (ibid.)
Thus Gadamer briefly introduces "insight" as a concept complementary
to experience. Perhaps we are to find in the notion of insight
Gadamer's way of talking of that mode of awareness proper to
experience, a mode of awareness which on the one hand is in clear
distinction to knowledge in the sense of science or theoretical
knowledge, and on the other demands to be described as real knowledge.
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But the notion of insight is mentioned rather than discussed.
Gadamer says that insight always involves escaping from a state of
dazzled^ blinded, deluded captivity /ein Zuruckkommen von etwas,
worin man verblendeterweise befangen war7- To this extent he echoes
Hegel's idea of experience as the movement whereby consciousness
realizes that the other is not blankly other, but only other for it.
Where Gadamer's notion of insight would sharply diverge from Hegel's
account is that insight, unlike Hegel's experience, is never made
redundant by the vanishing of all otherness, as in Hegel's Absolute
Knowledge. For Gadamer insight is essentially insight into the
limits of human knowledge. He refers to what he believes was
Aeschylus' recognition of the metaphysical significance of the
phrase "learning through suffering" (pathei mathos). According
to Gadamer Aeschylus saw in this phrase the expression of the inner
historicality of experience. (WM 339', TM 320) The phrase does not
merely mean that we acquire a more correct view of things through
a process of deception and subsequent undeception or disillusionment.
Aeschylus, Gadamer believes, means more than this:
He has in mind that which grounds this process. What
man learns through suffering is not this or that, but
is insight into the limits of human existence, insight
into the insurmountability /Unaufhebbarkeit/ of the
barrier that separates him from the divine. It is in
the end a religious recognition, the recognition from
which Greek tragedy was born.9
Insight then is that sort of knowledge against which reflexive philo¬
sophy will argue in vain. It is an awareness or knowledge of our
limits, our finitude, an awareness which will not transcend these
9
WM 339', TM 320', cf. WM 126j TM 117
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limits and that finitude by saying that after all these are only
"for us". It is awareness of a fundamental and insurmountable
negativity which characterizes human existence and which grounds all
the particular negations we experience.
Whatever may be the precise relation of insight to experience
(and it is perhaps unwise to push Gadamer's distinction here too
far), for Gadamer it is in experience that man attains to an authen¬
tic awareness of reality and of his own nature. This is no fusion
of reality and human nature in infinite knowledge. Experience is
experience of human finitude (ibid.) and historicality (WM 3k0; TM 321).
And yet as we saw above, experience has its own sort of completeness.
In the experienced man, Gadamer says, the truth-value of experience
finds its completion. (WM 339; TM 320) This completion of experience
does not involve a passing beyond experience; rather it is an open¬
ness to ever new experiences. The consummation of experience involves
the renunciation of all claims to possess final knowledge; it is the
end of all dogmatism:
If it is already characteristic of every phase of the
process of experience that the experienced person
acquires a new openness to new experiences, this is
above all true of the idea of complete experience. In
it experience is not at an end and a new form of know¬
ledge attained (Hegel), but in it experience is for the
first time wholly and authentically present. In it all
dogmatism, which proceeds from the soaring desires of
the human heart, reaches an absolute barrier. Experience
teaches us to recognize reality. What is properly
gained from all experience, then, is to know what is.
But "what is" is here not this_or that, but that "which
no longer can be overthrown" /was nicht mehr umzustossen
ist7 (Ranke).-'-®
10
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Gadamer will go on to analyse the hermeneutical experience in
terms of the specific form of experience we call the "I-Thou"
experience. But before moving on to that, it is worth staying a
little longer with his analysis of experience since it is on his
own admission fundamental to his over-all position, as he writes
in the Foreword to the second edition of Truth and Method: "The
chapter on experience assumes a key and a systematic position in
my investigations". (WM xxi,- TM xxiii) It is with his concept of
experience that Gadamer takes his stand against the claims of ref¬
lexive philosophy. But far from espousing any sort of "empiricism"
in the ordinary sense of the word, or any form of positivism,
Gadamer gives a critique of the traditional concept of experience
in philosophies orientated (consciously or unconsciously) towards
the natural sciences. His critique of the "teleological" concept
of experience embraces even the assumptions of non-scientific every¬
day man. In contrast to this concept Gadamer attempts to work out
his own concept of experience in dialogue with Hegel in whom he finds
a true understanding of experience as historical, negative and dia¬
lectical, though according to Gadamer Hegel too in the end succumbs
to the "teleological" account of experience in that he attempts to
transcend experience into Absolute Knowledge. It is important to
bear in mind both the immediate and the over-all context in which
Gadamer attempts to work out his concept of experience. In the
immediate context he is concerned to resist the lure of reflexive
philosophy and this he does by stressing the unsurmountable his-
toricality and negativity of experience in contrast to all perfected
knowledge. But the over-all aim of Truth and Method is to secure
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for the hermeneutical experience the status of knowledge and truth.
The problems raised by this double intention are focussed here in
the question of how he can stress the historical and negative
aspects of experience as opposed to any "Aufhebung" into perfect
knowledge without forfeiting the claim to knowledge and truth
which he wants to make for the hermeneutical experience. If he
avoids the Charybdis of reflexivity, can he evade the Scylla of
historical relativism and scepticism? And if he escapes Scylla,
can he evade Charybdis?
Ultimately the "universal" which Gadamer believes can allow
him to escape reflexivity without falling into scepticism is language
itself, or more accurately, "the centre of language". To what extent
this confidence is justified is a question which must be postponed
until our discussion of language. For the moment it is interesting
to observe how Gadamer wants to argue for a form of completeness or
perfection of experience. He resists the "teleological" completion
of experience (even in principle) by its "Aufhebung" into knowledge,
yet he is unwilling to accept the apparent consequence that experience
is thereby reduced to an aimless succession of meaningless events.
Experience is not to be viewed "teleologically", but it is not there¬
fore aimlessj'the end of experience is experience itself. Experience
is not directed towards knowledge, but it is not therefore direction¬
less; rather it is self-directed. It is aJjnost as if reflexivity,
which was solemnly kicked out of the front door, has sneaked, heavily
disguised, in the back door again. For as Gadamer emphatically tells
.us, the ultimate object of experience is not this or that, but
experience itself, experience as such, authentic or true experience.
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But this has at least a structural similarity to the contention that
the ultimate object of thought is not this or that, but thought itself
the end of thought is self-thinking thought. Perhaps we might say
that for Gadamer the end of experience is self-experiencing experience
And as so often with the orthodox forms of reflexivity, Gadamer' s
quasi-reflexivity (if we may so call it) is said to be essentially
a religious insight. This reading of Gadamer's notion of the com¬
pletion of experience may perhaps seem a little strained, but that
it is not purely arbitrary is shown by the way in which traditional
motifs of speculative or reflexive philosophy tend to re-appear in
Gadamer's philosophy in a modified form. Gadamer's idea of language
is, as we shall see, essentially a re-working of the idea of the
concrete universal,* language is said to be in some sense "specula¬
tive", it is "infinite in a finite waj"an important place is
reserved for terms like "reason", "Aufhebung", "mediation",
"negativity", and "dialectic". This is not the place to attempt to
assess the significance of this aspect of Gadamer's philosophy.
But these examples do seem to lend some support to our contention
that the way experience seems to bend back on itself in Gadamer's
treatment is at least analogous to the typical movement of reflexive
philosophy.
Another way of expressing this analogy between reflexive
philosophy and Gadamer's treatment of experience is to say that,
while Gadamer insists on the finitude and historicality of experience,
for him ultimately experience does not consist in a series of parti¬
cular experiences, but culminates in the experience of the structure
of experience. "Finitude" and "historicality" are not merely expres¬
sions of philosophical and historical agnosticism or scepticismj
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they define the structure of experience, the basic mode of human
Being and awareness. Our experiences seem to consist for Gadamer
in the development towards an awareness of the structure of experience,
that is, historicality and finitude. He says: "experience is the
experience of human finitude" (WM 339 j TM 320), and "true experience
is that of one's own historicality" (WM 3l;0j TM 32l). This is to
say that the content of experience is ultimately the form of
experience, and this seems to invite comparison with the claim of
reflexive philosophy to unify the form and content of thought in
the Absolute. The important difference of Gadamer from reflexive
philosophy, or at least from Hegel's version of it, would be that
the latter attempts to work through the content of thought, showing
how the content of thought develops into the form of thought (and
vice versa) in Absolute Knowledge. The question as to the success
« %
of Hegel's attempt (specifically in the Phenomenology of Spirit) is
beyond the scope of this study, but what is important for our present
purposes is his intention rather than his success or failure. For
there does not seem to be in Truth and Method an analogous attempt
to show how the content of experience comes to be the form of
experience. It may be via "a religious insight" (WM 339j TM 320),
but that seems to evade the philosophical task and sounds suspi¬
ciously like what Hegel called in the Preface to the Phenomenology
of Spirit "the rapturous enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol*
begins straight away with Absolute Knowledge.""'"'" Of course Gadamer
is not claiming Absolute Knowledge in Hegel's sense, indeed he
11
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wants to deny that this is a human possibility^ but he does seem, to
make claims for his account of the structure of experience that can
only be described as absolute. Irrespective of the success or failure
of his own attempt, Hegel's demand that absolute philosophical claims
should be philosophically justified seems a compelling one. The
acknowledgement of this demand from Hegel need not entail the refusal
to accept the profound truth contained in the religious insight in
question, or indeed in any other. Hegel himself would have been the
last to deny the truth of religious insight. The objection is to
the appeal to religious insight at a crucial stage in a philosophical
argument without any clear statement of how religious and philo¬
sophical truth relate to each other. Whether or not we accept
Hegel's version of the relation between religious and philosophical
truth, the task of making that relation as clear and explicit as
possible seems ineluctable. What this task would entail in the case
of Gadamer's philosophy will be the concern of Part Two of this study.
Gadamer's failure to show clearly how the content of experience
develops into, or is even related to, the form of experience, how
what we experience becomes, according to Gadamer, the awareness that
experience itself is the end of experience and that we must always
be open for new experience, is linked to similar obscurities attach¬
ing to Gadamer's notion of truth. The emphasis on truth as event,
as disclosure, tends to suggest that for Gadamer truth is to be
located in the "thatness", the "eventual" nature, of truth. The
event of Understanding is the event of truth by virtue of its
happening. For all Gadamer's insistance on the "Sachlichkeit", the
"objectivity", of truth in contrast to the psychologizing tendencies
of romantic hermeneutics, it is difficult to see how the material
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(ontic) content of truth is ultimately related to formal or structural
(ontological) event of truth. Truth as disclosive event seems hard
to bring into connection with any view of truth as the elaboration
of the content of Understanding. The question of how truth thus
seen in formal (ontological) terms can be related to any sort of
12determinate content will be taken up later. For the moment we
may note that Gadamer's rejection of the "teleological" approach to
experience seems to involve him in a position where the value of
experience (which Gadamer wants to maintain) resides solely in its
formal aspect and the connection of this formal aspect with any sort
of content becomes exceedingly tenuous. Whether this tenuousness is
irremediable, and in particular whether Gadamer's brief appeal to
13
religious insight could be expanded so as to strengthen this con¬
nection will be discussed in Part Two.
It is perhaps worth remarking in conclusion that this question
of the relation of the formal definition of experience to the actual
contents of experience recalls in some ways the question raised at
the end of the section on Gadamer's concept of Understanding,.where
we asked how the formal account of Understanding relates to the
actual process of Understanding. Could the process of Understanding
be said to be fully realized apart from knowledge of the nature of
Understanding? A similar questions may be asked of Gadamer's account
of experience. Gadamer wants to talk of the fruit of our experiences
as "true experience" which is insight into the true nature of all
12
See Chapter 7 below.
13 See also KS I 68; PH 80; see also Part Two, Chapter 1 below.
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experiences. Is it not the case that only from, the vantage point
of "true experience" we can see what is the real meaning of our
experiences? Apart from this insight are not our "experiences"
merely brute contingencies that befall us? Strictly speaking, do
we not have to have attained to "true experience" in order to have
experiences an experiences rather than as a round of meaningless
suffering The question as to how we attain to this "true experience"
is therefore not merely academic but is profoundly existentiell. And
at this point Gadamer leaves us most in the dark. He may reject the
serene confidence with which Hegel's "Science of the experience of
consciousness""^ beholds the necessity of the development of
experience towards that Science, a Science which goes behind the back
of actual experience"'"^ and from the realm of light watches experience
grope painfully in the darkness towards the light. let if Gadamer
rejects Hegel's sunlight, his notion of "true experience" is never¬
theless a sort of light, albeit an austere one. His attempt to
retrieve the truth of "the metaphysics of light" in the last chapter
of Truth and Method"*"^ indirectly confirms this. For Gadamer wants
to reject the idea that human experience is a mere blind groping in
the total darkness of scepticism, as well as to reject the sunlight
of Absolute Knowledge. Gadamer may be right in rejecting this all-
too-brilliant sunlight; but the superiority of Hegel over Gadamer is
that the former attempts to show how human experience with extreme
PS 56 (HW II 69)
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difficulty moves towards and finally reaches that light. Gadamer
gives little to show why the way of the cross should be the way to
truth rather than being senseless suffering; or why through suffer¬
ing we should learn.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE I-THOU EXPERIENCE AND THE HERMENEUTICAL ^.TPERIENCE
If, as Gadamer hopes, the devaluation of experience by the
"teleological" approach in general, and by reflexive philosophy in
particular, has been decisively overcome with the revised concept
of experience, it remains for him to specify the consequences of
this new concept of experience for the hermeneutical experience.
For Gadamer the hermeneutical experience is best understood in
terms of the "I-Thou" experience. The distinguishing feature of
this form of experience in comparison with the more general one we
have been dealing with hitherto is that the former involves persons
rather than mere objects. (M 3k0j TM 32l) It is thus a moral pheno¬
menon. (ibid.) In the hermeneutical experience we have to do not
with a mere process which we get to know and learn how to master
through experiencej we have to do with tradition which, as language,
speaks to us as a Thou, (ibid.) This should not be taken to mean
that the text is the expression of a Thou, which would be to return
to the psychologizing tendencies of romantic hermeneutics which
Gadamer is trying to overcome. The text itself is a Thou, detached
from any Thou which lies behind the text, and its meaning is what
encounters us as a Thou, (ibid.) Obviously there is some difficulty
involved in the idea that the texi addresses us in the same way as a
person, a difficulty which Gadamer admits and tries to clarify later.1
1
See MM 35?f; TM 3b0f
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Moreover it is not entirely clear what is involved in this attempt
to play off the I-Thou experience against the experience which
learns to master natural processes. It is unlikely that Gadamer
would want to contrast our experience of persons too sharply with
our experience of the natural world, since this would be to risk
falling into a sort of dualism not too dissimilar to that of which
he accuses Dilthey. As we see elsewhere, Gadamer wants to re-think
our relation to the natural world, and to emphasize our continuity
rather than our discontinuity with it. What exactly Gadamer's
critique of the "teleological" approach to experience and his revised
concept of experience would mean in terms of any sort of philosophy
of nature is not touched on here. But it is probably safe to con¬
clude that the difference he makes between the experience of natural
processes and the experience of persons is intended as one of degree
rather than of kind.
Gadamer outlines three different kinds of I-Thou experience
and the kinds of hermeneutical experience that correspond to them.
Both of these (i.e. the I-Thou experience and its corresponding kind
of hermeneutical experience) correspond to one of the approaches to
experience which Gadamer has treated in his general account of
experience. There is a kind of I-Thou experience and a kind of
hermeneutical experience which correspond (a) to the understanding
of experience operative in the natural sciences ; and (b) to the
reflexive (or Hegelian) account of experience; and finally (c) to
Gadamer's own revised concept of experience. Thus we have an ascent
2
See WM 100; TM 9h and KS III 217f; PH 236f. See also Part Two,
Chapter 5(a) below.
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from the distorted I-Thou experience and the correspondingly dis¬
torted hermeneutical experience which arebased on the understanding
of experience in the natural sciences, through the perhaps less
distorted forms of experience on the reflexive level, to the true
I-Thou experience and the true hermeneutical experience on the
level of Gadamer's account of the true nature of experience.
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(a) (i) The kind of I-Thou experience which corresponds to
the understanding of experience in the natural sciences is one which
"seeks to discover things that are typical in the behaviour of one's
fellow men and is able to make predictions concerning another person
on the basis of experience. We call this a knowledge of human
nature". (WM 3^1j TM 322) (The question whether this is the only
way to relate to the natural world is one which Gadamer does not
raise here.)
(ii) The hermeneutical relation which corresponds to this
I-Thou relation is that of "the naive faith in method and in the
objectivity which can be attained through it", (ibid.) By methodo¬
logically excluding all "subjective" elements in an effort to obtain
"objective" knowledge, such an approach merely succeeds in cutting
itself off from the continuing action of tradition in which alone it
has its historical reality, (ibid.) This, according to Gadamer, is
the method of the social sciences, which follows the methodological
ideas of the eighteenth century and their programmatic formulation
by Hume, in conscious imitation of the methods of the natural sciences,
(ibid.) The effect is that "the nature of the hermeneutical
experience is thus flattened out in exactly the same way as we have
seen in the 'teleological' interpretation of the concept of induc¬
tion since Aristotle", (ibid.)
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(h) (i) The I-Thou relation on the level of reflexive thought
is superior to the previous approach in that the person is recognized
as a person. But the movement of reflexivity does not allow the other
to remain other, to remain in a state of sheer immediacy, (ibid.)
This dialectical movement (which for Gadamer is an illusion /ein
dialektischer Schein7) destroys the reciprocity of the I-Thou relation
and turns it into a form of self-relation /Ichbezogenheit7. (ibid.)
Each partner in the relation tries reflexively to outdo the other,
(ibid.) He or she claims to know already the claim the other makes,
indeed to understand the other better than the latter does him - or
herself. "Thus the Thou loses the immediacy with which it makes its
claim. It /the Thou7 is understood, but in the sense that it is anti¬
cipated and reflexively intercepted from the standpoint of the other
/the l7". (WM 3l).lfj TM 322) Gadamer relates this to Hegel's descrip¬
tion in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the changing forms which the
struggle for mutual recognition takes, the struggle in which "I"
needs another "I" in order to be an "I", and the other has to be a
person in order to be the means to the end of my own personhood.
Not that the struggling individuals are always consciously aware of
the struggle that is going onj as Hegel says in the Introduction to
1
Phenomenology of Spirit, the phenomenologist goes behind the back
of the participants in the struggle towards self-recognition. In
whatever way what Gadamer says here may relate to the complex deve¬
lopment of the struggle for mutual recognition which Hegel describes
1
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in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Gadamer wants to point to a danger
of the reflexive relation the recognition of which is of central
importance to his own philosophical enterprise. This is the danger
of reflecting oneself out of the mutuality or reciprocity of the
I-Thou relation:
In fact, his /the servant in the master-servant
relation/ own self-consciousness consists precisely
in his withdrawing from the dialectic of this
reciprocity, in his reflecting himself out of his
relation to the other and so becoming unreachable by
him. By understanding the other, by claiming to know
him, one takes from him all justification of his own
claims. In particular the dialectic of all "caring"
/Ftlrsorge7 operates in this way, permeating all human
relationships as a reflected form of the desire for
mastery. The claim to understand the other in advance
actually performs the function of keeping the claim of
the other at a distance.3
(ii) What corresponds to this reflexive I-Thou relation
in the sphere of hermeneutics is the so-called historical conscious¬
ness, which claims to recognize the otherness of the historical
other. The past is seen not as a field in which general laws can be
discovered by induction, but rather, it is claimed, the past is
recognized in all its historical uniqueness. But as in the reflexive
I-Thou relation, the historical consciousness reflects itself out of
the reciprocity of its relation to the historical other. In the end
it forgets its own historicality (its own "otherness" as Gadamer puts
it elsewhere) and claims to know the other better than the other
knows itself. "By claiming to transcend completely its own
It is perhaps worth recalling that for Hegel the participants in the
struggle are reconciled in the realm of the Religious Consciousness
where mutual and self-recognition are first realized.
3
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conditionedness by its recognition of this /the historical uniqueness
of the other/, it is however caught in a dialectical illusion; since
in reality it is as it were trying to master the past" (ibid.) The
historical consciousness does not have to boast of a full-blown
philosophy of history in the manner of Hegel to fall into this trap.
The ideal of perfect enlightenment which; according to Gadamer;
guides for instance Dilthey is just as much a dialectical illusion.
(WM 3h31 TM 323f) To imagine that we can free ourselves of preju¬
dices (i.e. reflect ourselves out of our historical conditionedness)
does not prevent our prejudices from operating all the same. More¬
over; we thereby fail to learn what recognition of our own prejudices;
of our own conditionedness; would allow us to learn:
Whoever imagines that he is free of prejudices; basing
this confidence on the objectivity of his procedures
and denying his own historical conditionedness;
experiences the power of the prejudices which uncon¬
sciously dominate him . . . Whoever does not accept
that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see
what shows itself in their light. It is like what
happens in the I-Thou relation. Whoever reflects
himself out of the mutuality of such a relation alters
this relation and destroys its moral bond. In exactly
the same way whoever reflects himself out of the living
relation to tradition destroys the real meaning of this
tradition.^
il
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(c) (i) The I-Thou relation that corresponds to Gadamer's
own understanding of "true experience" is characterized by openness.
Openness means that I do not reflect myself out of the mutuality of
the I-Thou relation, I do not explicitly or implicitly, consciously
or unconsciously, claim to know the other better than the latter
knows him - or herself. Rather I allow the other to make a claim
on me, I listen to him or her, I let him or her tell me something.
But this openness is more than simply a matter of letting oneself
be told something by someone, of listening to someonej listening
to someone and indeed any human relationship or community whatsoever,
presupposes this openness:
In human relationships the important thing, as we have
seen, is really to experience the Thou as a Thou, i.e.
.not to overlook his claim and to allow oneself to be
told something by him. This constitutes openness.
But this openness exists ultimately not only for the
person to whom one listens; whoever allows himself to
be told anything at all is open in a fundamental way.
Without such mutual openness there are no genuine
human bonds. Belonging together always also means
being able to listen to one another /Zueinander _
gehbren heisst immer zugleich Auf-ein-ander-Hbrenkdnnen/.
Openness, then, is the prior condition of Understanding. It is,
at least ideally or formally, openness for anything, even for what
we do not want to hear: "Openness to the other then includes the
acknowledgement that I must accept as valid that which goes against
me, even when there is no one to enforce its validity, (ibid.)
ibid.
9b
(ii) li is not difficult to translate this idea of open¬
ness into terms of hermeneutics. Gadamer writes:
I must acknowledge the validity of the claim made by
tradition, not merely in the sense of acknowledging
the otherness of the past, but in such a way that it
may tell me something. This too demands a fundamental
sort of openness. Whoever is open to tradition in
this way perceives that the historical consciousness
is not really open at all but . . . has already
flattened out tradition in advance and in a fundamental
way. Thus the criteria of its own knowing can never
be put in question by tradition.2
The ideal of hermeneutics must be the ability to listen to what
tradition tells us, to remain open to the truth it mediates to us.
This openness is in the end the same as the "true experience" which
Gadamer sketched out a few pages above:
The hermeneutical consciousness has its fulfilment
not in its methodological self-certainty, but in the
same readiness for experience which distinguishes
the experienced person from the person captivated
by dogma. This is what distinguishes effective-
historical consciousness, as we are now in a position
to say more exactly from the perspective of the con¬
cept of experience.3
Gadamer will further analyse the concept of openness (and that
of experience) in terms of the question. Before following him we
might pause to ask what are the implications of the questions we
raised in connection with Gadamer's general analysis of experience
for the extension of that analysis into the realm of the I-Thou
relation and the realm of hermeneutics. The obvious question is
how this "openness", which is the same as "true experience", relates
to actual human relationships and to the actual interpretation of
2
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texts. This question has two aspects to it. First of all ^ there is
the formal or philosophical aspect. This is concerned with how the
formal account of the structure of openness is reached and justified.
How does Gadamer get from what we might describe as "inauthentic"
modes of I-Thou and hermeneutical experience to his own concept of
openness? This is a formal question which must be asked however
attractive we may find Gadamer's concept of openness. It is really
the same question as the one about the philosophical justification
of Gadamer's revised concept of experience in general- Is there
some access to this openness which is prior to its formal expression,
some so to speai pre-thematic awareness of openness on which Gadamer
can base his formal account? Such an awareness would be analogous
not only to Heidegger's "pre-ontological" grasp of Being, but also
perhaps to Hegel's grounding of his formal account of knowing and
Being in the experience of consciousness in general and in the
Vorstellungen of religious consciousness in particular. We see
something similar to this in Gadamer's notion of "true experience"
which was said to be essentially a religious insight. But Gadamer
does not deal explicitly with this question.
The second, more existentiell aspect of the question is this:
given the validity of Gadamer's account of experience, how do we,
as participants in human relationships and as interpreters of texts,
get from "inauthentic" modes of experience to that openness which is
the authentic human mode of Being, which is the true /dwelling-place
for human beings? This openness is, according to Gadamer, both the
prior condition of human relationships and the interpretation of
texts as well as the ideal to be achieved by these activities.
96
However the question is not so much whether it is possible to speak
both of prior condition and ideal termj one is tempted to call the
"become what thou art" motif perennial. It is not so much what we
are as how we become it that present problems here. As we have seen,
Gadamer gives a sort of typology of the forms of experience which is
convincing as an account of the various modes of experience. We
recognize the descriptions as accurate. The problem is how these
descriptions relate to each other. They are convincing as isolated
snap-shots; but we miss the sort of motion picture that we find, for
example in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There is nothing to account
for the movement, so characteristic of life, between these modes of
experience, whether that movement be one of "falling" from openness
to manipulation and dogmatism, or one of "ascent" to the openness
which alone is authentically human. To say that the "ascent" is
really a "return", that the step forward is really a "step back"
(i.e. for Gadamer to say that he is not recommending some new her-
meneutical procedure but is rather uncovering what precedes and
grounds all hermeneutical endeavour) does not really answer the
question about the movement itself. To say that we already are what
we must become does not answer the question about the becoming. That
question is how we see the true nature of Understanding and experience
as openness and know that we seej and how, having seen, we reach and,
so to speak, inhabit that region of openness. Unless there is some
attempt to answer that question Gadamer's concept of openness runs
the risk of being dangerously abstract and lacking in any connection




THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER
Gadamer attempts to clarify farther his notion of openness by
examining its "logical structure" in terms of the concept of the
question. (MM 3hb~3$lj TM 325 333) He will then proceed to show the
application of this "logic of question and answer" in the realm of
hermeneutics. (MM 351-360j TM 333-3U1) This latter section is the
completion of his attempt to describe (and/or prescribe?) the pro¬
cess of Understanding operative in the human sciences, and is largely
a dialogue with Collingwood. However it is the previous section on
the logical structure of openness (entitled "The model of the Platonic
dialectic") that is of particular importance for our understanding
of the foundations of Gadamer!s philosophical enterprise. For the
very phrase "the logical structure of openness" (MM 3hhj TM 325)
carries within itself the tensions which lie at the heart of Gadamer's
position. For, as we hope to show, the concept of openness ultimately
belongs to the realm of ontology, and it is precisely the relation
of ontology and logic that is so problematic in Gadamer. One way
of describing the over-all intention of Truth and Method is to say
that Gadamer is attempting to carry over into the realm of logic
the ontological insights of Heidegger (hence Gadamer«s running dia¬
logue - explicit and implicit - with both Hegel and Heidegger). The
problem is that Heidegger's concern was to get behind logic. How
1
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such ontological enquiry relates to the logical level (or how the
question of Being is related to questions about particular beings)
is the point at issue. It is this transition from ontology to
logic that is the "hidden agenda" of Truth and Method. Paul Ricoeur
2
in his essay "The Task of Hermeneutics" says this in slightly
different terms (the "epistemology" in question is that of the
human sciences, and hence is the same as the "logic" with which
Gadamer is concerned in his projected "logic of question and
answer") :
The concern to ground the /hermeneutical7 circle
more deeply than any epistemology can prevents
Heidegger from repeating the epistemological
question after the ontology . ... This aporia
becomes the central problem of the hermeneutical
philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and
Method. This Heidelberg philosopher proposes to
take up again the question of the human sciences
by means of the Heideggerian ontology ... 3
Explicit concern with ontology does not come to the fore until the
third part of Truth and Method (entitled "The Ontological Turn of
Hermeneutics guided by Language") and it is with his concept of
language that Gadamer attempts to hold together ontology and logic,
as we shall see in the following chapters. However the section on
the "logical structure of openness" repays careful attention as it
unconsciously reveals the dimensions of the problem Gadamer faces,
of the chasm he is trying to bridge. For ultimately the difference
between ontology and logic that Gadamer is trying to overcome is
nothing less than Heidegger's "ontological difference".
^
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. M. Murray, pp.lIj.1-160.
•5
M. Murray (ed). op.cit., pp.l£6f.
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There is a seemingly natural connection between Gadamer's analysis
of experience and the concepts of openness and of the Question. "The
openness that is part of experience is, from a logical point of view,
precisely the openness of being this or that. It has the structure of
a question": (WM 3Uk; TM 323) That the structure'of the question is
presupposed in all experience is obvious, Gadamer thinks, (ibid.) He
is concerned to stress what he calls "the priority of the question".
This priority was recognised by plato, Gadamer claims (WM 3l6', TM 326),
which explains the title of this section,("The model of the Platonic
dialectic"). Perhaps the best way of seeing what Gadamer means by
"the priority of the question" is to see the relation between question
and answer as analogous to the relation between experience and know¬
ledge as Gadamer understands this latter relation. , Although Gadamer
himself does not put it in these terms, we might say that just as he
strove to overcome the "teleological" subordination of experience to
knowledge, so he wants to overcome the "teleological" subordination
of question to answer. In fact in this latter case we should really
speak of the "teleological" subordination of the question to the state
ment, since here the question is merely a means to the further deter¬
mination of the statement. Where priority lies with the answer, the
answer is not really an answer at all, since on Gadamer's argument no
real question has been asked. When the question is merely instrumental
to the unfolding of the implication of the statement, when it is a
means of developing the knowledge we think we already have implicitly,
then for Gadamer there can be no real questions. In Gadamer's view the
great merit of Plato is to have exposed the hollowness of the pseudo-
questions of Socrates' opponents, for whom the question is merely a
method of displaying what they think they already know. Socrates in contrast
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knows that to ask real questions we have to know that we don't know
(the Socratic docta ignorantia). In Gadamer's terms, real questions
presuppose an openness. Without this openness there are no real
questions and no real answers. In this latter case questions are
methods, techniques for the development of what we think we already
know; answers are the setting forth, the elaboration, the display,
of our supposed knowledge. Like Plato (at least in Gadamer's read¬
ing), Gadamer insists on the priority of the question which alone
allows real answers and mediates real knowledge.^ And like Collingwood,
he wants to free logic from the hegemony of the statement. Under¬
standing is properly concerned not with statements but with answers.
To understand something is to understand it as an answer to a
question. The so-called statement is really an answer, and is to
be understood in the context of a question, rather than the question
being understood in the context of the "answer", that is, knowledge
which we think we already possess and which we merely explicate or
develop by means of the question.
Just as Gadamer rejected any knowledge that got beyond, that
transcended, "mere" experience, so he is suspicious of statements
that have become detached from a context of real questioning. We
see this, for example, in his critique of the sort of academic
philosophy which treats the history of philosophy as a series of
In fact, as we shall discuss below, the "priority of the question"
in Plato is perhaps less radical than Gadamer seems to think. One
is tempted to think of Socrates' questions as maieutic instruments
and as the emergence of an answer as the birth of implicit knowledge.
Socrates" "docta ignorantia" should not be taken too literally, for
after all in Plato's view we do already know the answer, only we
have "forgotten" it. Socrates' attacks on pseudo-knowledge do not
imply a denial that we already posses (implicitly) real knowledge.
See Collingwood's An Autobiography, reprinted with a new intro¬
duction by Stephen Toulmin (Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.
29-1*3.
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attempts to solve a certain number of timeless, unchanging problems
which are detached from any genuine philosophical questioning.^
Another example is his comments on legal procedures which deal with
statements which are torn from the living context of conversation,
of real question and answer. (WM iiUUj TM lj.26) Gadamer claims to
follow Plato in a general suspicion of the written word since it
is all-too-open to "dogmatic abuse". (WM 350f; TM 332) He believes
that the attempt to keep philosophy in the living context of con¬
versation by means of the dialogue form provides a model for his
own attempt to ground hermeneutics in conversation, in a dialectic
of question and answer in which the question has priority. The
analogy between Gadamer's re-thinking of the relation between
experience and knowledge and his re-thinking of the relation between
question and answer (statement) emerges when he writes:
And just as the dialectical negativity of experience
found its fulfilment in the idea of a perfect experience,
in which we become aware of our absolute finitude and
limited being, the logical form of the question, and the
negativity that is part of it, find their fulfilment in
a radical negativity: the knowledge of not knowing. This
is the famous Socratic docta ignorantia which opens up
the way, amid the most extreme negativity of doubt, to
the true superiority of questioning.7
The superiority or priority of the question corresponds then to what
we might call Gadamer's attempt to establish the priority of experience
in relation to knowledge. But just as there were some difficulties
Gadamer thinks that his critique of the German Neo-Kantians in this
regard parallels Collingwood's critique of the approach of the
"Oxford realists" to the history of philosophy,* see WM 357-9}
TM 338-ItO. cf. Collingwood, op.cit., pp.60ff.
7 WM 3klllf J TM 325f.
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attaching to Gadamer's concept of experience and its rather uneasy
hovering between scepticism and knowledge, so there are ambiguities
surrounding his idea of the priority of the question. Clearly the
"radical negativity" of Gadamer's version of docta ignorantia should
not be taken to be sheer scepticism. On the other hand, Gadamer
wants to reject the "teleological" subordinate or of question to
"answer" (i.e. knowledge in the form of statements). It is interest¬
ing that according to Gadamer the fulfilment of the question should
be in the knowledge of not knowing, for here we may perhaps glimpse
a kind of reflexivity similar to that which we detected in Gadamer's
idea of "true experience". Indeed one might wonder whether Gadamer
might not have expressed the fulfilment of the question as the
question of the question, where questioning is bent back on itself.
In this case questioning as such would be the object of questioning.
One might speculate as to why in fact Gadamer does not push the
priority of the question to this apparently inevitable conclusion,
but defines the fulfilment of the question in terms of knowledge,
that is, as the knowledge of not knowing. Is this not in the end to
understand the question in terms of the answer, even if in terms of
the initial absence of any answer? The question as the presupposition
of knowledge (or of the answer) is defined as knowledge of our initial
lack of knowledge; but this definition itself presupposes knowledge.
Gadamer's definition of the question seems to remain obstinately in
the realm of the answer, of knowledge. It is perhaps possible to
detect here a reluctance to follow the priority of the question to
its ultimate conclusions, for in the end the question is seen in
terms of the answer (or lack of it) rather than the answer being
grounded rigorously in the question.
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This reluctance which we have claimed to detect is in fact of
considerable significance because it is connected with the problem
of the relation of logic and ontology in Gadamer which was mentioned
above. For if we follow the priority of the question to its ultimate
conclusionsj we move out of logic altogether and into ontology, at
least in the Heideggerian sense of that term. To define the question
ultimately as the knowledge of not knowing, as absolute lack of
knowledge is (at least in one of understanding the phrase) in some
sense to remain in the sphere of logic. By "the sphere of logic"
we mean here the realm of determinate knowledge, or, in scholastic
terms, the realm of essence. The background to our use of the word
"logic" is not modern Anglo-Saxon philosophy but Greek, scholastic
and Hegelian thought (which form, after all, the context in which
Gadamer is thinking). Gadamer, then, defines the fulfilment of the
question as the knowledge of our initial lack of determinate know¬
ledge; but this is nevertheless to remain in the realm of determinate
knowledge, of essence, and of logic.
However to follow the priority of the question to its ultimate
conclusion is, as we have suggested, to question questioning as such.
This is not so much to adopt an extreme scepticism (which arguably
remains fixed in the sphere of determinate knowledge by its very
denial of the possibility of any such knowledge), as to move into
the realm of Heideggerian ontology, whose aim is to get behind the
realm of logic and to ask the question of Being as such. This
question can be formulated precisely as the question of questioning
as such, as in Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics where
10k
Heidegger talks of the recoil of the question "why?" upon itself,
0
when we dare to ask "why the why?" Moreover E. Coreth attempts to
ground his Metaphysics (which is heavily indebted to Heidegger's
ontological enquiries) in the question of questioning as such.^ The
priority of the question which Gadamer advocates would seem to lead
in the end to the ontological realm, the return from which into the
logical realm (i.e. the realm of determinate knowledge of this or
that) is, as we have suggested above, highly problematic. And yet
Gadamer wants to found a logic of question and answer on the priority
of the question.
We might also express this ambiguity in terms of the relation
between the notions of openness and determination. On the one hand,
as we saw above, openness is a key concept for Gadamer. Openness
is the prior condition of authentic Understanding3 openness is what
allows the process of Understanding to take place. There is clearly
a tendency here to see openness as the ontological ground of Under¬
standing, as that space or clearing which lets Understanding be at
all. But difficulties begin to emerge when Gadamer undertakes to
plot the logical structure of openness. For he seems to see the
hermeneutical logic he is seeking as some sort of dialectic of
openness and determination, as a dialectic of question (which opens
up the Being of something) and answer (which determines the Being
of something). We read for example that "the emergence of the
question opens up, as it were, the Being of what is asked about.
Q
Introduction to Metaphysics, p.5; see also W Met IfLj EB 3i+8.
9 See E. Coreth, Metaphysics, trans, and edited by J. Donceel
(Mew York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp.lj.9-68.
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Hence the logos which explicates this opened-up Being is already an
answer. (WM 3k$} TM 326) However this dialectic of openness and
determination is problematic, because the openness which is really
ontological, that is, the openness which allows Understanding to
take place, which allows anything to be at all, must be distinguished
from the determinate openness to be this or that. What we might call
"ontological openness" would be absolutely prior to any sort of
determination. How such "ontological openness" and logical determina¬
tion can be brought together in some sort of dialectic is not at all
clear, for the difference between them is nothing less than Heidegger's
"ontological difference". Such a dialectic would have to be explicitly
argued for, or at least discussed; however Gadamer seems merely to
assume what it is really his business to demonstrate.
There is, however, a sense in which Gadamer may legitimately
combine' openness and determination, but only at the cost of openness
ceasing to be "ontological openness" and becoming what we might call
"logical openness"; that is, instead of being sheer openness it
becomes a determinate or specific openness, not openness absolutely
prior to any determination, but openness for this or that. And
Gadamer indeed dismisses sheer openness as of no significance, and
insists that what counts is determinate openness:
c
The openness of the question is not boundless. It is
limited by the horizon of the question. A question
which lacks this loses itself in emptiness /geht ins
Leere7. It becomes a question only when the fluid
indeterminacy of the direction in which it is pointing
is overcome by a specific alternative being presented.
In other words, the question has to be asked. The -[1
asking of it implies openness, but also limitation.
We seem here to be drifting into the vicinity of Thomist thought.
However it is beyond our present scope and competence to follow up
this line of enquiry.
11
WM 314.6; TM 327
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This dismissal of sheer openness offers an interesting parallel to
12
Hegel's dismissal of sheer negation or nothingness. For Hegel
only determinate negation is of interest, since from the logical
point of view sheer negation is an empty abstraction - as is of
course Being, which is indistinguishable from sheer Nothingness.
From a logical point of view it makes sense for Gadamer to dismiss
sheer openness, since only determinate openness is of any logical
interest. Absolutely undetermined openness is as much an empty
abstraction as Hegel's Being and Nothingness. But from the point
of view of Heideggerian ontology (on which after all Gadamer claims
to base his enterprise) such relegation of Being and Nothingness to
the status of empty abstractions is precisely "forgetfulness of
Being" : it is to remain trapped in the realm of logic, of essence,
of determinate beings. The whole thrust of Heidegger's thought is
to probe Being and Nothingness, not as empty logical abstractions,
but as that which is prior to, which grounds, the whole realm of
logic, of essence, of determinate beings.
Gadamer's proposed dialectic of openness (question) and deter¬
mination (answer) is perfectly possible as a logical structure ground¬
ing hermeneutics just as long as it is clearly recognized that Gadamer
is remaining on the level of logic. In this case his logic of question
and answer is really some sort of modification of the Hegelian dia¬
lectic. That this is indeed the case is suggested by the fact that
what Gadamer seems here to object to in Hegel is that the latter
tries, as it were, to go it alone. It is not Hegel's dialectical
project as such, not the fact that Hegel remains on the level of
logic (i.e. forgets Being), that Gadamer seems to object to here,
but rather that Hegel thought he could in some way complete the
dialectic himself:
12
e.g. PS $1 (HW II 63)
107
To elaborate the totality of the determination of
thought, the aim of Hegel's logic, is the attempt
to enclose within the great monologue of modern
"method" the continuum of meaning which is always
realized in particular instances of conversation
between people . . . Hegel's dialectic is a mono¬
logue of thinking that seeks to carry out in
advance what matures little by little in every
genuine conversation.13
This passage suggests that Gadamer wants Hegel's dialectic without
his Absolute Knowledge, or "Hegel without a System" as de Waelhens
puts it."^ Such a modified Hegelian dialectic is of considerable
interest in its own right. It would of course be inconsistent with
some of the other things Gadamer wants to say in this section. It
would not in fact be grounded in the priority of the question. In
it the question would be after all "teleologically" related to the
answer, to knowledge. Gadamer reveals this in spite of himself at
several points (we have already seen how his definition of the ful¬
filment of the question as "knowledge of not knowing" implies as
much). For instance, he talks approvingly of the concern of the
Socratic dialogue with "the immanent objective logic /immanente
sachliche Konsequenz/ of what is unfolded in the dialogue". (WM
TM 331) In this dialogue "what emerges in its truth is the logos ...".
(ibid.) "Dialectic as the art of conducting a conversation is also
the art of seeing things in the unity of an aspect (sunoran eis hen
eidos) i.e. it is the art of the formation of concepts as the working
out of a common meaning." (ibid.) Elsewhere Gadamer says: "The
deciding of the question is the way to knowledge". (WM 3lj-6j TM 329)
13
WM 351; TM 332f
^
See the passage by de Waelhens quoted in Part Two, Chapter U(a)
below.
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Or again: "Only a person who has questions can have knowledge . . .
CWM 3U7j TM 328) Even if in Gadamer the question is in fact teleo-
logically" related to knowledge, this does not altogether invalidate
his re-appraisal of the role of the question; there is still room
for the relative priority of the question within the context of
knowledge. In this sense thinking is asking questions, is "orien¬
tation towards openness" (WM 3b9; TM 330). But the questions are
relative, determinate questions, the openness is determinate open¬
ness; and they are always within the context of knowledge. They are
very different from what Heidegger means by thinking as questioning
and as orientation towards openness. Gadamer may justifiably polemi-
cize against unquestioning (and "unthinking") dogmatism and received
opinion as inferior forms of knowledge, but this is not so very
different from the theme of most genuine philosophizing, and is
very different from the radical reversal of question and answer
(statement, apophantic logic) which Heidegger undertakes. Gadamer
joins Plato as a follower of Socrates, that is, he rejects pseudo-
knowledge and pseudo-questions and seeks a real openness to the logic
of "the thing itself". Thus he goes the way of "dialectic""'"^ which
ultimately brings him close to Hegel, but takes him away from
Heidegger who tries to go back up the (in his view) false trail
from Plato to Hegel and re-discover its forgotten beginning.
The fact that Gadamer's logic of question and answer should
turn out to resemble some modified form of Hegelian dialectic which
For the ambiguities surrounding Gadamer's appropriation of
"dialectic", see Chapter 8(b) below.
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is related only problematically to Heideggerian ontology assumes
/
considerable importance when we turn to the problem of truth, which
is after all the fundamental issue of Truth and Method. For any
thinking which remains within the realm of Hegelian logic (as
Gadamer, we have suggested, may in some sense be said to do), truth
can only be, as it is for Hegel, the whole."'" Any "correspondence"
theory of truth (i.e. correspondence between our ideas and some
"things-in-themselves") is ruled out from the start. Gadamer will
have no truck with any "things-in-themselves"j all that is, is
meaning. Truth can only take the form of some sort of "coherence"
theory of truth where truth emerges from the interplay or dialectic
of meanings (i.e. of interpretations). This is what Gadamer seems
to have in mind (although he does not use the term "coherence
theory of truth" which is perhaps only used in Anglo-Saxon philo¬
sophy) . But in such a theory anything less than the whole, anything
less than the elaboration of the totality of the determinations of
thought (Hegel), anything less (in Gadamer's case) than the total
"Conversation" which is constituted by all particular conversations,
is only partially true. And without any relation to the whole it
cannot be said to be true at all. It is not entirely clear whether
Gadamer thinks there is any such whole. Later in his discussion of
"the speculative structure of language" he says that a word "has a
17
relation to a whole, through which alone it is a word". ("WM h3h;
TM Ul!?) But this whole seems to be the Heideggerian implicit
totality (the "totality of involvements") and is quite different
16
PS 11 (HW II 15)
See Chapter 8(a) and (b) below.
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from the Hegelian implicit totality (the "totality of the deter-
n_3
minations of thought"). While a Hegelian Implicit totality may
be unknown in fact and merely anticipated (as in Pamnenberg), the
Heideggerian implicit totality is unknowable in principle. Hence
Gadamer (if he follows Heidegger) would have to hold that Hegel
was wrong not merely because he claimed to know a whole which he
in fact didn't, but because he claimed to know a whole which he
in principle couldn't. Ill of which presents grave difficulties
for Gadamer's view of truth, since the whole not only cannot be
known, it also cannot even be anticipated. We may wonder how much
remains of the "coherence" theory of truth when even the anticipa¬
tion of the whole is ruled out in principle. In fact Gadamer
attempts to ground his claim that truth is a possibility for human
Understanding on Heidegger's ontological view of truth. But
Heidegger is concerned with truth as the openness or the clearing
19
of Being, with truth which is prior to logic. The fact that
Gadamer's discussion of a logic of question and answer seems to
remain on the logical level has this important consequence; in so
doing it tends to cut Gadamer's dialectic off from the realm in
which he seeks to ground his claim that truth emerges from that
dialectic. It seems at this stage that Gadamer has not in fact
managed to repeat the epistemological question after the ontology
(to use Ricoeur's terms cited above); the truth which he tries
to carry over from the ontological to the logical level seems to
dissolve in his hands.
-i O
See the end of Chapter 7 and also Chapter 8(c) below.
19
For a fuller treatment of Gadamer's concept of truth see
Chapter 7 below.
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We must now turn to the third part of Truth and Method where
Gadamer brings together language and ontology, and examine whether
he can effect this transition from ontology to logic more success¬
fully there. However our examination of his "logic of question and
answer" has inspired a sense of the difficulty of the task he faces
rather than any great confidence in his ability to succeed. It has
also perhaps placed Gadamer's philosophical efforts in a broader
philosophical (and also theological) context. For the problem of
the relation of logic and ontology which faces Gadamer goes beyond
the question of the methodology of the human sciences and ultimately
merges into the cloud of problems (or mysteries?) which envelops
the relation of essence and existence, of logos and Being, of reason
and God. In this context his attempts to show that truth is possible
for human Understanding are of interest to both philosophy and
• %
theology, and can be instructive even when they fail to unravel




We must pursue our examination of Gadamer's concept of Under¬
standing by turning to his attempt to ground the process of Under¬
standing in language. For Gadamer language is not a form in which
Understanding is subsequently embodied] the whole thrust of his
argument goes in the opposite direction. Language is rather the
medium in which Understanding realizes itself; it is in language,
and only in language, that Understanding happens. However Gadamer
wants to distance himself even further from any understanding of
language as the subsequent form of Understanding. For him not only
is Understanding inseparable from language, but language actually
has in some sense priority in the Understanding process (priority,
that is, over the self-consciousness of whoever is engaged in Under¬
standing) . In this Gadamer is following the direction of Heidegger
who, starting from language as expression of "discourse" /Rede7 which
as an "existential" is "equiprimordial" with Understanding,"'" increas¬
ingly saw language as the key to his ontological enquiries. Starting
from his statement in Being and Time, that "There-being has language"
(BT 208), Heidegger would increasingly stress the priority of language
in the "Being-process" so that later he will say that language is
2
"the house of Being", and finally that it is language itself that
3
speaks. Language even comes to replace the term "Being" as the
See BT section 3k-
^ See ffber den Humanismus, p.f>.
^ See Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.12; Poetry, Language and Thought,p.190.
113
focus of Heidegger's quest. However we are not called upon here to
follow Heidegger's way to the mystery of language.^ Gadamer works
out his concept of language as it emerges from his examination of
Understanding and the hermeneutical experience in relative indepen¬
dence of Heidegger, though of course Heidegger remains a profound
though often hidden influence in Gadamer's thought.
For Gadamer then, language, far from being the external expres¬
sion or the tool of Understanding, in fact has absolute priority in
the Understanding process. Language is in a sense the real "subject"
of that process in that the "fusjiion of horizons that takes place in
Understanding is the proper achievement of language". (MM 359j TM 3Uo)
That Understanding as it finds it culmination in the hermeneutical
experience should be grounded in the priority of language has already
been indicated by the fact that the key analogy for Understanding is
5
the dialogue or conversation. Understanding as conversation is
grounded in language; and it is from "the conversation that we are"^
that we must attempt to draw near to the mystery of language. (DJM 360
TM 3ll0) And just as we said that for Gadamer language has priority
in the Understanding process, so in conversation it is not so much we
Beyond agreeing with Gadamer, against those who dismiss Heidegger's
writings on language as mere mystification and obscurantism, that
" what language is is one of the most obscure questions given to man
to ponder". (WM 359; TM 3Uo)
^ This comes out more clearly in German where the etymological connec¬
tion of Sprache (language) and Gesprach (conversation) is apparent.
^
Inasmuch as Understanding is an "existential".
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(as self-conscious subjects) who control and direct the conversation
as it is the conversation which controls and directs us. (WM 3k$
TM 36l) Understanding as conversation "happens to us", (ibid.) In
other words:
... a conversation has a spirit of its own, and the
language in which it takes place bears its own truth
within itself, i.e. it "reveals" /entbirgt/ something
and lets something emerge which henceforth is.
As we see in the above quotation, a conversation is concerned
with a "something", with a subject matter /Sache7, just as Understanding
is concerned with what is said (e.g. in a text) and not with the states
8
of consciousness or the "experiences" /Erlebnisse7 of the author or
9
reader. In the "conversation" between text and interpreter there is
an attempt to reach an understanding /Verstandigung7 about the matter
at issue. This understanding will be in linguistic form, not, Gadamer
remarks, in the sense that it is subsequently put into words, but in
the sense that the fulfilment of Understanding is the "coming-to-
language" of "the thing itself" /die Sache selbst7, the subject-matter
concerning which an understanding is sought. (WM 360 j TM 3l+l)
Access to this "thing itself", the emergence of which is the
goal of Understanding, is not to be achieved as in methodologically
precise scientific procedure (and in all thought which is orientated
towards such a procedure) by excluding (at least in principle)
language and its distortions, its "bewitchments". For Gadamer the
7
WM 361j TM 3k$-
O
For "experience" see Part Two, Chapter 2, note 1, below.
^
Though no doubt states of consciousness and ^experiences" can
become the subject matter of Understanding by a secondary
thematization.
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"thing itself" is not "beyond language" as it is in the "metaphysical" ^
tradition from Plato to Positivism. The "thing itself" only is
inasmuch as it "comes-to-language", according to Gadamer; and it
only "comes-to-language" in a conversation or dialogue. In this
fundamentally linguistic process the prejudices of the participants
are not to be excluded rigorously but., as we have seen, are to be
brought consciously into the play of the conversation. This bringing
into play of prejudices, of horizons of meaning, is intimately con¬
nected with the linguistic nature of Understanding, a connection
which the champions of scientific method indirectly confirm when they
try to escape from what they see as the distortions and prejudices
of language. The emergence of the "thing itself" in conversation
means not the exclusion of the language and the prejudices of
either of the parties, but the transformation of both when a common
language emerges which is necessarily a "new" language, «ki the sense
that this common language, this fusion of horizons, did not exist
before. Thus the fulfilment of Understanding in the emergence of
the "thing itself" in a common language is always an event:
... in a successful conversation (or dialogue) both
partners come under the influence of the truth of the
subject matter (or "thing itself") which binds them
into a new community /Gemeinsamkeity7. Understanding
in a conversation (or dialogue) is not a mere setting
forth of one's_own position but a transformation into
"the common" /das Gemeinsame7 in which one does not
remain what one was.H
"Metaphysical" in Heidegger's sense, though as we shall see, Gadamer
wants to give a rather more positive reading of the metaphysical
tradition than Heidegger. See Part One, Chapter 8 below.
11
MM 360; TM 310-•
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All this can be seen with particular clarity, Gadamer tells us,
in the extreme hermeneutical situation of translation. (WM 362ff;
TM 3U6ff) The translator does not as it were extract some non-
linguistic entity (the "thing-in-itself") from one language and
re-embody it in another. The "agony" of translation is precisely
that what is said in the original seems so inseparable from the
language of the original. The "ecstasy" of translation, we might
suggest, is that it is nevertheless possible, by a to-ing and fro-
ing, an interplay, a sort of dialogue, between the language of the
original and the language of the interpreter, for what is said in
the original to come-to-language in the language of the interpreter.
But this coming-to-language will not be a mere transposition of some
detachable "thing-in-itself" into a new linguistic embodiment (or
"symbolic form"), it will be rather an interpretation of what is
said in the original; and as such it will be both the same as the
original (it is the same subject-matter that is being interpreted)
and yet different (the horizon and the language that the interpreter
necessarily brings with him means that the interpretation is some¬
thing new, is an event.)
For Gadamer, then, translation is not a special case different
from interpretation but is merely an extreme instance of what always
happens in interpretation. It brings out what holds good for all
interpretation - that Understanding is not achieved apart from
language:
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Even in such extreme situations, in which it is
necessary to translate from one language into another,
the subject matter can scarcely be separated from
language. Only that translator can succeed /wird
wahrhaft nachbilden/ who brings to language the
subject-matter pointed to by the text, i.e. who finds
a language which is not only his own but which is
also appropriate to the original. The situation of
the translator and the situation of the interpreter
are fundamentally the same.12
Just as in translation there is no non-linguistic understanding which
is subsequently embodied in a different language, so in all Under¬
standing there is no non-linguistic understanding which is then given
linguistic expression. The finding of a common language coincides
with the realization of Understanding in which an understanding is
reached. (WM 365; TM 3U9f) Gadamer sums up: ". . . language is the
1 ^
universal medium /Mediuiry7 in which Understanding is realized. The
mode of realization of Understanding is interpretation." (WM 366;
TM 350) This means that wrestling to find the right word, to find a
common language, is not a secondary and subsequent undertaking; it
is not a matter of finding the linguistic expression for an under¬
standing we already possess in a non-linguistic way. On the contrary,
Gadamer tells us that "in reality the problems of linguistic expression
are already problems of Understanding itself", (ibid.)
Gadamer's examination of Understanding has moved through his
survey of the history of the concept of Understanding in the human
sciences to Gadamer's own conception of Understanding in terms of
what he calls "the hermeneutical experience". Understanding as "the
hermeneutical experience" with its "fusion of horizons" takes place
12
WM 361;; TM 3b9.
IT
For language as medium and for Gadamer's evocative if rather elusive
phrase "the centre of language" /die Mitte der Sprache7 see Part One,
Chapter 8(a), especially note 2, below.
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always and only in the medium of language. It is this fundamental
linguisticality of Understanding on which Truth and Method will
increasingly focus attention as it draws to a close.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND CORRECTNESS
Before proceeding to Gadamer's explicit concentration on language
as such, on language as that which grounds all Understanding and hence
all Being (i.e. language as "the horizon of a hermeneutical ontology"),
it is worth staying a little longer with Gadamer's presentation of
language as the medium of the hermeneutical experience$ for in this
transition (with all its recapitulation and anticipation) from the
examination of the hermeneutical experience to the examination of language
itself there comes into focus a number of issues which pertain to the
heart of Gadamer's philosophical enterprise. The section on the linguisti-
cality of the hermeneutical object (WM 367-73$ TM 351-357) deals with
the relative strengths and weaknesses of speech and writing as modes of
communication. We need not linger over this discussion, beyond remarking
that what is at stake for Gadamer is the overcoming of all psychologism
which might limit the free play of horizons of meaning with normative
concepts like the mind of the author (mens auctoris) or the mind of the
original addressee. (WM 372f$ TM 356f).
The section on the linguisticality of the hermeneutical act or
achievement /Vollzug7 (WM 373-332$ TM 357-366) has more to say about the
basic issues with which Gadamer is concerned. To consider the linguisti-
cality of Understanding is, according to Gadamer, to express from a
different perspective what has already been pointed to in the section on
the dialogue of question and answer. (WM 373$ TM 357) By this Gadamer
presumably means that we are now focussing explicity on the linguisti-
cality of the achievement of the "fusion of horizons" through the
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conversation of question and answer. Gadamer repeats the by now
familiar criticism of the naivete of any historicism in udiich the
historian unconsciously apprehends his object in terms of his own
conceptual framework. Such naivete merely indicates insufficient
reflection on the part of the historian; but when the historian
imagines he can step out of his own concepts and think in the concepts
of the epoch he is seeking to understand the results are disastrous.
In doing this the historian sets himself an impossible task, not in
the sense of an unattainable ideal, but in the sense of a dangerous
absurdity, for he is attempting to exclude that which alone makes
Understanding possible. (Paraphrase of WM 37h; TM 357f) As we have
stressed throughout this study, it is an absolutely fundamental tenet
of Gadamer that some sort of pre-understanding (or prejudice, as
Gadamer likes to call it) is the condition of the possibility of
Understanding, a condition that is absolute and inescapable
/unaufhebbar7. As Gadamer now puts it:
To think historically is to achieve the transposition
/die Umsetzunj^7 which the concepts of the past undergo
when we try to think in them.^
And as Gadamer has insisted above, "we" are not separable from our
concepts, our prejudices, our "World". (WM 288f; TM 271f) He now says
that "to interpret means precisely to bring our preconceptions with us
into the play /of the Understanding proces£7j so that the meaning of
the text is really made to speak for us". (WM 375 j TM 358) Hence,
says Gadamer, there is no such thing as an interpretation which is
correct "in itself"j such an interpretation is "a foolish ideal which
fails to understand the nature of tradition". (ibid.) Interpretation
1
WM 288f; TM 358.
121
is tied to the hermeneutical situation in which it finds itself, (ibid.)
That all interpretation is thus tied to a situation (its
"Situationsgebundenheit") does not mean however that there is no such
thing as correctness, that all interpretation is given over to subjecti¬
vity and relativity, Gadamer assures us. (WM 375; TM 359) The act of
interpretation is not something secondary, a pedagogical device, but it
is the very act of Understanding itself, it is itself, Gadamer says, "the
concretion of meaning", (ibid.) The element of application, Gadamer
reminds us, is an integral part of the Understanding process, (ibid.)
But the variety of ways in which a text is understood does not condemn
us to relativism, Gadamer claims, and it is language itself that
secures us against such a fate:
That the claim to truth of every interpretation is not in
the least relativized thereby /i.e. by the difference of
each interpretation from every other/ is clear from the2
fact that all interpretation is essentially linguistic.
Such a claim stands out as the crux of Gadamer's philosophical
3
enterprise. As we have indicated at an earlier stage, it is with the
concept of language that Gadamer seeks to justify his claim that the
irreducible variety of ways in which a text represents itself does not
mean a fall into a flux of mere appearances. Despite our radical fini-
tude and historicality, truth is still a real human possibility. (WM
281)1; TM 268) As we see now, Gadamer holds that language is somehow
the guarantee of this. Why this should be Gadamer attempts to make clear
in the next few sentences. What is important for Gadamer is that the
linguistic explicitness that any understanding gains through interpretation
^
ibid.
3 See the end of Chapter 1(b) above.
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(i.e. when an understanding which is implicit - but not for that reason
non-linguistic, Gadamer would have us believe - is put into words) does
not create a second meaning alongside that which is understood and
interpreted, (ibid.) An interpretation is not therefore alongside of
some "thing-in-itself", and hence there can be no question of comparing
these, as is the case in correspondence theories of truth. For Gadamer,
as for Heidegger, truth is not (at least not "primordially" in Heidegger's
sense) a matter of adequatio intellectus et rei.^ The concepts we use in
interpreting have no independent existence alongside of what is being
interpreted. They are not "thematic ". (WM 375; TM 359) They as it were
disappear behind that which they bring to language in the interpretation,
(ibid.) Indeed, and paradoxically, it is precisely in this ability to
disappear into what is said that the correctness of an interpretation
consists. (WM 375f; TM 359) Thus it is of the essence of an interpreta¬
tion that it should present itself as that which is destined immediately
to disappear. Its being is its disappearance into what is interpreted,
we might say. As Gadamer says:
And yet at the same time it is true that it /an interpre¬
tation/ must come_to presentation as that whose definition
is to disappear /dass sie als zum Verschwinden bestimmte
zur Darstellung fcommen mus£7.^
This passage clearly owes something to Heidegger's description in
Berig and Time "f the inconspicuousness of the ready-to-hand.^ To cite
^ See BT 257ff• Heidegger does not rule out such a correspondence theory
of truth; he merely denies its status as the "primordial" or original
nature of truth. What subsequent role it might play, is, however, far
from clear. It is precisely this unclarity which Gadamer may be said
to be attempting to remedy.
^
WM 376; TM 359-
^
See BT sees. 15 and 16.
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Heidegger's famous example, we only notice a hammer when for some reason
or another we are prevented from using it. The hammer only becomes an
"object", only becomes "thematic", for us by some breach of our uncon¬
scious relation to it in which it is, as it were, totally transparent
to what we are doing with it. Gadamer does not mention Heidegger at
this point, but there can be little doubt that his description of inter¬
pretation here (a description which holds a central place in the movement
of Truth and Method) is indebted to Heidegger in this respect. Without
there being a systematic correspondence between Heidegger's description
of the inconspicuousness of the tool and Gadamer's description of inter¬
pretation, there are nevertheless unmistakable analogies. Not only does
interpretation only do its job by being transparent to what it is inter¬
preting, by being "unthematic", it is also the case that what is to be
interpreted (i.e. tradition - or rather the contents of tradition) only
becomes an "object" when there is a breach with the immediate unconscious
intimacy with tradition (hence any "objective" approach in the human
sciences is in Heidegger's sense "derivative").
A detailed examination of these analogies between Heidegger and
Gadamer would no doubt be worth pursuing, but it would lead the present
study too far afield. Moreover Gadamer's description of interpretation
points not only back to its roots in Heidegger but also forward, we might
say, to Hegel.^ For the motif which emerges here, the motif of this
mediating interpretation on which the possibility of Understanding is
dependent (ibid.) and which, although different, is transparent to the
? To parody the title of George Lichteim's book From Marx to Hegel we
might say that Gadamer is on the way "from Heidegger to Hegel".
12b
same, and only by being different can allow the same to present itself,
this motif is what Gadamer calls "the speculative". It is in "the
speculative structure" of language that Gadamer will attempt ultimately
to ground his philosophical endeavour.
We shall examine Gadamerfe presentation of "the speculative
structure" of language below. For the moment it is important to stay
with Gadamer at this point and to press the question how it is that
language with its "speculative structure" (even if Gadamer has not yet
explicitly used this term) can be the guarantee of the correctness of
an interpretation. What does it mean to say that the correctness of
an interpretation can be authenticated by its capacity to disappear
into what is said? As we have seen,this unity of what is to be inter¬
preted with the interpretation precludes any attempt to compare them.
Truth is not the identity of what is to be interpreted and the inter¬
pretation in the sense of an identity which is first constituted by a
consciousness which compares the two. According to Gadamer, what is
to be interpreted, the interpretation and the interpreting consciousness
that is supposed to compare the latter two cannot be separated in this
way. On the contrary, they form a unity which is absolutely prior to
any subsequent attempt to separate them. Gadamer's emphasis throughout
Truth and Method has been that we cannot begin with an independent
consciousness which we subsequently relate to its "objects", in this
case tradition^ tradition and the interpreter form what we might call
g
an ontological unity which is prior to any subsequent separation.
Nor, according to Gadamer, is an interpretation merely a tool in the
O
In this Gadamer is adhering to the basic contention of Being and Time
that There-being and World are "equiprimordial", that "Being-in-World"
is absolutely prior.
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the control of the interpreting consciousness. What is to be interpreted
and the interpretation also form an ontological unity., for only in the
interpretation is what is to be interpreted for the interpreter. And
according to Gadamer this ontological unity which embraces what is to
be interpreted, interpretation and interpreter is grounded in language;
9
or better perhaps, language is this ontological unity.
Now just as Heidegger's point in Being and Time was that truth as
adequatio intellectus et rei was subsequent to, and derivative of, a
more primordial sort of truth which was the uncovering, the unhiddenness
(a-letheia) of beings, a truth which is founded in the structure of
"Being-in-the-World" (BT 26l); so we might infer that for Gadamer too
truth is a more primordial phenomenon than any comparison of what is
to be interpreted and the interpretation, and is rather the "letting-
be", the "disclosure", of what is to be interpreted in the interpretation
for the interpreter. And as for Heidegger in Being and Time this pri¬
mordial truth was grounded in the fundamental ontological unity of
"Being-in-the-World", so for Gadamer truth would be grounded in the
fundamental ontological unity of language.
This, let it be emphasized, is not what Gadamer says in so many
words in Truth and Method. It is merely a "likely story" which attempts
to make sense of Gadamer's text. And likely enought it may perhaps be,
except that it fails to take account of the way in which Gadamer attempts
to move decisively beyond Heidegger. This movement beyond Heidegger
does not so much consist in Gadamer's grounding of truth in language
rather than "Being-in-the-World", for in this Gadamer is merely follow¬
ing the way of Heidegger himself. The real difference is that Gadamer
^ With the proviso that, since it first allows beings to be, language
itself is not a being and hence in a sense cannot be said "to be".
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does not merely attempt to go beneath the superficiality of a corres¬
pondence theory of truth to some "primordial" truth. He is more interested
in the "return journey", in showing how truth is possible not only as
some primordial experience of the openness of Being, but also as
"correctness". It is significant that Gadamer says, not that
"Situationsgebundenheit" does not detract from the claim to truth of
interpretation, but that it does not detract from its correctness
/Richtigkeit7. (WM 375i TM 359) Similarly the capacity of disappearing
guarantees not the truth but the correctness of the interpretation.
(WM 375f; TM 359) That this distinction is more than merely verbal is
corroborated by what we have already noted about Gadamer's philosophical
aims as compared with those of Heidegger. It is Gadamer's intention to
overcome the dangerous isolation of philosophy from the sciences in the
thought of Heidegger,^ to put Heidegger's ontological discoveries to
work in the sciences (specifically the "human sciences"), to show how
Heidegger's enquiries into the question of Being have consequences for
the logic of question and answer which allows a particular being or
matter /Sache/ to be spoken about. Hence Gadamer is concerned not only
with truth as some primordial event of Being, but with truth in the
more ordinary sense of correctness, specifically the correctness of a
particular historical interpretation with reference to a particular
historical matter /Sache7. It is this latter truth in the sense of
correctness that Gadamer says is legitimated by the capacity of an inter¬
pretation to "disappear" into what is interpreted. And this "disappear¬
ing act" is intimately connected with, and ultimately grounded in, the
10
See KS III-200; PH 196.
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essence of language which is, as we shall see, to bring its object to
presentation by itself beings in its self-presentation, perfectly
transparent to the object."'""'"
The present writer must simply confess his inability to follow
the move that Gadamer makes at this point. It seems that Gadamer wants
somehow to fuse the process (if we may call it such) by which something
is (in the Heideggerian sense that it means something to someone, is
"brought to language") and the process by which something is the parti¬
cular thing, the particular "what" that it is. What the present writer
cannot see is how the capacity of language to disappear into what it
says has anything to do with what is said. This capacity of language
is indeed the "wonder of wonders", for it is only through it that
anything can be at all. One can see why Gadamer could bring together
this capacity of language with the phenomenon of truth as Heidegger
understood this, i.e. truth as the primordial openness, the unhidden-
12
ness (a-letheia) of beings. But truth as correctness is concerned
with whether what is said is identical with what it is said about.
The identity that correctness is concerned with is the identity of
logic and not some identity of Being in Heidegger's sense. Or to use
the terminology of Being and Time, we might say that the latter identity
is ontological (that language should be identical with, should disappear
into, what is said is an a priori structural necessity), whereas the
11
We might also say that language reflects or throws back the mirror-
image of the object, hence the "speculative" nature of language.
12
Though of course one must immediately add that for Heidegger this
unhiddenness is accompanied by hiddenness. Truth for Heidegger in
its essence comports an element of untruth because Being for
Heidegger is finite. (One might add that it is one thing to say
that Being as appropriated by finite human beings is permeated by
that finitude, but quite another to say, as Heidegger appears to
do, that Being itself is finite.)
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former identity is ontic (it has to do with how things happen to be in
this particular case). The question then is how these two come together
in such a way that ontological identity guarantees ontic identity, as
Gadamer says it does (if not in precisely these terms).
It may be possible to go some way towards answering this question
by invoking that most controversial of notions: dialectic. We have
already met with the term in our chapter on "the dialogue of question
* 13and answer"; and we shall meet it again in the next chapter when we
examine Gadamer»s notion of "the speculative structure of language".
For the moment we must simply sketch out the relation of dialectic to
the question formulated above (as far as the present writer can under¬
stand this relation). It is not surprising that, caught between an
apparently formal or abstract identity of thought (or utterance) and
thing on one hand and a contingent identity of thought (or utterance)
and thing on the other, Gadamer should go the way of dialectic. In «.
this he is following Hegel who also sought a via media between the
abstract or formal identity of a Schelling"^ on the one hand, and on
the other the correspondence theory of truth as correctness which per¬
sisted even in Kant. For Gadamer as for Hegel (though not in the
same way as for Hegel), truth is not the comparison of thought (or,
in Gadamer's case, words) and things, for there are no "things"
apart from thought (or words). Nor is truth some a priori formal
identity of which we may, on privileged occasions, have an immediate
intuition. For both Gadamer and Hegel (though of course in different
13
See Chapter 5> above.
In whose Absolute, according to Hegel's famous gibe, all cows
are black; see PS 9 (HW II 13).
According to Heidegger; see BT 2£8.
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ways) truth as a purely formal identity is not denied; but it only
achieves its reality by being worked out, by being mediated, in the
concrete dialectic of history. One can perhaps interpret Gadamer's
position as being something like as follows: there is a formal
(ontological) identity between language and what is spoken of;
however this identity, while formally (ontologically) prior, must
nevertheless be achieved or realized materially (ontically) in
concrete dialogue (dialectic). Word and thing may be formally
(ontologically) identical; but that this word should be identical
with this thing, that this interpretation should be identical with
this thing-to-be-interpreted, must be worked out in the dialogue of
question and answer. Hence we might say that the ontological unity
of word and thing is the "truth" (in Heidegger's sense) on the basis
of which the ontical "correctness" of this word to this thing is
possible. But not only is "ontological truth" the condition of the
possibility of "ontical correctness" (more or less Heidegger's position -
at least in Being and Time); the former is only real as the latter, it
only becomes concrete in the latter. Thus we meet again the "specula¬
tive" motif which was said to characterize language as such. However
the identity-in-difference structure which characterizes the relation
of word and thing stands itself in an indentity-in-difference
structure which relates it to the finding of the correct word for
this thing. This would be analogous to the way in which in Hegel's
thought the identity-in-difference structure of purely formal logical
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relations stands itself in an identity-in-difference structure which
relates it to the material world.18
In some such way it might be possible to explain what Gadamer
means when he says that language guarantees the correctness of inter¬
pretation. The truth that binds together word and thing in a pri¬
mordial way must be concretized in the dialogical process of finding
the correct word for this thing. Whether or not the analogy with
Hegel was helpful in illuminating Gadamer, it at least serves to show
how Gadamer differs radically from Hegel in at least one respect.
For in Hegel's thought the concrete dialectic succeeds in mediating
the Idea to itself, in realizing the formal relations of logic, only
by working up the contents of thought into the ultimate totality
Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge. It is only by returning to itself
as Absolute Spirit that the process of the "going out" of the Idea
from itself (one is tempted - with historical justification - to talk
17
of the Idea's "self-emptying" ) receives its validation. This means
that truth must wait upon the completion of the process, the return
18
of the Idea to itself in Absolute Spirit. "The true is the whole."
Or in terms of the Philosophy of Religion, the way in which the
identity-in-difference structure of the inner life of God (i.e.
the ontological or immanent Trinity) stands itself in the identity-
in-difference structure of God's relation to the world (the economic
Trinity). For the "double Trinity" in Hegel, see E. Fackenheim,
The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1967), pp.lij.9-15^.
17 As A.V. Miller does when he translates the "Entausserung" of the
Phanomenologie by "kenosis".
18
PS 11 (HW II 15)-
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Apart from the whole there is no truth, and prior to the whole such
partial truth as there is is an anticipation, a prefiguring, of the
19
whole.
In Hegel, then, the realization, the concretization, the
"dialectical self-presentation", of the merely formal relations of
logic is dependent on the complete elaboration of the contents of
thought. This elaboration cancels yet preserves /aufhebt7 the notion
of truth as correctness with its opposition of thought to the thing-
in-itself. This opposition becomes the opposition of thought to
20
itself (since the thing-in-itself is always for me ), but this latter
opposition is still the opposition of the contents of thought. These
contents become ever more general as the dialectic develops, and with
the culmination of the dialectic in Absolute Knowledge they become,
as it were, universal or formal, but with a universality or formality
that is achieved, is realized, so that we may talk of an instantiated
formality or a concrete universality. When Hegel has finished the
Phenomenology he can proceed to unfold the System in general and the
Logic in particular, which presuppose the ascent to Absolute Knowledge.
What is important for us in all this is the fact that the notion of
truth as correctness (correctness not in the sense of the adjustment
of thought to some thing-in-itself - adequatio intellectus et rei - but
of the immanent adjustment of the self-contractory "moments" of the
Pannenberg is thoroughly Hegelian in this respect, though of course
in other respects he goes in a very different direction from Hegel.
20
See PS fj2ff (HOT II 6Uff).
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21
contents of thought ) does play a role in allowing truth in its most
profound sense to be realized. But "correctness" can only mediate
"truth" in its profound sense by being elevated, cancelled and pre¬
served /aufgehoben/ by the totality of the determinations of thought,
by Absolute Knowledge.
Now for Gadamer such Absolute Knowledge is in principle impossible
for human beings. It seems to follow from this that correctness could
never be legimated. For Gadamer as we have seen there can be no
correctness in the sense of a simple comparison of thought and thing-
in-itself. Gadamer has gone the way of dialectic where the correctness
of an interpretation must be worked out in the dialogue of question and
22
answer. But if this dialogue is in principle endless, never to be com¬
pleted, how is it ever possible to say that an interpretation is correct?
From Hegel's point of view it is impossible. At this point Gadamer
does in fact tend to appeal to a "whole", but this is not "the totality
of the determinations of thought" that Hegel had in mind when he said
that "the true is the whole". It is rather the whole or totality that
91
The development of this by the British "Neo-Hegelians" is often called
the "coherence" theory of truth as opposed to the "correspondence"
theory of truth of the "Realists".
99
This is what Gadamer seems to be saying from one point of view. Else¬
where he says that "the dialectic of question and answer always pre¬
cedes the dialectic of interpretation". CWM lpLj.7J TM lj.29) Presumably
in this latter passage he is using "interpretation"/Auslegung/7 in
the sense of specialized literary or philological interpretation.
This latter would then be "derivative" of the more basic activity of
interpretation which is a fundamental mode of human being. This dis¬
tinction does not seem directly to affect our argument here.
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that we find in Being and Time, the "totality of involvements"
/Bewandtnisganzheit/", the totality of implicit relations and references
23which make up a "World". It is beyond our scope to go into this
question of the meaning of "totality" in Hegel, Heidegger and Gadamer.
As far as our present argument is concerned, what matters is that
Heidegger's totality is the essentially hidden ground of particular
involvements, and any revelation of it comes only in some extraordinary
primordial experience. It is decidedly not the completed elaboration
of the totality of the determinations of thought which might validate
a particular interpretation. It is highly doubtful whether Gadamer
can derive from Heidegger a totality which will guarantee the correctness
of a particular interpretation] though the revelation of a "totality of
involvements" in Heidegger's sense may well have something to do with a
primordial experience of "truth".
Gadamer can of course always say that truth cannot be limited to
the logical determinations of thought, that Hegel has missed the depth
dimension of truth that Heidegger points to. Maybe so. But Gadamer's
specific project (over against Heidegger) is apparently to show how
truth as correctness, as the ontical correctness of this interpretation
with regard to this matter or content /Sache7 is the concretization or
instantiation of the ontological or formal concept of truth as the a
priori identity of word and thing. And it is very difficult to see how
Gadamer can justify his confidence in the possibility of truth as
correctness when he rejects both the "correspondence" theory of truth
(with its "thing-in-itself") and the "coherence" theory of truth (with
its logical whole, the totality of the determinations of thought). He
23 See BT 118.
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may opt for a different sort of theory of truth altogether, as did
Heidegger when he located truth at a level prior to the "derivative"
notion of truth as correctness. But then the onus is on Gadamer to
show that language is not only the home of ontological "truth" but
also somehow the guarantee of ontic correctness. For more light on
this rather obscure aspect of Gadamer's philosophical enterprise, we




THE SPECULATIVE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE
(a) "The Centre of Language"
In a chapter in which he will attempt to show the analogies between
his own philosophical hermeneutics and the metaphysical tradition stretch¬
ing from the Greeks to Hegel, Gadamer begins by differentiating clearly
between his own view of the interrelations between language, Being and
truth, and the view which, despite all its variations, remains the basic
theme of the metaphysical tradition. The Greek view is theological,
says Gadamer"'" (WM 1+325 TM )|1)|); it saw the Being of beings /das Sein
des Seienden/ as a being /ein Seiendes/ which completes itself in
thought, (ibid.) This highest and most real being, which gathers into
itself the Being of all beings, is nous, (ibid.) The articulating
logos brings to language the structure of the being /"des Seienden",
perhaps still referring to "the highest being" which is nou£7j and
this coming-to-language is for Greek thought the presence of that being
itself, its truth. (WM l+32f j TM 1+11+) It is in terms of this infinite
presence as its own completed possibility, as its own divinity, that
human thought understands itself. (WM 1+33 j TM I4II4.) This thumb-nail
sketch of Greek metaphysics is, despite its extreme condensation,
recognisable enough, it is also couched in such a way as to make
clear what Gadamer means when he calls Hegel's philosophy the renewal
of Greek metaphysics on the basis of subjectivity. (WM 1+33; TM 1+Li+f)
Both of these, however, Gadamer rejects, since neither, he believes, does
1
Echoing Heidegger's critique of "onto-theo-logy" in Identity and
Difference, pp.1+2-76 (for German, p.l07-H+3)j see also the Intro-
duction to "Was ist Metaphysik?", pp.l9f.
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justice to the finitude of our historical experience. (WM 1|33; TM Ul£)
More appropriate to this finitude and historicality is the phenomenon
of language which, for Gadamer, does not merely copy a pre-existing
structure of Being, but in which the order and structure of our experience
is first of all, and in constantly changing ways, formed, (ibid.) It
is, as Gadamer puts it, from the centre of language /die Mitte der
2Sprachn/ that our whole experience of "World" and in particular the
hermeneutical experience unfolds, (ibid.)
It is in this "centre of language" that for Gadamer language,
Being and truth hang together. Language for Gadamer is not the copy of
pre-given order of Being whose true relations lie under the gaze of an
Infinite Spirit, (ibid.) Nor is language an instrument to be used like
the language of mathematics to construct an objectified, calculable
universe which is at our disposal, (ibid.) Neither the Infinite Spirit
of "onto-theo-logy" nor the infinite Will-to-Power of modern technological
man is appropriate to our finitude. "It is only the centre of language
which, related to the totality of beings, mediates the finite, historical
essence of human being with itself and with the world." (ibid.)
It is only in the centre of language, Gadamer tells us, that the
dialectical puzzle of the One and the Many which has exercised a fas¬
cination on the minds of philosophers from Plato to Hegel finds its
^
TtLe English phrase does not catch the resonance of the German. "Mitte"
means middle or mean or medium. It also echoes: a) "Mittel" which is
a means to an end or a physical medium; b) "der Mittler" which means
"the Mediator"; and c) "Vermittlung" which is mediation in both the
ordinary and the philosophical senses. Heidegger also talks of "eine
einfache Mitte" between the primordial self-giving Logos and cor¬
responding There-being, a "middle-point" which W.J. Richardson says
is "the ontological difference as such"; see Richardson, op.cit.,
p.501-
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true and ultimate grounding /seinen wahren Grand und Boden7. (ibid)
But the real dialectic of the word in which there is always only one
Word despite its articulation into a plurality of words is not the
mere mirroring of logical content which we find, according to Gadamer,
in Platonic and Augustinian dialectic. (WM i;33f j TM ljl5) This real
dialectic is to be found when a word "as it were breaks forth out of
a centre /Mltte/ and has a relation to a whole, through which alone it
is a word." (WM b3b', TM I|.l3) What exactly Gadamer is saying here the
present writer is not sure. Talk of a word which "brings a World to
presentation" by breaking forth out of a centre may have something to
do with "the simple centre" /das einfache Mitte/ which Richardson says
is the "ontological difference as such", the primordial breach in
which World (Being) and There-being (the being which understands Being)
emerge (see note 2 above). However to posit such a connection is to
speculate, and it must be admitted that what exactly Gadamer means by




However obscure may be the origin of the "dialectical" process in
which one word brings to presentation the many implicit meanings or
words which allow it to mean what it does mean, Gadamer has rather
more to say about the process itself. A word, he tells us, makes the
whole view of the world /Veltansicht/ which grounds it appear. (WM 1+31+5
TM UlJjf) In the moment of its happening, a word lets the unsaid /das
Ungesagt£7j at which it hints, simultaneously be there /lasst . . .
mit da sein7. (WM k3hj TM 1+16) This "occasionality" of language is
not an unfortunate defect, but rather the expression of the living
virtuality of language which brings into play a whole of meaning
without being able wholly to express the latter, (ibid.) All human
speaking, Gadamer tells us, is finite in such a way that it contains
an infinity of meaning to be unfolded and interpreted, (ibid.)
We shall return to Gadamer's idea that what is said represents an
infinity of the unsaid a little later when we come to his notion of
"the speculative." For the moment we must make two remarks about
Gadamer's "dialectic" of the Word and the words. First of all it is
worth noting the curious reversal which the traditional dialectic
undergoes in Gadamer's treatment. For in Gadamer it is no longer the
words which manifest or articulate the unity of the infinite Word.
It seems rather that the one finite, historical word represents the
infinite variety of words or meanings which are implied by that one
word. For Gadamer apparently the finite many do not represent the
Infinite One, but rather the finite one represents the infinite many.
But this makes one wonder whether "infinite" - /unendlich7 is not
being used in a very different sense in each case. The "infinity" 0f
nous or of the divine Word is quite different from the "endlessness"
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of the flux of Becoming.^" Gadamer is of course quite entitled to
reject the former and embrace the latter (as Nietzsche may be said to
have done). It is however quite another matter to suggest that the
latter is in some sense "the truth" of the former. This leads to
the second point which is that Gadamer seems to be saying that his
dialectic is the true dialectic to which previous versions of dia¬
lectic are more or less confused and distorted approximations. He
appears to be giving a re-interpretation of the metaphysical idea of
dialectic so as to reveal the truth which it obscurely points to;
2
and in this he seems to be going the way of a "hermeneutics of belief"
which tends to re-interpret positively, rather than the way of a
"hermeneutics of suspicion" which tends to interpret away false
characterizations of reality. But one must ask at what point a re-
interpretation becomes so different from what it is interpreting
that it actually stops, despite its protestations to the contrary,
being a recognizable interpretation and becomes simply a replacement
of one thing by another. Each interpretation may no doubt, as Gadamer
tells us, be different, but when does it become so different that it
can no longer validly claim to be an interpretation at all? We will
One might also argue that Gadamer's "infinity" seems close to Hegel's
"bad infinity" which is mere "endlessness". See J.N. Findlay,
Hegel: A Re-examination p.l63.
p
To use the terminology of Paul Ricoeur. Examples of the demythologiz-
ing "hermeneutics of belief" would be Hegel and Bultmann; examples of
the demystifying "hermeneutics of suspicion" would be Marx, Nietzsche
and Freud. Which camp Heidegger belongs to is not clear, though
arguably he would, with his critique of the Western metaphysical
tradition, tend towards Nietzsche and the "hermeneutics of suspicion",
though there are of course also tendencies in the opposite direction.
There are both "right wing" (Macquarrie) and "left wing"
(Derrida) interpretations of Heidegger, a point made by Fergus Kerr in
his unpublished 1977 Cmnniivg Lectures in the University of Edinburgh.
The ambiguity of Gadamer's position is discussed below.
lllO
have occasion to ask this question at several points in the analysis of
Gadamer's text which follows. For the moment we must simply ask
whether Gadamer's "dialectic" could really be said to give, in Hegelian
fashion, the "truth" of previous thought on the subject; or whether
Gadamer is not in fact, despite his protestations to the contrary,
much closer to Nietzsche in his repudiation of the Infinite Word and
his embracing of the endless play of the flux of Becoming?
Gadamer's re-interpretation of the motifs of the metaphysical
tradition continues with his re-working of the idea of "participation"
or "belongingness" /Zugehorigkeit7> In metaphysics "participation"
means, Gadamer tells us, the transcendental relation between Being
and truth in which knowledge is a moment of Being itself and not
primarily an activity of the subject. (WM k3h} TM 1+16) Such inherence
/Einbezogenheit7 of knowledge in Being is the presupposition of ancient
and mediaeval thought, as we can see above all in Plato's idea of the
soul participating in the true world of the Ideas. (ibid.) Here there
is no question of a self-certain world-less spirit having to relate
itself subsequently to the world. Here world and self belong together
in a primordial way; the relation between them is primary (or a priori).
(WM U35j TM 1+16) Earlier thought conceived this relation in terms of
the universal ontological function of teleology, (ibid.) But for
modern science such an a priori relation of "participation" and its
expression in terms of teleology has no legimacy. (WM lj.35; TM 1+17)
The interrelatedness /Zuordnunj7 of man and world which grounded the
Logos philosophy of the ancient and mediaeval worlds has been dis¬
solved. (ibid.)
Ihi
German philosophy, however, from Leibniz to Hegel tried to
combine the new science with the insights of the metaphysical, tradi¬
tion (VJM TM IjJ.7); and it is Gadamer's explicit intention to
3take up this task again, (ibid.) Thus his examination of the her-
meneutics of the human sciences leads him back to the problems of
classical metaphysics. (WM ij.36; TM l|17f) What the metaphysical
tradition with its presupposition of the "participation" of knowledge
in Being can offer to the modern world locked in its own subjectivity
can be expressed as "dialectic" - the movement of Being or "the thing
itself" which thought experiences. Hegel's dialectic is a conscious
appropriation of the Greek heritage. (WM U36; TM 1+18) Gadamer
claims that his own hermeneutical theory with its interwovenness of
event /Geschehen/ and Understanding is indebted to Greek thought as
well as to Hegel, (ibid.) But this recognition of his debts does
not mean that he is attempting to renew the classical doctrine of
the intelligibility of Being or to transfer it to the historical world.
(WM b36f; TM 1)18) This, says Gadamer, would be merely a repetition
of Hegel which is untenable not only in view of Kant and the empirical
standpoint of modern science, but also in view of the fact that we no
longer experience history in terms of any knowledge of divine salvation.^
For Gadamer's positive assessment of the insights of classical meta¬
physics cf. KSI 63f j PH 7li?f. There Gadamer tells us that the
"infinite correspondence of soul and Being" which metaphysics pointed
to resides in language.
^ One might wish that Gadamer had expanded a little on his reasons for
not following Hegel, first of all because "Kant and the empirical
standpoint of modern science" are not criteria which he leaves
unquestioned elsewhere (but for a positive estimate of Kant see our
chapter on "The Limits of Reflexive Philosophy"),* and also because
the demise of God's saving presence in history would merit, one
would have thought, a little more than half a sentence, especially
in view of Gadamer's "optimism" (for which see our chapters on
Eschatology and on Providence below).
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CWM h37i TM I4I8) Gadamer claims to be only following "the necessity of
the thing itself /der SacheT" when he is led by his critique of modern
aesthetics and historicism to transcend the "objectivity" of Cartesian
"subjectivism" towards an interdependence of subject and object which
comes close to the insights of classical metaphysics, (ibid.) But in
contrast to Greek thought and to German Idealism, Gadamer says he is
thinking "from the centre of language." (ibid.)
The sort of "participation" which Gadamer envisages is, however,
very different from what is found in the metaphysical tradition. It
no longer designates "a teleological relatedness of mind or spirit to
the essential structure of beings". (WM 1*37; TM I4.19) Nevertheless
Gadamer believes there is a genuine analogy between the metaphysical
doctrine of "participation" and his understanding of the "eventual"
character of Understanding. Just as metaphysical "participation" is
expressed in "dialectic" which is the movement of Being itself -which
thought experiences, so for Gadamer Understanding is a relation in
which the content of tradition becomes "an event", comes-to-presentation,
in the hermeneutical experience. The consciousness of the interpreter
is not in control of the hermeneutical situation; it is tradition that
has the real initiative, for it is the word of tradition that encounters
us. The activity of the interpreter is merely a response to the prior
address of tradition. Indeed we must really speak here of the activity
of "the thing itself" /das Tun der Sache selbst/7. ("WM Jj.39; TM I|.2l)
By this is meant that the interpreter is not in a position to pick and
choose in advance his hermeneutical objects; he must in a literal
sense take what comes. Interpreting consciousness does not have the
freedom to detach itself from the hermeneutical situation in order to
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survey the field of possible objects, some of which it may subsequently
decide to engage with. For interpretation cannot unmake the event that
it itself is /Das Geschehen, das sie ist, kann sie nicht ungeschehen
machen/. (WM b39j TM 1|20) Gadamer plays on the etymological connection
between "participation" or "belongingness" /Zugehorigkeit/7 and hearing
/Horery7 in order to suggest the dependency of interpretation on the
prior address of tradition, as well as the essentially linguistic
character of the process.
With this concept of the activity of "the thing itself" Gadamer
believes himself to be drawing near to Hegel and the Greeks. Gadamer
compares his own critique of modern methodology with Hegel's critique
of "external reflection" (WM l|39j TM lj.21), in which the subject, with
its illusion of self-sufficiency, deals with its objects in a merely
external way. The true method is, according to Hegel, the activity
of "the thing itself", (ibid.) This does not deny that philosophy
has its own kind of activity, which Hegel calls "the strenuous effort
of the Notion" /die Anstrengung des Begriffs/7-'' This effort consists
in not interfering arbitrarily, or with insights gleaned elsewhere, in
£
the "immanent rhythm of the Notion". In Gadamer's view, hermeneutics
also has its own kind of "strenuousness", the effort of "being negative
towards oneself". (WM 14fLj TM U22) The authentic hermeneutical atti¬
tude of "persistent listening" /unbeirrtes Hbren/ has to discipline
itself to hold at arm's length all expectations of meaning that have
been rejected by the text, (ibid.) The experience of having our
^ PS 35 (HW II hh)■
6
PS 36 (HW II U5).
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expectations of meaning and the prejudices they derive from overthrown
by "the thing itself", the subject-matter of the text, corresponds,
Gadamer believes, to "the authentic experience of dialectic", (ibid.)
We only have to think of Plato's "dialectic" which Gadamer claims is
first and foremost the art of conducting a dialogue in such a way
that our false opinions are revealed and our eyes are opened to "the
thing itself" - the most famous example of this process being Socrates'
dialogue with the slave-boy in the Meno. (WM hbOj TM lj.21f) However
dialectic is not restricted to this sort of pedagogical dialogue, but
belongs to the essence of that kind of thought which alone allows the
nature of "the thing itself" to emerge. (WM TM U22) Plato fuses
the Socratic art of dialogue with Eleatic dialectic and in his
Parmenides raises the latter "to a new reflective level". (ibid.)
That things change into their opposite when we attempt to think them
through logically is the experience of thought to which Hegel also
appeals. Now the hermeneutical experience, Gadamer insists, is not
an experience of thought in the same sense as this sort of dialectic
of the Concept or Notion which claims to free itself from the power
of language, (ibid.) Nevertheless, Gadamer claims, there is in the
hermeneutical experience something like a dialectic /so etwas wie eine
Dialektik7, an activity of "the thing itself", an activity on the part
of the interpreter which, in contrast to the methodology of modern
science, is a passivity /ein Erleiden/. (WM IjliOfj TM J+22)
This "something like" /so etwas wie7 must not be allowed to
slip by unnoticed. What for our purposes is important is not that
there are some resemblances between Gadamer's dialectic and meta¬
physical dialectic. Our concern is rather with what precisely is the
ili5
nature of the relation between the two sorts of dialectic, and with
what is the significance of this relation if and when it has been
clarified. We have already in this chapter referred to the apparent
ambiguity of Gadamer in this regard. There we asked whether Gadamer
could in any genuine sense be said to be giving the "truth" of meta¬
physical dialectic in his own form of dialectic. Does Gadamer not
perhaps merely give the appearance of re-presenting the truth, old
7
yet ever new, of metaphysics? Does not the new wine trampled out
by Nietzsche and Heidegger burst open the old wine skins of metaphysics?
Do not Gadamer's attempts to patch up the rotting fabric of traditional
metaphysics only make the damage worse than before? It is beyond our
present scope to attempt to answer these questions. However since
the metaphysical tradition which Gadamer wants to re-present is
inextricably interwoven with the Christian tradition, we must ask
of him at a later stage parallel questions concerning the relation
Q
of his philosophy to the Christian tradition.
Before moving on to Gadamer's concept of "the speculative",
there is one further point concerning his dialectic which must be
made. For Gadamer what is "dialectical" about interpretation is
not so much the fact that the one-sidedness of each statement must
be balanced by a statement from another perspective. (WM I4J+I5 TM l;23f)
This, Gadamer says, is a secondary phenomenon (ibid.), and one which
is well known to Schleiermachemian hermeneutics. (WM kk7; TM h29)
The phenomenon which according to Gadamer is "really" dialectical is
more radical than this. It is the phenomenon in which "the word
7 cf. KS III 88.
O
See Part Two, passim.
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which interpretratively meets the meaning of the text brings to language
the whole of this meaning; that is, it itself allows an infinity of
meaning to come to finite presentation". (WM Uil; TM b23) This is the
understanding of dialectic which we have already met with at the
beginning of this chapter. The question we must ask is whether this
understanding of dialectic is not so radical that it undermines the
task that has traditionally belonged to dialectic, that is, of mediating
the immediacy of Being "in itself". Dialectic is the process which,
9from Plato to Hegel, allows the transcendent First Principle of
reality to come to expression. We suggested above"^ that Gadamer
goes the way of dialectic in order to give Heidegger's ontological
insights, his experiences with Being, expression in the logic of the
particular sciences, specifically the human sciences. These sciences
are concerned with particular, determinate beings; it is ontology
alone which is concerned with Being itself, with Being as such.
Gadamer's project can be seen especially clearly in his attempt to
guarantee ontic truth or correctness in terms of the ontological
truth which is "language itself"."^ We had doubts about the success
of Gadamer's attempt, but noted that such success as he might have
depends on his use of dialectic to mediate the immediacy of ontolo¬
gical truth into the realm of ontic correctness. But whereas
Hegel's dialectical mediation depends on the elaboration of "the
totality of the determinations of thought", Gadamer expressly
relegates such a concept of dialectic to "a merely secondary phenomenon".
^
Though this transcendence, which we see above all in Republic 509
and in Plotinus, tends to be toned down in Hegel, cf. Chapter 5(c)
below.
See Chapter 7 above.
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Dialectic for Gadamer is not primarily to do with the elaboration
of truth in statements, but with that prior process or event in
which the content of tradition first "comes to language". It is
only in this "coming-to-language" that the content of tradition
means anything (i.e. is at all). Thus we might say that for Gadamer
dialectic is the "ontological event" par excellence. But if dia¬
lectic is itself the "ontological event", it is very difficult to see
how it can also perform the function of mediating the immediacy of
the "ontological event" in the logical realm of determinate beings.
If dialectic is primarily to do with the fact that the contents of
tradition come-to-language (i.e. are at all)., it is very difficult
to see how it can also perform its traditional task which is logically
to unfold what is there. The onus is on Gadamer to show how his new
concept of dialectic relates to the traditional concept. He must
allay our fears that his transformation of dialectic into an
"ontological event" not only empties the term of its traditional
meaning, but also prevents it from fulfilling its traditional function -
a consequence which casts doubt on Gadamer's ability to move beyond
Heidegger's ontology to the logic of the human sciences. Unfortunately
Gadamer does not, in the present writer's view, do enough to show that
these fears are groundless.
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(c) "The Speculative"
Gadamer proposes to explicate his own understanding of dialectic,
as opposed to metaphysical dialectic, by introducing the concept of
"the speculative". (WM 14*1; TM 1*23). With this term, which was much
used by Hegel, Gadamer wishes to indicate that which the metaphysical
and his own hermeneutical dialectic have in common, (ibid.) Gadamer
begins by giving a description of the phenomenon of mirroring, for this
phenomenon is what the word "speculative" originally refers to. (ibid.)
Something is mirrored in something else, for example a castle in a
lake; the lake then throws back the image of the castle. The mirror
image has no being-for-itself; it is like an appearance which does
not itself exist and which lets a view of the mirrored object appear.
The real mystery of mirroring is "the intangibility of the image, the
unearthly quality of sheer reproduction" /die Ungreifbarkeit des Bildes,
das Schwebende der reinen Wiedergabe/. (ibid.) "Speculative", as the
word was coined by philosophers around 1800, is based on this phenomenon
of mirroring, (ibid.) A person or thought which is speculative is
opposed to "the dogmatism of everyday experience" (ibid.), where every¬
thing is locked into the fixed determinateness that allows it to be
what it is and nothing else. In contrast to this, the "speculative"
person is able to reflect, that is, in Hegelian terminology, to
recognize the "in itself" as "for me". (WM 14*2; TM 1*23) A thought
is speculative when the relation it expresses is not merely the attribu¬
tion of a predicate to a fixed subject, but must rather be thought of
as a mirror-relation in which that which mirrors is the pure appearance
of that which is mirrored, so that "the one is the one of the other,
and the other is the other of the one", (ibid.)
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This "speculative relation" of thought is described by Hegel
in the Preface to this Phenomenology of Spirit where he differentiates
between the structure of the "speculative sentence" and the subject-
predicate structure of the proposition or judgement."'" The "speculative
sentence" (the examples Hegel gives are "God is Being" and "the actual
is the universal") has the subject-predicate structure of the pro¬
position or judgement only in appearance. In reality the "predicate"
turns out to be, not a quality attached to a fixed subject, but
rather the essence of the subject. The normal movement of thought is
as it were blocked; it has to reconsider and to keep re-reading the
2
sentence until it grasps its "speculative structure." According to
3
Gadamer in his essay "The Idea of Hegel's Logic" , it is Hegel's
intention that the "speculative sentence" should demand "a retreat
of thought into itself" (HD 66; HIKE!) 95). It is beyond our present
scope and competence to examine Hegel's difficult pages on the
"speculative sentence", and indeed to examine the account which Gadamer
(who never errs on the side of over-simplificationi) gives of them.
We must simply sketch out the main points that have a bearing on
Gadamer's argument.^" It is important for Hegel that this inner
blocking of ordinary thought-processes be expressed, be "set forth"
(as Miller translates, PS 39); the speculative relation must, Gadamer
1
See PS 36-I1I (HW II U6-5l) •
2
This, Hegel tell us, is why philosophy is so difficult to read, and
why it must frustrate ordinary ways of thought.
3
HD b9-69; HD(ET) 75-99.
Gadamer has, in any case, a tendency to delight in detailed exegesis
for its own sake; and while this habit is often illuminating, it
also results in lengthy digressions which impair the onward flow of
his argument, of which it could be said that it meanders rather than
flows.
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tells us, go over into dialectical presentation. (MM I4J4.35 TM k2$) A
merely inner appropriation of speculative truth is not enough; as
Findlay puts it in his analysis of Hegel's text:
Speculative dialectic does not merely dispense with
the fixed distinctions of argumentative thought in some
high flight of insight. It shows them breaking down as
it reflects on the intrinsic sense of propositions.5
This "express presentation" of the break-up of ordinary thought is
authentic form of philosophical proof. Once proof loses this connection
with dialectic, Hegel tells us, there is an end of philosophical proof.^
Thus proof is not an activity of argumentative /rhsonnirend/ thought
with its chains of deductive reasoning; proof is rather the activity
of the "thing itself", the subject-matter, which with its "immanent
rhythm" emerges from the spectacle of the dialectical break-up of
inadequate modes of thought. But for Hegel this dialectical presenta¬
tion is in truth not really external, Gadamer tells us; it only
thinks it is as long as thought does not yet realize that in the end
it turns out to be the reflection of "the thing itself", the subject-
matter, into itself. (WM I4J4J4.; TM 1|.2£) It is only, we might say, until
thought realizes that "reality" is not external to it, nor does
"reality" reside exclusively within it, but that it itself is a
moment of "reality" as the latter relates itself to itself (i.e.
becomes a Self), it is only until then that the dialectical presen¬
tation of "reality" or the "speculative relation" remains external.
Once the level of Absolute Knowledge has been attained, Gadamer tells
us, the distinction made in the Phenomenology of Spirit between
"speculative" and "dialectical" disappears is "aufgehoben" (ibid.),
^ PS 503f.
6
PS UO (HW II £0>
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since all externality of thought to its subject-matter is overcome.
It is here that Gadamer parts company with Hegel. Gadamer, we
may presume, approves of Hegel's idea that thought participates in the
dialectical self-presentation of "reality", of "the thing itself".
But the idea that this dialectical presentation should be merely a
stage on the way to the perfect transparency of self-reflection in
Absolute Knowledge can only be rejected by Gadamer. For him it is
presumably unacceptable that the need for dialectical presentation
should prove to be, after all, merely provisional. Gadamer, however,
focuses his critique of Hegel's "Aufhebung" of the difference between
dialectical presentation and "the speculative" on the relation to
language that this "Aufhebung" implies. Hegel's dialectical method
of demonstration which consists in forcing the language of proposi¬
tions or statements /Aussagen/ into self-contradiction and destruc¬
tion, as well as his conviction that this process of self-contradic¬
tion and destruction can lead eventually beyond language altogether
into the realm of pure concepts, presuppose that language is in
essence the language of statements. It is above all this pre¬
supposition that Gadamer wants to dispute. This assumption about
the nature of language Hegel shares with the Greek Logos philosophy,
whose intention, Gadamer tells us elsewhere, was to get beyond
7
language altogether. Hegel's dialectic rests, as did Plato's, on
the subordination of language to the statement. (WM Wi; TM k2?)
But this assumption, Gadamer affirms, "is in extreme contrast to the
essence of the hermeneutical experience and the linguisticality of
all human experience of the world", (ibid.)
7 See WM 395j TM 377f•
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Thus Gadamer refuses to view language primarily in terms of the
proposition or statement and to oppose it to "the speculative",
allowing it to serve as a merely provisional means of e:xpressing the
latter. On the contrary, for Gadamer language has itself something
"speculative" about it. (MM I4I4I4-j TM U26) By this Gadamer does not
meant that language instinctively prefigures the reflexive relations
Q
of logic, as Hegel thought, (ibid.) Rather the realization of
meaning in language is "speculative" "insofar as the finite possibi¬
lities of the word are orientated towards the intended meaning as if
towards the infinite", (ibid.) This realization of meaning is by no
means the same as "making statements". Just how little "making state¬
ments" is a real saying of what one means will be clear to anyone who
has been involved in legal proceedings where the horizon of meaning
which accompanies what is said is excluded with methodological
exactitude. The resulting "statements" are inevitably distorted,
(ibid.) On the contrary, Gadamer says, "to say what one means, to
make oneself understood, means to hold what is said together with
an infinity of the unsaid in the unity of one meaning ..." (ibid.)
Even though one uses the most common words, one still speaks
"speculatively" when one's words "do not copy beings but express a
relation to the whole of Being and let it come to language". (WM kh5;
TM lj.26) Even in the most everyday speaking there appears an element
of "speculative mirroring",- there is "the intangibility of that which
is nevertheless the purest reproduction of meaning", (ibid.) This
"speculative" dimension of everyday speech has, Gadamer tell us,
something in common with poetry. (WM hh&£ > TM Ij.26ff)
For a more detailed discussion of this see HD 63ffj HD (ET) 91ff.
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There seem to be two main points in Gadamer's treatment of the
"speculative" nature of language which require discussion. First of
all, Gadamer's use of the term "infinite" seems to be rather ambiguousj
and secondly, his polemic against "the statement" leaves unclear what
exactly in his view the status of "the statement" is - or whether it
has any status at all.
(i) To deal with the problem of"infinity" in Gadamer it might
be helpful to adapt for our own purposes two terms introduced into
9
linguistics by de Saussure: "synchronic" and "diachronic". What we
then might call "synchronic infinity" would be the infinite horizon
of meaning which accompanies and is implied by every (finite)
utterance. While this infinite horizon has no doubt developed in
time, while as "World" it is no doubt in some sense "historical",
we are here focussing on the fact that it is present, if unexpressed,
in the individual utterance. "Diachronic infinity" on the other hand
would be the endless mutations of meaning caused by the succession of
interpretations in time.10 No doubt (from Gadamer's perspective)
it is artificial to attempt to abstract these two types of infinityj
but it nevertheless seems useful to distinguish between "infinity" as
implied totality11 of meaning and "infinity" as the endlessness of the
historical process of interpretation.
^ It must be stressed that we are not using these terms in a way
which precisely conforms with their role in de Saussure's thought
(for which see John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics
(Cambridge University Press, 1968), pTIIfjffT.
10
Such mutations could also be caused by cross-cultural interpretation.
11
The ambiguity of the term "totality" will be discussed shortly.
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Now in the present writer's view Gadamer seems to move indis¬
criminately between these two uses of the term "infinite" which we
have distinguished in his text. The "infinity of the unsaid" some¬
times seems to refer to the horizon of implicit meaning which
accompanies each word or utterance like a penumbra, and sometimes
to the endlessness of what has not yet been said and which could be
said from different perspectives or horizons of meaning. We might
contrast an "inner infinity of meaning" with an "external endlessness
of meaning". Gadamer's attempt to re-instate the language of tradi¬
tional metaphysics on the basis of the second of these uses of the
word "infinite" may be given short shrift. To re-introduce terms
like "speculative", "infinite", "unity", and "totality" on the basis
of what we have called "diachronic infinity" or mere endlessness is,
in the present writer's view, disingenuous. It is sheer bad faith
to re-instate the dreams of "onto-theo-logy" on the basis of the
endless play of temporal flux. Far better would be to go the way
12
of Nietzsche and his followers and openly repudiate the dreams
of metaphysics (including "truth", which Nietzsche tells us is "the
13
kind of error without which a certain species could not live" ).
Whether the key words of metaphysics might find an authentic
re-pristination on the basis of the other kind of "infinity" we
characterized as "synchronic infinity" is another matter. That there
is a certain kind of language akin to poetry which allows the
12
i.e. To practise a "hermeneutics of suspicion" rather than a
"hermeneutics of belief"'} see section (b), note 2, of this chapter.
■L3 The Will power, no.lj.93, quoted in Kaufmann's^translation of
The Gay Science, (New lorkk Vintage Books, 197U), p.172, note 7-
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encompassing life-world to reverberate, and which in this sense might
be said "speculatively to re-present the infinity of the unsaid", is
a much more defensible position. In the present writer's view it
might be more appropriate to term such language "evocative" rather
than "speculative"] and since that which is evoked - or, to change
metaphors, that which is lit up - is Being or "World", we might even
speak of "ontologically evocative" language. Such language may
possibly justify the use of worlds like "unity", "totality", "infinity",
and might certainly lay claim to its own kind of "truth".
(ii) This leads to our second point which is: what is the
relation between this "evocative" language and the language of the
statement? To this no doubt prosaic question Gadamer appears to
give no satisfactory answer. His polemic against the hegemony of
the statement gives the impression that the statement is merely a
degenerate form of the authentic linguistic relation to the world
which is "speculative". And yet, as Pannenberg remarks in his dis¬
cussion of Truth and Method, Gadamer is not one of those thinkers
who tend to oppose the assertive or propositional nature of language
to some existentialist communication of purely personal meaning."^
Gadamer, on the contrary has much to say about the "objectivity"
/Sachlichkeit/ of language.1^ Pannenberg even thinks he has caught
Gadamer out when the latter speaks of the process which enable parti¬
cular realities to become the content of a statement. It must be
Pannenberg, op.cit., p.ll|3f (Basic Questions I, 12£f).
Pannenberg, op.cit., p.lU5f (Basic Questions I, 127f)] cf. WM I).21f]
TM U03f.
16 • "U ■ibid.
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noted (in Gadamer's defence) that in the passage concerned he is dis¬
tinguishing the (good) "objectivity" /Sachlichkeit7 of the Greeks
from the (bad) "objectivity" /0bjektivitat7 of modern science which
reduces the dignity of the "thing" to a mere object /Gegenstand7-
Pannenberg's discussion misses the importance for Gadamer of Greek
thought as a way out of our contemporary impasse. But Pannenberg
is correct (in the present writer's view) in pointing to the ambi¬
guity of Gadamer's position with regard to the role of the statement.
Pannenberg's response to Gadamer's ambiguity is to reject the
latter's attempts to devalue the statement, these attempts being
incompatible with the fact that Gadamer is (in Pannenberg's view)
17
a Hegelian malgre lui. It is Pannenberg's view that the proper
task of hermeneutics is not to dissolve the distorting categories
of the statement into the more fluid play of "speculative" language
with its "infinity of the unsaid". On the contrary that task is
for Pannenberg to "turn into statement that which accompanied the
l8
original statement as unspoken". In a deliberately provocative
gesture Pannenberg declares the goal of hermeneutics to be the
— 19
objectification /Objektivierung7 of the text in all its implications .
However Pannenberg's suggestion that the logic of Gadamer's argument
leads to the above conclusion perhaps fails to take sufficient account
17 Pannenberg., op.cit., p.llj.6 (Basic Questions I, 129).
18
Pannenberg, op.cit., p.114; (Basic Questions I, 126f).
ibid., especially footnote.
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of the extent to which Gadamer is committed to Heidegger's view that
hiddenness is not a contingent privation of truth, but its essential
accompaniment. This means that for Gadamer "the unsaid" is not that
which we have not as yet said and, as finite human beings, are perhaps
incapable of ever sayingj for Gadamer "the unsaid" accompanies the
said in principle, and it is only through the former that the latter
can be said at all, can be at all. Here we come upon an apparently
irreconcilable conflict. On the one hand, there is the Hegelian
implicit totality which every statement points toj the elaboration
of this totality into Absolute Knowledge may, in contrast to Hegel,
be rejected as a human possibility, as is the case with Pannenberg.
But Pannenberg remains nevertheless in some sense a Hegelian in
that he believes that such an elaborated totality may be known at
the End of history. We finite beings may not know the totality now
(though we may provisionally anticipate it)j the totality nevertheless
is real enough and knowable - if only by the Divine Knowledge in which
20
we may share in the End. The Heideggerian implicit totality is
however itself in some sense finite and in principle unknowable.
21
Finitude is construed by Heidegger in an "ontologically positive"
manner, i.e. finitude is the condition of the possibility of Being
and truth, not a human attribute which (temporarily?) denies us access
2°The "totality of involvements" /Bewandtnisganzheit/ which was briefly
discussed in the previous chapter.
21PH 215cf. Gadamer's introduction to the Reclam edition of Heidegger's
Per Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.105-
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to them. Moreover for Heidegger this totality is not something
which we could construct out of statements, for it is absolutely
prior to the secondary and derivative role of statements (or
"apophantic logic"). While in the earlier Heidegger the relation
of this prior totality to language is not clear (beyond the simple
contrast with "apophantic" or propositions!, logic), in his later
writings it becomes increasingly clear that this prior totality
is by no means beyond language (which in that case would be reduced
to the language of statements) but rather is intimately connected
with a primordial, poetic Saying.
Now this primordial, poetic Saying clearly lies behind Gadamer's
notion of "speculative" language or, as we preferred to call it,
"ontologically evocative" language. The problem is that Gadamer
wants to extend the range of this language beyond the purely onto-
logical concerns of Heidegger. As we have repeatedly stressed,
Gadamer's intention is to overcome the dangerous isolation of philo¬
sophy (which for Heidegger is ontology) from the sciences in
22
Heidegger. But we must ask: is this "ontologically evocative"
language the appropriate language for the sciences? Do not the
sciences (and even the human sciences) have to be elaborated precisely
in statements? Gadamer of course would deny that this is so. But
while "speculative" or "ontologically evocative" language may well
be the language of great literary and religious texts, one wonders
to what extent it would be said to be the language of the human
sciences in general (and even of the disciplines concerned with
literary and religious texts). To this extent Pannenberg's claim
22
cf. KS III 200; PH 196.
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that interpretation is the elaboration of the content of texts in
statements seems to be justified. On the other hand, to treat a
literary or religious text (e.g. the New Testament) merely as a
collection of statements is to miss the point. If there is such a
thing as "ontologically evocative" language then clearly parts of
the New Testament are examples of it; they light up our relation
to Being, to "ultimate reality". What is said in this "speculative"
language can be communicated in preaching or in liturgy,which
can also be examples of "speculative" language. But we can also
attempt to express Christian faith in statements or propositions
about matters of fact, and these have other criteria of truth (or
perhaps we should say "of correctness") than the authority with
which "speculative" language imposes itself upon us. This latter
undertaking would be called "theology", or perhaps, in some sense
23
of that ambiguous phrase, "philosophy of religion".
The above example of the relation of the New Testament to
preaching and liturgy on the one hand and to theology and philosophy
on the other perhaps raises more problems than it solves. The point
We are pleading here for the possible co-existence of an "onto¬
logically evocative" language of faith which makes an immediate
and total claim on us and which "relates" us to "the ground of
Being"; and a language which elaborates in statements or proposi¬
tions the meaning of that faith in terms of particular, deter¬
minate beings, events and experiences. Faith, that is, involves
not only a moment of sheer transcendence beyond the World, a
moment in which we are "related" to the groundless ground of the
totality of beings, to "the ground of Being"; it is also concerned
with the immanent work of the Spirit within the World or totality,
with the work of the Spirit in particular events and experiences.
These events and experiences may symbolically or poetically evoke
the totality, and our "relation" to the ground of that totality;
but unless they can also be expressed in "objective" statements
which can be true or false, we are arguably not taking our faith
with ultimate seriousness, cf. Part Two, Chapter 6 below.
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we have been trying to make is that Pannenberg's Hegelian approach
seems to be saying something important and true (i.e. that the
elaboration of concrete matters of fact in statements is important);
and that Gadamer's Heideggerian approach also says something
important and true (i.e. that there is a different sort of language
which evokes our "relation" to Being). But each of these positions
is, in the present writer's view, one-sided; it cannot do justice
to the aspect of truth pointed to by the other. This raises the
question whether the two positions are irreconcilable, or whether
after all there might not be some way of combining them.
To ask this question is ultimately to ask about the relation
between Hegel and Heidegger. Are the insights which lie at the
heart of their respective philosophies as flatly opposed as they
appear to be? Or might it be possible to do justice to both?
Such a question is of course enormously complex, and it would be
foolish indeed to rush in where angels and professional philosophers
fear to tread. However the fact that Gadamer's philosophy in its
own way attempts to mediate between Hegel and Heidegger prompts us
to risk some comments on this issue. First of all, we must ask to
what extent Heidegger's question of Being is dependent on his
doctrine of the pre-logical, ontologically finite "life-world".
Put another way, to what extent is the question about the totality
of beings dependent on the internal structure of that totality?
Would not "the wonder of wonders" that an implicit totality of
beings is at all persist even if that totality were to be conceived
along Hegelian lines rather than Heidegger's more pragmatic lines
(where "beings" are foci of pre-logical "involvements" or relations
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of meaning rather than objects of statements)? A Hegelian implicit
totality can remain as unknown and inaccessible as Heidegger's
implicit totality ever was - only it is so because human beings are
in fact finite, and not because that totality is in principle finite.
No doubt such thoughts are heresy from a Heideggerian point of view,
since his "ontologically positive" understanding of finitude is as
fundamental a theme as his question about Being. But this does not
prevent us from asking in what sense these two themes are actually
dependent on each other.
Of Hegel, on the other hand, we must ask whether his logical
totality does not permit of being grounded in the unfathomable depths
of the Godhead to which the mystical tradition testifies. Can God
be enclosed within the realm of reason, of logic and of essence?
Is there not some truth in the ancient idea that reason (nous) is only
a moment in the Divine Life?2^"
The direction of our questions to Heidegger and to Hegel is not
hard to grasp. They envisage the possibility that Heideggerfe sensiti¬
vity to the question of Being (and to the "ontologically evocative"
language that illumines Being) may be combined with some sort of
Hegelian implicit totality of beings which is capable, in principle
if not practice, in the End if not now, of being elaborated into a
meaningful whole. That whole which is provisionally anticipated (or
in religious language "hoped for") would be the ultimate criterion
for the truth (or correctness) of the statements we make about
determinate beings, events and experiences, about "objective" matters
of fact. Perhaps our suggested cross-fertilization of Hegel and
2^
For more on this topic see Part Two, Chapter £ below.
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Heidegger would produce a still-born monster; perhaps it is "specu¬
lation" in the worst sense of that term.. It certainly is a union
which at least one of the parties, Heidegger, would have rejected
most vehemently. But on the other hand, our study of Gadamer has
suggested that a rapprochment on Heidegger's terms does not work;
Heidegger's notion of ontological truth cannot, we suggested, on
its own guarantee the truth (or correctness) of statements. Yet
as Pannenberg points out, Gadamer is well aware of the need to hold
ont to some form of "objectivity". Gadamer wants to retain in some
form or another the truth contained in the metaphysical concepts of
logic, dialectic, and the concrete "what-ness" of particular entities
(essence). But Heidegger's ontology on its own, we su^€St , does
not allow for these. Only some such synthesis as we suggested above
would seem to allow room for both aspects of truth. Of course such
a synthesis may not in fact be possible - Hegel and Heidegger may
be simply incompatible. But that, we suggest, does not augur well for
philosophy, for we should end up with either a Hegelian or a
Heideggerian position which in incapable of doing justice to the
insights of the other. For theology too such a situation would be
unwelcome, since, as we shall argue below, the philosophical insights
of Hegel and of Heidegger correspond to different aspects of the
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Christian-Platonic tradition.^ The impetus to combine the insights
of Hegel and of Heidegger does not derive from some tendency to
philosophical syncretism, but rather from the inner necessity of
the tradition which has been the great vehicle of truth in the West.
Many, particularly in the English-speaking world, would scorn the
idea that philosophical truth is to be carved up between Hegel and
Heidegger. But all we are saying (and will argue below) is that
Hegel and Heidegger seem each to have got hold of a fundamental
aspect of the Christian-Platonic tradition (no doubt a controversial
claim with regard to Heidegger.) One can of course attempt to
reject this tradition, though such an undertaking is very much
harder than it might at first seem (on "rejecting tradition" see
Chapter 9(c), note 23, below). Unfortunately not everyone has had
as clear a vision of what such a rejection involves as did Nietzsche.
Karl Marx, from this point of view, was a "left-wing" Hegelian who
missed the significance of the dimension of transcendence in the
Christian-Platonic tradition to which Heidegger testifies.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE UNIVERSAL ASPECT OF HERMENEUTICS
(a) Gadamer's "Hermeneutical Ontology"
We have now reached the final section of Truth and Method which
is entitled "The Universal Aspect of Hermeneutics". In this section
the "ontological turn" which characterizes Part Three as a whole finds
its completion. Much of this final section is concerned with the
"retrieval" of the Platonic metaphysics of the beautiful, and to this
we shall devote a separate section. However since the opening pages
of this final section give a succinct summary of the results which
Truth and Method purports to have arrived at, they seem to merit
separate treatment. It seems prudent to try to get one final over¬
view of the wood before plunging once more into the trees (and indeed
the tangled undergrowth^") of Gadamerian exegesis.
Gadamer's reflections have been guided, he tells us, by the idea
that language is a centre in which self and "World" meet; or better
perhaps, in which they make themselves manifest in their primordial
_ 2
"togetherness" /sich in ihrer ursprimglichen Zusammengehbrigkeit
Already in the 1920's, Gadamer tells us, his friends had coined the
term "ein Gad" to designate something which was unnecessarily com¬
plicated! See his Philosophische Lehr.jahre, p.lj.6.
2
"das Zusammengehoren" is the term used by Heidegger for the
belonging together of There-being and Being. This supports a con¬
nection between Gadamer's "die Mitte der Sprache" and Heidegger's
"einfache Mitte"; see Chapter 8(a), note 2 above. "Zusammen-
gehdrigkeit" also echoes "Zugehorigkeit" (belongingness or parti¬
cipation) about which Gadamer has written above.
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darstellen/. (WM I4J4STM U3l) The "speculative centre of language" in
which this "togetherness" or unity is made manifest is, in contrast to
the dialectical mediation of the concept,"^ always a finite event, (ibid.)
Gadamer rehearses the themes which he has presented in the previous
section (and on which we have offered some comment) : language, with
its "speculative structure", is not a copy of a fixed given but is
the coming-to-language of a whole of meaningj this process brings us
into the vicinity of ancient dialectic which knew of no methodical
activity of a subject but rather only of an activity of the "thing
\j|i\i£<!ft 4-Ko^kt iawvU-tj**-8 ; 4+yf atWify +kt " U-s«l£"
itself^is the authentic "speculative movement" which takes hold of
the speaker. CWM b$0} TM U3l) These themes, Gadamer now tells us,
point to "a universal-ontological structure", that is, to the funda¬
mental constitution of anything at all to which Understanding can be
directed. ("WM TM U32) The universality of the hermeneutical
phenomenon is a reflection of the universal truth that all intelligi¬
bility is in essence linguistically constituted, (ibid.) Hence we
say not only that art "speaks to us" but also that nature "speaks"
and indeed that things "speak for themselves".^" The universal con¬
nection of Being and language is, Gadamer tells us, what grounds the
curious link between literary interpretation and the study of nature
which accompanied the beginnings of modern science (e.g. "the book
of nature") . (ibid.) "Whatever can be understood presents itself of
8 -where self and World are united in the infinite, i.e. in Absolute
Knowledge.
^ This is a rather free rendering of the German idioms Gadamer appeals
to here. cf. his essay "The Nature of Things and the Language of
Things" (KSI 59-69j PH 69-81).
^ cf. WM 170, 226f5 TM 160, 211ff.
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itself as language to the Understanding, (ibid.) This is the by now
familiar structure which Gadamer calls "speculative". Coming-to-
language does not mean that something acquires a sort of second exis¬
tence; it is rather the case that that as which something presents
itself belongs to its own being, (ibid.) The "speculative unity" of
language involves a difference between Being and self-presentation
which is no difference at all. (ibid.) Or as Gadamer elaborates:
What comes to language is certainly other than the
spoken word itself. But the word is only a word
through that which comes to language in it. In its
own physical being the word is only there to be
taken up into what is said /urn sich in das Gesagte
aufzuheben7. Conversely, that which comes to
language is not some extra-linguistic entity which
is pre-given; rather it only^receives its own
determinateness in the word.
It is this "speculative" structure or movement characteristic of
language at which his critiques of aesthetic and of historical conscious¬
ness were aiming, Gadamer tells us. (ibid.) Thus it is this "speculative"
structure which holds together the three Parts of Truth and Method.
Part One with its critique of modern "subjectivistic" aesthetics ended
by rejecting the idea that the work of art has any "being-in-itself"
separable from, and comparable with, its contingent reproduction or
performance. Such "aesthetic differentiation" of the work "in itself"
and its performance is a secondary thematization. (WM b%Of; TM i|32)
ibid. The theological student can hardly miss the Christological
echoes of this "speculative structure" of language. Nor can he
or she fail to notice that Gadamer does not look to Christology
for the supreme manifestation of this structure, but rather to
the Platonic doctrine of Beauty - a point we shall take up later
in this chapter and again in Part Two.
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Similarly, Gadamer tells us, the meaning of an historical event or of
an historical document is not some fixed object "in itself"] histori¬
cal consciousness is in reality the mediation of past and present.
(WM It^lj TM U32) Thus the "speculative structure of "identity-in¬
difference" characterizes both aesthetic and historical experience.
The movement of Truth and Method as a whole is from the establish¬
ment of this "speculative" movement as the authentic structure of
aesthetic and historical experience to an explicit concentration on
the structure as such which turns out to be the "essence of language".
The "speculative" movement is not only the structure of aesthetic and
of historical experience] it is also the structure of reality itself,
of Being itself. Reality or Being is essentially "speculative", that
is, linguistic. Thus Truth and Method moves from an examination of
the theories of interpretation operative in aesthetics and the human
sciences to an examination of interpretation as the fundamental,
ontological process. Interpretation is not merely what we do when
we are involved with works of art or historical documents] it is that
which makes possible any experience whatsoever of any reality whatso¬
ever. Hermeneutics, as the science of interpretation, is thus no
merely ancillary discipline but is of "universal-ontological" import.
In Gadamer•s own words :
For the human relation to the world is absolutely and
fundamentally linguistic and hence intelligible.
Hermeneutics is, as we saw, to this extent a universal
aspect of philosophy and not merely the methodological
basis of the so-called human sciences.'''
From this vantage point Gadamer once more rehearses his criticisms
of any extension of the methods and ideals of the natural sciences
WM l+fjl] TM ii32f. Gadamer!s italics.
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beyond, their own relatively restricted sphere. The objectifying
attitude of the latter and their concept of "being-in-itself"
/AnsichseinT' represent an abstraction, an artificial removal from
the authentic and original linguistic relation to the world. (WM l|£lj
TM 1+33) The natural scientific "mind-set" tries to assure itself of
beings, to make certain of beings, by a methodical organization of its
knowledge, and condemns as heresy all knowledge not susceptible of
8
this sort of methodological certainty. (ibid.) But Gadamer also
wants to avoid any merely Romantic reaction to positivism, as well
as any idealistic metaphysics of infinity la Hegel, in whose com¬
pany, he has argued, Schleiermacher ends up. (ibid.) The "language
9
that things have" is not the logos ousias of the metaphysical
tradition and it does not complete itself in the self-intuition of
an infinite intellect - it is rather the language which we apprehend
in all our finitude and historicality. (WM lt5lf j TM 1+33) The linguis¬
tic event in which understanding is repeatedly concretized is finite,
Gadamer stresses. (WM l+5>lj TM 2+33)
Gadamer returns to what he has called the "universal-ontological"
aspect of the speculative structure of language in the final paragraph
of the passage under consideration. He emphasizes once more that it is
no peculiarity of the work of art to have its being in its presentation,
nor is it a peculiar characteristic of historical being to be under¬
stood in terms of its significance. (WM h!?2; TM l+33f) On the contrary
®
por a succinct summary of this transformation of truth into certainty;
see the essay "Was ist Wahrheit?", KSI 2+6 38, esp» p.30.
^
Apparently a German idiom; see note It above.
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as Gadamer says in the following sentences which attempt to sum up
the vast and intricate tapestry of Truth and Method:
Self-presentation and being-understood do not only
belong together in the interpenetration of the work
of art and its "effective-history", of what is handed
down in history and its being understood in the
present. It is not only art and history that are
speculative, each differentiating itself from itself,
bringing itself to presentation; it is not only art
and history that are language which speaks meaning.
These characteristics apply to every being /alles
Seiende/ insofar as it can be understood. The
"speculative" constitution of Being which grounds
hermeneutics is of the same universal scope as
reason or language.-'-®
The movement of Truth and Method, then,is from an examination of
the logic of the human sciences to "language as the horizon of a
hermeneutical ontology". The "speculative" structure of hermeneutical
experience turns out to be the structure of language and ultimately of
Being itself. Gadamer's attempt to blend Heidegger's insights into
the ontological significance of language with a revaluation of the meta¬
physical tradition results in a synthesis which does much to overcome
the onesidedness of both. There can be little doubt that Gadamer must
be credited with a major philosophical achievement. However there
remains the nagging doubt that Gadamer's real contribution is in the
end to ontology and not to logic of the human sciences which it was
his avowed intention to transform. While Gadamer declares that, in
contrast to Heidegger, his real interest is in the consequences of
ontology for hermeneutics rather than in ontology itself (WM 250,TM 235),
WM i|52; TM U3U- Here is another of those" tantalizing references to
reason which Gadamer makes from time to time. Unfortunately he
nowhere in Truth and Method gives an extended discussion of reason.
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it is perhaps a little surprising that his major work should end by
discussing a "hermeneutical ontology" rather than an "ontological
hermeneutic". This latter phrase which we have coined (or perhaps
perpetrated) is intended to suggest the development of the conse¬
quences of Heidegger's ontology in the sphere of hermeneutics or
the logic of the human sciences. And it does not seem to the present
writer that Gadamer has succeeded in presenting a satisfactory
"ontological hermeneutic". Perhaps this is because the latter
phrase may represent a "square circle". Perhaps it is in the end
as impossible to understand hermeneutics or the logic of the human
sciences in terms of ontology as it is to understand ontology in
terms of logic.We may in the end be left with two complementary
dimensions of reality, neither of which is reducible to the other.
12
To these two dimensions of reality would correspond two disciplines:
first of all ontology, which would be concerned with Being as such,
with the Being of the totality of beings /das Ganze des SeiendenT"j and
secondly logic, taken in the widest sense of that term, which would
be concerned with the structure and relatedness of beings in the
An absurdity which the Western philosophical tradition has spent
most of its history trying to perpetrate, according to E. Gilson
in his Being and Some Philosophers. Our contention here and below
that an adequate understanding of reality demands two complementary
disciplines (i.e. ontology and logic), neither of which is reducible
to the other, perhaps draws near to the Thomist insistence on the
complementarity of Existence and Essence. But it is beyond our
present scope and competence to explore this area here.
This is not to say that two such disciplines could not have a
reciprocal influence, that each could balance and correct the
other. It is only to say that for one to swallow up the other
spells philosophical disaster.
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totality of beings. To posit these two dimensions is in effect to
repeat the suggestion made at the end of the previous chapter that
the essential insights of Heidegger and Hegel must somehow both be
retained for a satisfactory philosophy. The real contribution of
Gadamer may be that he has attempted to do this. Truth and Method
may be a continual discussion of the philosophical past; but its
real worth may be that it sets the agenda for discussion in the
philosophical future.
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(b) A Methodological Interlude
On first reading it is perhaps rather startling that Gadamer
should choose to finish Truth and Method not with a recapitulation
of the general results of his investigation into Understanding in
the human sciences, but rather with a detailed exegesis of certain
texts of Plato dealing with Beauty. The final overview and summary
of arguments which we might expect at the end of a major philosophical
text is quickly disposed of in the opening paragraphs of the final
section which we have discussed above in section (a) of this chapter.
The final section of Truth and Method is largely concerned with an
interpretation of Plato. But this peculiarity is not merely a
quirk or a failure of nerve on the part of Gadamer; it is rather of
considerable methodological significance. Gadamer has, after all,
consistently refused any "teleological" elevation of the experience
of Understanding into knowledge. Interpretation is by Gadamer's
own definition open-ended, and is not "teleologically" related to
any final results. In Gadamer's view there is no such thing as
one universally and externally "correct" interpretation. Hence in
order not to fall victim to the reflexive argument, the power of
which he well knows,1 Gadamer must avoid giving the impression that
his own claim that there is no final knowledge is itself being
presented as some final knowledge. Gadamer must seek to banish the
impression that Truth and Method gives the final, correct interpre-
2
tation of interpretation. Gadamer's interpretation of interpretation
must, to remain true to its own interpretation, end in interpretation
1
cf. our chapter on reflexive philosophy above.
2
Or as de Waehlens puts it in the title of his article cited in Part
Two, Chapter lj.(a) below, Gadamer's "hermeneutics of hermeneutics".
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and not in any theoretical findings about interpretation. And since
for Gadamer interpretation is always interpretation of the tradition
which comes to us, his own interpretation of interpretation must
remain an interpretation of tradition, in this case of the Platonic
tradition which in Gadamer's view determines Western thought both
positively and negatively. Moreover Gadamer must not appear merely
to be giving an ingenious exegesis of Plato which claims to show
that Plato has unconsciously stumbled across Gadamer's theory of
interpretion, no doubt in a primitive and imperfect version. On
the contrary, Gadamer's interpretation of interpretation means
that Plato's theory of Beauty must address us across the creative
void of time, and must demand to come to presentation for our
world in the way it does in Gadamer's text. Initially Gadamer comes
to meet the tradition as the spokesman of our age, the age dominated
by the methodological ideals of the natural sciences; he comes with
the questions of our age, and above all with the question, old yet
ever new, about the nature of truth; he comes, as it were, at the
invitation of the word of tradition (in this case the Platonic tradi¬
tion about Beauty) which first comes to him and addresses him, and
says, to adapt Isaiah,. "Gome now, let us reason together". The out¬
come of this reasoning together is that Gadamer becomes the spokesman
of the tradition; it is in his words that the message of tradition
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comes to us. In this concrete instance of interpretation, as in all
interpretation according to Gadamer, the initiative and priority of
tradition must be stressed.
It must be said in Gadamer's favour that, far from leaving us
with any abstract theoretical account of interpretation, he leaves
us rather with a concrete example of what he understands interpre¬
tation to be. Hence Gadamer himself puts the reader in a position
where the overall evaluation of Truth and Method depends on how con¬
vincing he or she finds the particular interpretation with which
Gadamer chooses to end. Of course this interpretation is not an
isolated example, since the bulk of Truth and Method has consisted
in interpretations of various texts by authors including Aristotle,
Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger (to mention only a few).
The reader of Truth and Method will no doubt have come to some
decision about how convincing he or she finds Gadamer's interpre¬
tations long before reaching this final section. The more suspicious
reader will wonder about some of the more ingenious interpretations
by Gadamer, and will ask whether in reality tradition forces Gadamer's
hermeneutical theory onto 'Gadamer, or whether perhaps Gadamer might not
The fact that the above lines are reminiscent of the views of the
so-called "Hew Hermeneutic" theologians Ebeling and Fuchs is no
coincidence. Gadamer says that his approach has something in
common with that of the latter. CWM 313 note 2j TM 526 note 238)
However in my B.D. dissertation (Edinburgh University, 1977) I
argue that despite his use of certain themes in the later writings
of Heidegger (especially the theme of language), Fuchs ultimately
adheres (like Bultmann) to the "existentialist" interpretation of
Being and Time. He also tends to emply a "law-gospel" schema so
that it is "the language of Jesus" alone that saves. On both
these issues Gadamer would disagree with Fuchs. Thus Fuchs would
be subject to basically the same criticisms that Gadamer levels
at Bultmann. See Part Two, Chapter 3 above.
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force this fundamental theory onto tradition. He or she may wonder at what
point an ingenious interpretation becomes disingenuous.^ But each
case (and the present interpretation of Plato is no exception) must
be decided on its own terms. And it is not the least merit of
Gadamer that, whether the priority really lies with tradition or
with his own preconceived theory of interpretation, he at least
forces the reader to come to grips with certain key texts in the
Western philosophical tradition. Whether or not Gadamer's inter¬
pretation of interpretation is in the end fully convincing, what
does convincingly communicate itself is Gadamer's own passion for
the art of interpretation. If the reader is thereby driven to a
first or a fresh encounter with these texts, Truth and Method has
then arguably obtained its goals with more success than any theo¬
retical argument could guarantee. For to read Truth and Method
is to undergo an experience which opens up new horizons of meaning]
Truth and Method itself has some of that authority which does not
need to be supported by theoretical justification, a kind of
authority which Gadamer will now explore in terms of Plato's
doctrine of Beauty.
^
As we have already asked in the previous chapter with regard to
Gadamer's interpretation of certain themes in the metaphysical
tradition.
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(c) Truth and Beauty
Gadamer believes that the "ontological truth" taken by his
hermeneutical enquiry brings him close the "the metaphysical concept
of the beautiful". (MM TM The closing pages of Truth and
Method are devoted to an exploration of this closeness he perceives
between his own concept of the hermeneutical experience and the meta¬
physical concept of the beautiful which is particularly at home in
the Platonic tradition."'" The concept of the beautiful, Gadamer tells
us, which was eliminated by the nineteenth century critique of
classicism, was formerly a universal metaphysical concept, (ibid.)
Gadamer has no intention of reviving the last embodiment of this,
tradition which stressed the metaphysical status of the beautiful,
that is, the aesthetics of perfection of the eighteenth century.
(MM b55j TM 1|37) He intends rather to go back to the source itself,
to the writings of Plato.
In Plato, Gadamer tells us, the Idea of the beautiful moves very
close to that of the Good, insofar as it too is chosen for its own sake,
as an end in itself rather than as a means to some other end. (MM U5>3;
TM h3H>) According to Gadamer there is in Platonic philosophy a
For the controversy as to whether or not Beauty is a "transcendental"
see F.J. Kovach's article under the general heading of "Beauty" in
the New Catholic Encyclopedia. Kovach'says that inclusion of Beauty
as a "transcendental" is characteristic of the Platonic tradition
in contrast to the Aristotelian.
2
G. Putnam in his article under the general heading of "Beauty" in
the New Catholic Encylcopedia distinguishes between a metaphysics
of beauty and beauty merely as a part of a metaphysical system.
The former, he says, has its roots in Plato and receives its
decisive metaphysical elaboration in Neo-platonism, and particularly
in Plotinus.
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close connection between, and. not seldom a confusion of, the Idea of
the Good and the Idea of the beautiful, (ibid.) Both are beyond a "11
that is conditioned and plural, (ibid.) Gadamer compares the absolute
Beauty, which exists "apart and alone"/ of Socrates' speech in the
Symposium (209a-212a^) to the Good of which Socrates says in the
Republic that it is "beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power"
(509b) . The beautiful "in itself" is as much "beyond all beings" as
the Good, Gadamer claims, (ibid.) Gadamer asks whether the move
beyond physical beauty to "intelligible" beauty really involves a
differentiation and increase in the beauty of what is beautiful, and
not merely of the beings that are beautiful. (WM > TM k3%) The
implication of this question seems to be that Gadamer thinks that
transcendent Beauty is immanent in what is beautiful in such a fashion
that it is in some sense independent of the particular way in which
what is beautiful is ordered or structured. While Gadamer will admit
later that it is the order or well-proportionedness of what is beauti¬
ful that makes it beautiful,^ he seems to think that Beauty is not
dependent on the order or structure of what is beautiful to the extent
that there could be varying degrees of Beauty in proportion to the
varying degrees of order and structure of what is beautiful.1 Gadamer
^
See the Penguin translation of the Symposium by Walter Hamilton, p. 95-
^ Wahrheit und Methode gives a mistaken reference (uncorrected in the




See WM b57; TM U39-
? Hence Gadamer implicitly rejects any analogical treatment of Beauty,
as in, for example, Pseudo-Dionysius, where all things are beautiful
by participation in the Beauty of God, by analogy, i.e. in their
own way. cf. Putnam, op.cit.
178
seems to see the difference between what is beautiful and what is not
8 9
as absolute] there are, apparently, no degrees of Beauty.
However for Plato, Gadamer recognizes, there is a hierarchy of
Beauty which is also a teleological hierarchy of Being. (WM k$k> TM
1*35>) Beauty appears more purely and more clearly in the intelligible
sphere than in the visible, which is marred by that which resists
measure and perfection, (ibid.) The basis of this intimate connection
of the Idea of the beautiful with the teleological hierarchy of Being
is, Gadamer tells us, the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure.
CWM 1*31*5 TM 1+36) Plato defines the beautiful in terms of measure,
appropriateness and good proportion, while according to Aristotle
the elements (eids) of the beautiful are order (taxis), symmetry
(symmetria) and clear definition (horismenon). ^ (ibid.) The close
connection between the mathematical hierarchy of Beauty and the
heavenly hierarchy means that the cosmos, which is the model of all
well-orderedness in the visible sphere, is also the highest example
of Beauty in that sphere, (ibid.) For the ancient Greeks, Gadamer
sums up, measuredness and symmetry are the decisive conditions of
Beauty."^" (ibid.)
8
See WM l±56f] TM 1*38.
^ Just as, it might be argued, there are no degrees of Being in
Heidegger's ontology, cf. note 19 below.
Gadamer does not give references, but presumably he is thinking of,
among other texts, Philebus 61*e, 66a-bj the Aristotle reference is
Metaphysics 1078a 36.
^
That there is another dimension to Plato's theory of the beautiful
is a point which will be discussed shortly. It is perhaps worth
noting here that this dimension was taken up by Plotinus, who tried
to go beyond a narrow conception of Beauty in terms of symmetry
(the version Plotinus attacks appears to be that of the Stoics).
See Enneads 1.6.
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This definition of the beautiful, which persisted more or less
intact until the nineteenth century, is universal and ontological,
says Gadamer, and involves the priority of nature over art. (ibid.) It
was only in the nineteenth century that aesthetic questions were posed
12
in terms of art. (ibid.) This development is rooted in a meta-
physcial process, Gadamer tells us, a process in which nature loses
"the universal, ontological dignity which belonged to the cosmos as
the hierarcbyof beautiful things." (WM b$h£> TM I4.36) Despite the
marginal recognition of the idea of Gestalt in modern science, nature
is thought of as formless or as ruled by mechanical lawsj and the aim
of science is ultimately the domination of nature, (ibid.) In such a
context the beautiful will be conceived in terms of the artistic
13
spirit of man. (ibid.)
Gadamer says that he has no intention merely of reversing this
development, and of re-instating the last embodiment of the Greek idea
of the beautiful, the eighteenth century aesthetics of perfection.
("WM l;55j TM U37) For him Kant's critique of aesthetic rationalism is
12
It might be said that the pendulum has now swung to the opposite
extreme. Modern aesthetics is concerned with art and tends to
play down the concept of the beautiful, cf. Putnam, op.cit.j also
J. Stolnitz' article "Beauty" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
cf. Pierre Fruchon's long article, published in four parts,
"Hermeneutique, Langage et Ontologie: Un discernement du platonisme
chez HrG. Gadamer", Archives de Philosophie, vol.36 (1973)* 529-
568; and vol.37 (197W, 223-21+2; 353-375j 533-571• All our refe¬
rences below are to vol.37. Some of Fruchon's interpretations are
rather controversial, though discussion of them is beyond our
present scope. However his characterization of this metaphysical
process as a move from "ontocentrism" to "anthropocentrism" is -
helpful.
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convincingj despite Kant's unfortunate fathering of aesthetic sub¬
jectivism. (ibid.) In Gadamer's view it is wrong to base a meta¬
physics of the beautiful solely on the ontology of measure and the
teleologicanjhierarchy of Beings to which the "classicism" of the
rationalistic "rules of art" ultimately appealed."^ (ibid.) However
the metaphysics of the beautiful must not without more ado be identi¬
fied with such aesthetic rationalism, (ibid.) If we go back to Plato
we discover quite another side to the phenomenon of the beautiful,
and it is this "other side" of Plato's doctrine that is of interest
to Gadamer's present undertaking, (ibid.)
Gadamer begins his rediscovsy of Plato by remarking that however
closely Plato linked the Idea of the beautiful and the Idea of the
Good, he nevertheless made a distinction between them, a distinction
which gave preference to the beautiful. (WM U55; TM b3l) As against
the sheer intangibility /Ungreifbarkeit7 of the Good, the distinguishing
feature of the beautiful is its ability to be grasped. (WM k5&S TM U37)
It is of the essence of the beautiful that it appears. (ibid.) Referring
to Philebus 61;e, Gadamer says that when we attempt to grasp the Good
itself, it takes flight into the beautiful; in the quest for the Good
the beautiful shows itself. (ibid.) Then, referring to Phaedrus 2f?0b-d,
For "aesthetic rationalism" see Gilbert and Kuhn, A History of
Aesthetics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 195k), chapter J.
("German Rationalism and the New Art Criticism").
^ In his early interpretation of Philebus entitled Platos dialektische
Ethik, Gadamer is even more explicit: "The beautiful ... is none
other than the Good in a form which can be seen and spoken about . . . .
The flight of the Good into the beautiful means more than its ineffabi-
lity. In this flight the Good withdraws itself in order to show
itself". This interpretation is Heideggerian in every sense of the
term. It is perhaps worth remarking that in his commentary on
Philebus Hackforth makes no comment on this phrase which is so
significant for Gadamer.
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Gadamer says that whereas models of human virtue (e.g. justice and
temperance) are hard to perceive in the world of appearances since
they lack any lustre of their own, the beautiful "immediately
captivates us" (a phrase Gadamer will make much of). (MM U56; TM U37f)
The beautiful has its own radiance, so that we are not deceived by
distorted copies as is the case with virtue, (ibid.) In Plato's
words, which Gadamer quotes: "for beauty alone this has been ordained,
to be most manifest to sense /ekphanestaton/ and most lovely of them
all".16
It is now that the connections which Gadamer wishes to establish
between Plato's doctrine of Beauty and his own "hermeneutical ontology"
17
begin to emerge. For in this anagogical function which the beautiful
has for Plato, there becomes visible an "ontological structural element
of the beautiful and with it a universal structure of Being". (MM I|5>6j
TM U38) The distinguishing feature of the beautiful as against the
Good is that it presents itself, it makes itself in its very Being
immediately apparent or clear /einleuchtend/. (ibid.) The beautiful
has the supreme ontological function of mediating between Idea and
appearance, for the Idea of the beautiful is truly present, whole
and undivided,in what is beautiful, (ibid.) However much Beauty may
be experienced as the reflection of somethirg supraterrestial, it is
nevertheless there in the visible world, (ibid.) That Beauty is
indeed something "other", something of a different order, is shown
16
Phaedrus 25>Od (Hackforth translation) . Gadamer translates
"ekphanestaton" as "most radiant" /am meisten hervorleuchtend/
Clement of Alexandria had already in the second century A.D.
distinguished the four possible meanings of a writing: the literal,
moral, anagogical and mystical. See Gilbert and Kuhn, op.cit.,
pp.lil9f •
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by the way it suddenly lights up, and equally abruptly and without
transition disappears, (ibid.) If we must speak of a
hiatus (chorismos) between the world of the senses and the world of
Ideas, says Gadamer, here it is and here it is immediately overcome.^
CWM h$6f; TM I4.38)
We have already drawn attention below to Gadamer' s view that
there is an absolute difference between what is beautiful and what
is not, that the Idea of Beauty suddenly plays in its full splendour
over what is beautiful and then equally suddenly vanishes."^ It does
not seem to the present writer that Plato says in the Fhaedrus
passage what Gadamer wants to make him say. In particular it does
not seem to be the case that Plato says that the Idea of Beauty is
for a brief space of time (or beyond time?) entirely present in
what is beautiful. If that were so, it is difficult to know what
is the meaning of the ascent to Absolute Beauty described in the
Symposium. What Plato says in Phaedrus about the special role of
Beauty seems quite compatible with the passage in the Symposium; but
l8
The theological student can hardly avoid remarking that Gadamer
here wants to make Plato's doctrine of Beauty perform the function
that the Cross plays in the Christian tradition, i.e. of at once
displaying and overcoming the gulf between God and man. In view
of our ensuing discussion of Gadamer's interpretation of Plato,
it is worth pointing out that the Christian tradition has generally
held that while Atonement has been effected once and for all and
in principle on the Cross, nevertheless complete At-one-ment or
Reconciliation must wait until the End when God will be all in
all. cf. Part Two, especially Chapter I4. below.
Gadamer's concept of the beautiful seems to owe more to Heidegger's
"event /Ereignis/ of Being" than to Plato. Nevertheless, as we
suggest-in Part~Two, Chapter I4., Heidegger is not without his debts
to Platonism, whatever he may say against Plato.
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what Plato clearly says in the Symposium seems incompatible with what
Gadamer tries to make Plato say in Phaedrus. To try and rid Plato's
doctrine of Beauty of a hierarchy of Beauty, of degrees of Beauty,
seems to go against the plain meaning of the Symposium. This is not
to say that there is no place for an elaboration of the aspect of
Beauty highlighted by the Phaedrus passage, but only that such an
elaboration must remain compatible with the Symposium.^
Gadamer now focusses his attention on the radiance of the beauti¬
ful to which Plato alludes in Phaedrus. Radiance or "shining forth"
/Hervorscheinen/, Gadamer says, is not merely one of the qualities of
what is beautiful, but rather constitutes its real nature. CWM Is57
TM 24-39) It is the proportion of a being which does not merely permit
it to be what it is, but which also makes it stand out as an internally
proportioned whole, (ibid.) However Beauty is not merely symmetry,
Just as the radiance of the beautiful, which Phaedrus points to, is
only one element of the beautiful according to mediaeval thought.
According to Thomas Aquinas the three elements are: integrity, suit¬
able proportion and clarity. In this he echoes Pseudo-Dionysius
for whom (according to Putnam, op.cit.,) the elements of the
beautiful are:
(1) the selfhood, identity (tautotes), or perfection that comes
from participating, according to one's capacity, in the beauty
of God;
(2) the harmony that orders the universe in a hierarchy,- and
(3) radiance, fundamentally a spiritual quality, an enlightening
of the mind, of which visible clarity is but an image.
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but the coming-to-light /Vorschein7^"'" itself which rests on it.^
(ibid.) Beauty is a sort of shining, (ibid.) But to shine is the
activity of light which itself only appears /zum Erscheinen kommt/
by shimng /scheinen/ on something, (ibid.) Beauty, Gadamer says,
has the mode of Being of light, (ibid.) This characteristic structure
of light, that is, only to be itself visible by making something else
visible, Gadamer calls its "reflexive constitution". With this
"reflexive constitution" of light we have clearly returned to the
"speculative structure" which in Gadamer's view characterizes language
and ultimately Being itself. That light can only really be itself
by illuminating an Other (and, if we are to take seriously Plato's
analogy in Republic £09b and its Neo-platonic elaboration, that it
can do so only by bringing into existence an Other) has unmistakable
similarities to the "speculative" structure of language whereby what
.. is imaged in the word only has its being in the word, while the
21
"Vorschein" is usually used only in set phrases like "zum Vorschein
kommen" (to appear, to come to light); it is difficult to translate
by any single English word. The following sentence with its play
on"scheinen" (to shine or to seem) and "erscheinen" (to appear) is
also difficult to translate. However the English translation does
not catch the meaning of either sentence very successfully.
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A point made already by Plotinus, see note 11 above. Plotinus'
Neo-platonic concept of the beautiful influenced the Middle Ages
via Pseudo-Dionysius. Albert the Great defines Beauty as the
splendour of form shining on the proportioned parts of matter.
(See Gilbert and Kuhn, op.cit., p.lipL). Thomas Aquinas himself
talks of lux splendens supra format™, a phrase which Gadamer
cites (WM 1+62 j TM I4I4.3). But as we emphasized in note 20 above,
this lux or claritas, while perhaps the most striking and even
most important aspect of the beautiful, is nevertheless only one
aspect among others; it is dependent on the others. On the
mediaeval doctrine of Beauty cf. Gilbert and Kuhn, op.cit.,
Ghapter V, especially pp.l39ff.
word's essential being resides in its bringing-to-presentation that
which it images. This structure of language is, according to Gadamer,
the structure of Being itself; Being is essentially self-presentation.2"^
We have already had hints that the mode of Being of Beauty is ana¬
logous to this "speculative structure" when Gadamer talked of the
intangible Good being present in the beautiful; for when Gadamer
examined the origins of the term "speculative" in the phenomenon of
mirroring he spoke of what is intangible nevertheless coming-to-
presentation in the image. (WM ULtlf; TM J4.23)
Gadamer also pursues the traditional connection between the
radiance of Beauty and form or intelligibility. We have already noted
some examples of the mediaeval idea of the Beautiful as the light or
radiance of form.2^ Gilbert and Kuhn go further and suggest that
light and form tend to be identified in mediaeval thought:
Splendour is not merely a sensuous efflux but a formative
and informative energy. Forma est lumen purum. Light
and form are identified because light is the finest and
highest of substances, the most excellent of elements^
as form is the end to which any given thing aspires.
The light which plays on the beautiful is intelligible light. Gadamer
writes:
2"^
To put it in Heidegger's terms (which must lie behind much of what
Gadamer says on this theme): Being is the Being of beings; but in
beings Being shows itself (and hides itself). See Identity and
Difference, pp.6lf (for German, p.129).
2^ See note 22 above.
Gilbert and Kuhn, op.cit., p.li|,)|,. On the identification of light
and form. cf. note 27 below.
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It is light which first articulates visible things toforms which are both "beautiful" and "good". But the
beautiful is not limited to the sphere of the visible.
It is the mode of appearance of the Good in general ....
The light in which not only the visible but also the
intelligible realm is articulated is not the light of
the sun but the light of the mind_/des Geistes/, of_
nous. Plato's profound analogy /Republic 5o8a-509b/
already alluded to this, and from it Aristotle deve¬
loped the doctrine of nous 3 and following him the
Christian thought of the Middle Ages developed the
doctrine of the intellectus agens. The mind which
unfolds from out of itself the multiplicity of what
is thought is present to itself therein. 2°
This radiance or intelligible light does not fall on a form from an
external source, Gadamer says a little later; rather it is the nature
27of the form itself so to shine, so to present itself. What interests
Gadamer is the close connection between the appearing or coming-to-
light /Vorscheinen/ of the beautiful and the clarity of the intelligible
/Einleuchten des Verstandlichen7 which is grounded in the metaphysics
of light. (WM 14.58; TM I4I4.O) For the development of Truth and Method
was from an examination of the mode of Being of the work of art to an
26
WM I4.58; TM U39f.
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Without wishing to become embroiled in a discussion of ancient and
mediaeval philosophy, an area which is beyond our present scope and
competence, it is perhaps worth venturing the following remarks.
If we may take Plotinus as a trustworthy guide to Plato (as
J.N. Findlay urges we should in his Plato: The Written and Unwritten
Doctrines, p»377)j then nous is the second principle, the first
emanation from the One or the Good; but the Good is beyond nous.
This seems to fit in with the Republic passage Gadamer refers to,
where the Good is placed beyond knowledge and truth and even Being.
Thus while nous is the realm of light, where "light is transparent
to light" (Enneads, II.8.1+), the source of light is beyond^nous._
While Gadamer is doubtless correct in saying that intelligible light
does not fall on the form from an external source, and while doubt¬
less it is the form that shines, nevertheless the true Platonist
would reject the identification of the form of what is beautiful
and the source of its radiance.
J.U (
examination of the mode of Understanding operative in the human
sciencesthe connection of the beautiful and the intelligible lies
at the basis of Gadamer's work, (ibid.)
At this point it is important to try to focus as clearly as
possible on Gadamer's overall intention in this final section of
Truth and Method. The connection between the coming-to-light of the
beautiful and the clarity of the intelligible is of crucial importance
to Gadamer first of all because it holds together Truth and Method]
and secondly because it allows him, he believes, to draw some important
analogies in these closing pages. For if there is an intimate connec¬
tion between the coming-to-light of the beautiful and the clarity of
the intelligible, then according to Gadamer we can use our experience
of the beautiful as a model for understanding our apprehension of
intelligibility and truth. The experience of the beautiful will
then provide the model not only for Understanding in the human sciences,
but also for Being as such. There seem to the present writer to be
two main questions relating to this project of Gadamer:
(1) The all-important connection between the coming-to-light of
the beautiful and the clarity of the intelligible is, in Gadamer's own
words, "grounded in the metaphysics of light". How successfully can
Gadamer translate this "metaphysics of light" from its (according to
him) obsolete ancient and mediaeval form into a satisfactory contempo¬
rary form?
(2) Even if he can do this, does this connection necessarily
mean that the experience of the beautiful must be the paradigm for
all apprehension of intelligibility and truth?
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We will conclude our account of Truth and Method by attempting
to give some answers to these questions.
(l) According to Gadamer the "reflexive" structure of light (a
structure which, as we have seen, is analogous to the "speculative"
structure of language and Being), to which the metaphysics of light
testifies, "can obviously be detached from the metaphysical picture-
thought /Vorstellung/ of a physical-intellectual /sinnlich-geistigenT"
source of light in the style of Neo-platonic and Christian thought".
(ibid.) Gadamer continues in the next paragraph:
. . . the metaphysics of light brings out a side of
the ancient concept of the beautiful which asserts
its legitimacy even when detached from its connection
with substance metaphysics and its metaphysical
relation to the infinite Divine Mind.
Without wishing to defendthe much-maligned "substance metaphysics" or
to return anachronistically to some pre-critical metaphysical theology,
• %
nevertheless one finds it difficult to share Gadamer's confidence that
the "reflexive" structure of light or the "other side" of the Platonic
doctrine of the beautiful can so "obviously" be detached from their
context in the body of thought to which they belong. Gadamer tends
to contrast two aspects of Platonic thought which, according to
Fruchon's exegesis of Gadamer, are the sources of the main current of
Western tradition as well as of its accompanying counter-current.
These currents are: first of all, that flowing from the Platonic
"ontology of measure", the "teleological hierarchy of Being", a
current which,according to Nietzsche and Heidegger, ends in the nihilism
and technocracy of the modern world; and secondly the counter-current
28
WM b$9; TM UiiO
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springing from the "other side" of the Platonic doctrine of the
beautiful (which we have attempted to sketch out in the preceding
pages) and re-emerging in Neo-platonic and Christian mysticism.^
Gadamer, it seems, wants to reject"^ the main current of the Western
tradition and to isolate from it the counter-current in order to
base on the latter his own hermeneutical ontology. However the
present writer is not at all sure whether such an isolation of the
"other side" of the Platonic tradition is possible, or even desirable.
Indeed the burden of Part Two of this study will be that rather than
the isolation of either current of the Western (i.e. the Christian-
Platonic) tradition, the task for the philosophy and the theology
of the future will be to do justice to both currents.^"
To be fair to Gadamer, however, it must be stressed that while
he clearly regards as untenable the mainstream of the Western meta¬
physical tradition, he does not reject it in as outright a fashion
as Heidegger for whom the tradition of "onto-theo-logy" or "metaphysics"
32had to be "overcome". Rather he wants to "retrieve" what is true
^ cf. WM I4.6I5 TM 14l2f. This passage is quoted in full at the end of
Part Two, Chapter 1 below.
See note 32 below.
While the maln current of Western tradition may have forgotten or
suppressed the counter-current, with the horrifying results docu¬
mented by Nietzsche, Heidegger and others, the answer does not
seem to be simply to reverse this process and to reject the main
current. Certainly Gadamer is much less prone to do this than
Heidegger, but he still seems to the present writer to err in
that direction.
32
Of course Heidegger did not think he could reject the Western meta¬
physical tradition as if it were an object he could simply choose
to accept or reject. Rather he talks of a "leap" out of that
tradition into a way of thinking as yet unthought, as well as of
a "retrieval" of what is "unsaid" in the tradition. But Heidegger's
"retrieval" of tradition is much more a "destruction" of that
tradition than Gadamer's. cf. BT, section 6, pp.lflffj also Fruchon,
op.cit., pp.£61|ff.
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in the metaphysical tradition,, as we saw in the previous chapter. Not
only does he wish to "retrieve" the radiance of the beautiful that
constitutes the "other side" of the Platonic tradition, he also wants
to "retrieve" the intelligibility of that light or radiance. While
rejecting the "teleological hierarchy of Being" and the "ontology
of measure" which constitutes the mainstream of the Platonic tradition,
he nevertheless wants to retain the truth contained in these, that is,
the conviction that Being is essentially intelligible, that there is
a true correspondence between the human soul and reality. Gadamer
rejects the infinite Divine Mind, the nous, the realm of Ideal Forms,
but thinks he can preserve the truth these notions point to, that is,
the intelligibility of Being, with his concept of language. The
infinite Divine Word is rejected, but its truth is preserved by the
33
finite human word. It is the light of the word, writes Gadamer,
"that allows everything to emerge in such a way that it is inherently
clear /einleuchtend/ and inherently intelligible /yerstandlich7".
(WM TM I4I4.O) We can see this connection of light and the word,
Gadamer thinks, in Augustine's interpretation of the Genesis Creation
narrative where Augustine notes that God speaks for the first time
when light is created; God does not speak at the first creation of
heaven and earth, and this creation is significantly described as
being without form. Augustine interprets this to mean that this first
H cf. the essay "The Nature of Things and the Language of Things",
where he writes: "... the task of metaphysics continues, though
as a task that cannot be solved as metaphysics, that is, by going
back to an infinite intellect". There is a way however, Gadamer
continues, "the way of language". (KSI 6k; FH Ik).
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speaking of God is the coming into being of intelligible light through
which the differentiation of formed things is possible, says Gadamer.
(DM b$8f j TM JUi+O) Gadamer thinks this passage in Augustine is "a
first hint of that speculative interpretation of language which we
developed in the structural analysis of the hermeneutical experience
of the world, according to which the multiplicity of what is thought
first proceeds from the unity of the word". (DM U59j TM ijilO)
Without becoming involved in the discussion of the complex and
contraversial topic of Augustine's doctrine of Illumination, it is to
be remarked that the jump from Augustine's association of God's Word
with the origin of intelligible light to Gadamer's association of
the finite human word with the origin of the intelligibility
/Yerstandlichkeit/7 of "World" seems a very large one indeed to any
but the most convinced Gadamerian. We have given examples in the
previous chapter how Gadamer likes to claim that he is giving "the
truth" of some traditional metaphysical concept. Here he seems to
be claiming that the "speculative" structure of language which he
has described is what really guarantees the doctrine of the intel¬
ligibility of Being which is the nugget of truth in the worthless
remains of metaphysical speculation on the infinite Divine Mind or
nous. The intelligible form on which the radiance of Beauty plays
O)
is given by the finite human word.
^ Hence Gadamer stresses the priority of language even in non-
linguistic art-forms like sculpture,■painting and even music.
To the extent that these are at all meaningful (and if they
cease to be that, they cease to be works of art) they presuppose
language, Gadamer says. (DM 376fj TM 360f).
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At this point the present writer must confess that what Gadamer
is attempting to do here is so complex, and his text so allusive (and,
it must be said, so sketchy), that it is beyond his present scope and
capacity to give it the detailed critical analysis it requires. He
has a suspicion, however, that Gadamer does not do justice to the role
of form in the traditional doctrine of Beauty, and that his attempt to
replace the form and intelligibility conferred by the infinite Divine
Mind or nous with the intelligibility of language is not entirely suc¬
cessful. As we suggested in the previous chapter, the "speculative"
structure of language is an ontological first principle and does not
guarantee intelligibility in any given case. "The Word" or "language"
in this sense seems to have something in common with the source of
light in Neo-platonic metaphysics where this source is an ontological
first principle. But this Neo-platonic first principle must generate
a second principle, that of nous, in order to shine forth; this is
35
demanded by the structure of light to which Gadamer himself appeals.
But if Gadamer's concept of language corresponds to the ontological
first principle, the source of light, it is difficult to see how it
can also do the work of the second principle, traditionally nous, which
is the home of intelligibility and form. We seem to see here a
pattern we have noted elsewhere, in which Gadamer tries to make what
is properly a first (or ontological) principle do the work of a
second (or logical) principle. To show that this suspicion is
35 See WM U57j TM 1+39.
3^
Or, as in the case of "dialectic", turns a logical concept into
an ontological principle, and still expects it somehow to perform
the function it did in the logical realm. See Chapter 8(b) above.
193
correct would require more arguments than can be given here, and
probably a more lucid and detailed exposition than the one Gadamer
actually gives. Nevertheless it seems worth recording the present
writer's doubt whether Gadamer has managed to retrieve the Platonic
doctrine of Beauty in its full sweep, and his suspicion that Gadamer's
concentration on the "other side" of Platonism has led him to neglect
the more familiar aspect with its emphasis on order, measure, and
teleology. If this latter aspect of Platonism has given rise to
many evils when detached from its "other side" (evils documented
by Nietzsche, Heidegger and their followers), this does not seem a
reason to reject it altogether as Nietzsche and Heidegger do, and
as Gadamer, despite all his manoevering, seems in danger of doing.
It would seem better to give equal emphasis to both sides of
37
Platonism. Nevertheless we owemuch to Gadamer for his drawing
to our attention the "other side" of Platonism, and should not be
overcritical if, like most thinkers who go against the stream, he
seems to overcorrect.
(2) However even if Gadamer could make a satisfactory transposition
of the "other side" of the Platonic doctrine of the beautiful and the
"metaphysics of light", there still remains the question whether the
It is interesting to speculate about the connections between
Gadamer's two sides of Platonism and Nietzsche's distinction of
the Apollonian and the Dionysiac in Greek culture in The Birth
of Tragedy. This is not to say that Nietzsche made such a dis-
tiction within Platonism (though Plato, with all his artistry,
is a not unambiguous figure). But the contrast between the
Apollonian dreams of "theoretical man" (typified by Socrates)
and the loss of self in Dionysiac intoxication seem in some ways to
parallel the contrasts which run through Gadamer's work. Perhaps
we are still waiting for an "artistic Socrates". Or perhaps
Nietzsche could have found his "artistic Socrates" in Plato himself
if only he had looked hard enough.
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experience of the beautiful can be the paradigm for all apprehension
of intelligibility and truth.
Clearly there are strong similarities between the experience of
the beautiful and the hermeneutical experience in terms of which
Gadamer has sought to understand Understanding. Like tradition in
Gadamer's description of it, what is beautiful as it were takes the
initiative and imposes itself on usj there is a real"activity of the
thing itself". (WM I4.6O5 TM )])|1) Just as we say that what is beautiful
is "clear" /einleuchtend_7 and are captivated by it before it has been
integrated into the whole of our orientations and evaluations; so we
can say that something which is said to us is "clear" or "illuminating"
/einleuchtend/, and can assent to it without it being proven or
certain, and even when we are unsure how it is compatible with the
•3 O
whole of what we hold to be correct. (WM U60; TM )|)|1 f) What the
experience of the beautiful and the hermeneutical experience have in
common is that they are both genuine experiences in the sense that
they claim our assent before they are elevated to the status of
certain knowledge; any such elevation is for Gadamer impossible in
principle for human finitude. (WM J46O; TM I4I4.2) Both kinds of experience
presuppose human finitude, says Gadamer; for an infinite Spirit
That Gadamer's reading of the metaphysical concept of the beautiful
is accurate in this regard is given independent confirmation by
Gilbert and Kuhn, who write: "When St. Thomas defines beauty he
seems to emphasize the immediacy of its apprehension. There is
no waiting for analysis, no labour of proof. Sight is enough.
'Clarity1, it has been well said, 'is for beauty what evidence is
for truth'". Gilbert and Kuhn, pp.l)|)|f; their quotation is from
de Wulf's Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, p.29.
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presumably both the experience of the beautiful and the hermeneutical
experience would not be possible, nor would philosophy itself, as
Plato pointed out (Symposium 20l+a). (MM U60fj TM U62) The fact that
we can refer to Plato in this context, Gadamer says, is because of
the "other side" of the Platonic doctrine of the beautiful which has
accompanied the mainstream metaphysical tradition like an undercurrent
and has emerged in Neo-platonic and Christian mysticism. (MM I).6l;
TM U+2f) The affinity between Plato's doctrine of Beauty and Gadamer'3
universal hermeneutic is due to the continuity of this tradition,
Gadamer says. (MM i;6lj TM l^j.3)
Gadamer goes on to indicate the consequences of this connection
between the coming-to-light of the beautiful and the clarity of the
intelligible for the problem of truth. Just as for Plato the Idea
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of Beauty was entirely present in what is beautiful, and the gap
between appearance and reality was overcome, so for Gadamer the
presentation and/or the interpretation of an art-work are not to be
differentiated from the work "in itself"; they are the true being of
the work. (MM J4.625 TM Wi.) In the present author's own words, truth
seems to be for Gadamer the identity-in-difference^ of the work of
art and our interpretation, an identity-in-difference which is prior
to any critical activity on our part, and which, far from being estab¬
lished by us as autonomous subjects, actually imposes itself on us
According to Gadamer, that is; the present writer has doubts, cf.
note 19 above.
This phrase, which belongs to the vocabulary of British Neo-
Hegelianism, is not one which Gadamer himself uses. But it seems
to the present writer to express the "speculative" relation about
which Gadamer has so much to say.
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from itself. This "activity of the work itself" which draws us as
participants into the process of its coming-to-presentation is com¬
pared by Gadamer to the game. And just as to detach ourself from
unselfconscious immersion in the game is to spoil the game; so to
try and establish the "truth" about the presentation of an art-work
from a detached critical distance is to spoil its real truth; a truth
which consists in the very event of its coming-to-presentation
in our interpretation of it. All that has been said in the above
about the art-work applies also to tradition; and ultimately;
Gadamer believes; to Being itself. The medium in which the art¬
work; tradition; and ultimately Being itself come-to-presentation
is language; it is the "speculative" structure of language; its
"identity-in-difference" structure; which allows all of the above
mentioned to bring themselves to presentation in finite human
interpretation.
What is said above will by now be familiar to the reader. What
is new in these final pages is the way Gadamer weaves together these
familiar themes with elements taken from the Platonic doctrine of
Beauty. We have already attempted to give some critical discussion
of these themes,^" and there would be little point in repeating this.
Moreover these final pages give even less in the way of argument than is
usual for Gadamer; they are something of a "tour de force" in which
he weaves together the themes of the book as a whole in passages
^ See especially Chapter 7 above.
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which are as allusive as they are sometimes elusive. The section
has itself something of that illuminating and captivating quality
which it claims is the distinctive feature of both Beauty and Truth.
Its style is evocative rather than demonstrative, and it proceeds
by analogy and metaphor rather than by rigorous argument.
But however illuminating we may find these pages of Gadamer,
and however much we may feel that they present a true insight into
the nature of truth which modern thought is in danger of overlooking,
nevertheless we must wonder whether such an understanding of truth
is sufficiently broad as to embrace all human apprehension of truth.
Just as Gadamer has emphasized one side of Plato's doctrine of
Beauty, possibly at the expense of the other, so we may wonder
whether he has not over-emphasized one aspect of truth. In the
previous chapter we suggested that while there might well be a
place for what we called "ontologically evocative language", there
must also be a place for statements of fact. Each of these would
have the sort of truth appropriate to it: to the former would corres¬
pond the sort of truth that Gadamer has presented in Truth and Method,
and especially in these closing pages; to the latter would correspond
what we might loosely call the Hegelian sort of truth, truth as
totality, a totality in terms of which a particular statement of
fact could finally be known to be true.^2 Whether these concepts
of truth are compatible or not was discussed to some exfent at the
^ Such a totality need not of course be available for human inspec¬
tion in the present as, on one reading at least, Hegel seemed to
think it was. It might be, as for Pannenberg, an anticipated
totality.
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end of the previous chapter. The question will again be raised in
Part Two when we discuss the relation between the Platonic/mystical
"eschatology of transcendence" and what we have called the "eschatology
of consummation" (Chapter b); and also the relation between play and
teleology (or Providence) (Chapter 5). For the present we must content
ourselves with observing that Gadamer's presentation of the nature of
truth in these final pages accords a special place to poetic truth.
But poetic truth is seen as a heightened form of the universal nature
of truth. Conversely, all truth is ultimately seen in terns of •
poetic truth; even statements /Aussagen7 are seen in terms of "the
poetic statement";
. . . the poetic statement proves to be the special case
of meaning that has passed fully into, and has been fully
embodied in, the statement. Coming-to-language in a
poem is like being inserted into an ordered network of
relations /Ordnungsbezlige/ which supports and guarantees
the "truth" of what is said. To be attested in this way
belongs not only to the poetic statement, but in some
measure to all coming-to-language.5-3
And according to Gadamer, the presence of what is intuited /das
anschaulich Gegebene/' in what is said is just like the presence of the
Idea of Beauty in what is beautiful. (WM b^bj TM J4I1.6)
But however much there may be to recommend in such an attempt to
restore the truth-function of poetry and of all language akin to poetry,
especially in the face of much modern philosophy and literary criticism,
nevertheless it seems dangerous to take poetic truth as the paradigm
for all truth. In the final paragraph of Truth and Method Gadamer
claims that the sort of truth he has been presenting is the truth
k-3 mm b6h; TM bb$-
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appropriate to the human sciences. (WM TM 14;6f) He goes out of
his way to stress the scientific quality of this kind of truth which
transcends method, (ibid.) While the present writer can see the
importance of stressing the role of poetic truth in the study of
literary and religious texts, he remains unconvinced that poetic
truth should also be the sole criterion in the scientific study of
historical documents. While Gadamer may be right to resist the
domination of poetic truth by scientific method, it nevertheless
seems dangerous to allow poetic truth to dominate scientific method.
How these two kinds of truth are compatible is beyond our present
hh
scope and capacity to sayj but to emphasize either one at the expense
of the other seems a dangerous step to take, and one which can have
unfortunate consequences for the various academic disciplines,
including philosophy and theology.
^ But see Part Two, Chapter 6(b) below.
PART TWO
GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHT AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION
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CHAPTER 0 IE
THE HERMENEUTICAL EXPERIENCE AND RELIGIOUS ETPERTETJCE
Our first task in Part Two must be to draw together the scattered
explicit references which Gadamer makes to the connection between
religious experience and his account of the hermeneutical experience.
This will serve as a starting point for our contention that Gadamer
ultimately grounds his account of Understanding in religious experience.
That this grounding is by no means as explicitly discussed as it might
be has not only the effect of making the relation between religious
experience and philosophical hermeneutics appear rather ambiguous (in
a way not dissimilar to the way in which the relation between religion
and philosophy in Hegel is notoriously ambiguous); it has also the
effect of making Gaddmer's account of Understanding seem dangerously
abstract, in the sense that how this Understanding can actually be
achieved does not seem to be dealt with satisfactorily. "The
Speculative" can all too easily seem "merely speculative"; in
Christian terms, Gadamer may not yet have considered the great weight
of sin.1 But this is to anticipate. We must first examine such
evidence as there is to suggest that for Gadamer there is a connection
between religious experience and the hermeneutical experience.
We have already noted above how Gadamer links the attainment of
"true experience", which is for him the experience of the unsurmountably
finite nature of experience itself, with religious insight, in this case
the religious insight which gave birth to Greek tragedy. (WM 339; TM 320)
1
cf. Kierkegaard's brilliant critique of "Speculation" in his The
Sickness unto Death, trans. by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 19i|3-)j PP* 15>0ff.
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Aeschylus, according to Gadamer, realized the metaphysical significance
of the phrase pathei mathos (learning through suffering) which expresses
"the inner historicality of experience". The metaphysical significance
of Greek tragedy (as opposed to any reduction of it to a merely
aesthetic phenomenon) is also affirmed by an earlier passage in Truth
and Method:
The spectator recognises himself and his own finite being
in face of the might of fate. The tragic emotion is not
a response to the tragic course of events as such or to
the justice of the fate that overtakes the hero, but to
the metaphysical order of Being that is true for all.
To acknowledge that "this is how things are" is a kind
of self-knowledge on the part of the spectator, who
emerges with new insight from the illusions in which he
lives. ("WM 126j TM 117)
As we have seen, according to Gadamer this insight is essentially
religious. The general problem of the relation of religious insight to
philosophy may be postponed for the moment. What it is important to
note here is that the religious insight of Greek tragedy only relates
to one aspect of Gadamer's basic philosophical position. It relates to
what we might call "the moment of finitude", to Gadamer's contention
that human Understanding is radically finite and unable to be elevated
to the level of the gods (or of God), to the level of Infinite Spirit
and of Absolute Knowledge. What it does not relate to is Gadamer's
confidence that despite all human finitude, Being and truth are accessible
to human beings inasmuch as the latter let themselves be drawn into the
gracious play of the former. Fruchon suggests at the end of his long
examination of Part Three of Truth and Method that "for Gadamer the
ontology of Heidegger reproduces as it were a tragic theology, in
2
which Being can hold itself back and leave man helpless in the dark."
^
Fruchon, op.cit., pp. 570 f.
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In contrast to this, Fruchon thinks that for Gadamer the experience of
finitude testified to by Greek tragedy "is only the threshold of the
revelation of Being and does not ground a tragic ontology. The thought
of Gadamer is ultimately rooted in Platonism and Christianity which
both, by identifying Being with light and with the reflection in which
it never ceases to reveal itself, signify with equal force the death of
3tragedy." Whether or not we agree with Fruchon's strongly negative
reading of Heidegger, there seems little doubt that he is correct
when he claims that the place to look for the source of Gadamer's
confidence, his "optimism" as de Waelhens calls it,^ is the Christian
and the Platonic traditions.
The clearest statement that there is a fundamental connection
between Gadamer's concept of Understanding and religious experience
comes in the essay "The Nature of Things and the Language of Things",
where Gadamer writes:
The real concept of self-understanding /i.e. a self-
understanding which has overcome modern subjectivism/. . .
is not to be thought of in terms of the model of
perfected self-consciousness, but rather in terms of
religious experience. It is always inherent in the
latter that only through divine grace do the false
paths of human self-understanding reach their true end,
that is, the insight that in all paths one is being led
to salvation. (KSI 68; PH 8o)
Now this religious insight is rather different from the religious
insight which was said by Gadamer to lie at the heart of Greek tragedy.
There is a stress in both on human finitude, and on the disastrous
consequences of any attempt at human self-determination which dis¬
regards the dependency of the human situation. But the nature of this
^ ibid.
^ See passage quoted in Chapter it (a) below.
2Oil.
dependency is different in each case. In the case of Greek tragedy
it is dependency on an indifferent and even hostile fate; in the case
of the second quotation religious experience (which here can only mean
Christian and^r Platonic religious experience) feels a dependency on
a God who "in everything works for good with those who love him."
(Romans 8:28) In the latter case the destruction of the self which
wants to affirm itself is not merely the tragedy of the human con¬
dition; it leads to the liberation of the true self which finds
itself in participation in the life of God. It loses itself only
to find itself.
That Gadamer's concept of Understanding is related to this kind
of religious experience can be seen in the essay "The Problem of Self-
Understanding" (KSI 70-81; PH 144.-58) when he says that Understanding
involves "a moment of loss of self /ein Moment der Selbst-losigkeit/"
(KSI 75) PH 51), and that this loss of self is really an enrichment of
self:
. . . and surely the elevation into the dialogue will
be experienced not as the loss /Verlust7 of self-possession
but rather as an enrichment of self, while we remain all
the while unaware of ourselves. (KSI 79j PH 57)
It is true that at this point Gadamer makes no mention of religious
experience and connects his account of Understanding rather with the
structure of play or the game. One reason for this may be that in this
essay,, which is intended as a contribution to the theological problem
of self-understanding as this emerges from the work of Bultmann,
Gadamer prefers to contribute his own model of the game as a way of
conceiving Understanding rather than to appeal to the religious
experience which is after all precisely the phenomenon to which
This thumb-nail sketch is intended to refer both to the Christian
and to the Platonic traditions, and for the moment ignore the
differences between them.
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theology with its concept of self-understanding is attempting to do
justice. Whether or not this is the case, the experience of loss of
self in a game hardly seems interchangeable with the religious
experience of grace. Perhaps the confidence with which Gadamer des¬
cribes Understanding (which is after all There-being's fundamental
mode of Being) as the enrichment of self through loss of self could
only be grounded in the religious experience Gadamer invokes else¬
where. That there may be analogies between the game and religious
7
experience is not thereby denied, but only that the game is capable
of taking the place of religious experience as the ground of a con¬
fidence that the "world process" is somehow benevolent and unreservedly
Q
to be trusted.
In fact a few pages later in the same essay Gadamer does link
the concept of self-understanding back to its theological roots when
he writes:
The self that we are does not possess itself. One
could rather say that it "happens". And this is what the
theologian is really saying when he asserts that faith is
an event in which a new human being is established. He
also says that we must believe and understand the Word
and that it is through the Word that we overcome the
abysmal ignorance about ourselves in which we live. The
concept of self"-understanding has an originally theo¬
logical stamp ... 9
^
For the relation of Gadamer to theology, and to Bultmann in particular,
see Chapter 3 below.
? in fact, as we will suggest below in Chapter 5, Gadamer's concept
of play derives from Heidegger who seems to have owed much to the
mystical tradition. It also seems to go back, via the mystical
tradition, to the "other side" of Platonism.
O
cf. Chapter 5 below.
9
KSI 78; PH 55)
1
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What Gadamer is really saying when he tells us what the theologian is
"really saying" is far from olear. Is he in Hegelian fashion giving
us the conceptual truth contained in the imaginative form (the
"Vorstellungen") of religion? Is he in equally Hegelian fashion
rooting his own philosophy in the Christian tradition? It any rate
the ambiguity concerning the precise relation of philosophy and religion
is certainly Hegelian, as is the ambiguity of the theologian's role
caught between the immediacy of religious experience on one hand and
the reflexive elaboration of its truth in concepts by philosophy on
the other.^
A clearer statement of the relation of Gadamer's concept of the
hermeneutical experience to the religious tradition of the West, but
one which is still ambiguous as to the precise nature of this relation,
comes in Gadamer's survey in Truth and Method of the history of Western
thought on languagei
In the midst of the penetration of Christian theology
by the Greek idea of logic something new is born: the
centre of language, in which the mediating character of
the Incarnation event first comes to its full truth.
Christology prepares the way for a new anthropology which
mediates the finite spirit of man with the divine infinity
in a new way. There that which we have called the her¬
meneutical experience will find its real ground.H
Although this seems a clear enough statement that it is the Christian
tradition which grounds Gadamer's philosophical project, it is not
systematically developed. It is rather in the Platonic experience of
Beauty that Gadamer tries to ground his philosophy, a point we will
discuss in the next chapter. In fact Gadamer sees an intimate connection
10
Actually Gadamer can be seen as "out-Hegeling" Hegel when he gives us
the conceptual "truth" of Hegel's concept of Spirit which is itself
the "truth" of the tradition of Christian spirituality: "This concept
of Spirit that transcends the subjectivity of the ego has its true
counterpart in the phenomenon of language ..." (KSI II4.8; PH 128)
11
WM k05; TM 399. For the history of Western thought on language
see Appendix.
207
between the "other side" of the Platonic doctrine of Beauty and one
strand of the Christian tradition, as we can see in the following key
passage to which we shall return at several points in Part Two of our
study:
The fact that we have been able to appeal to Plato
repeatedly ... is obviously due to this "other side" of
the Platonic doctrine of Beauty which accompanies the
history of Aristotelian/scholastic metaphysics like an
undercurrent, and emerges from time to time, as in Neo-
Platonic and Christian mysticism and in theologies and
philosophies of the Spirit. In this tradition of
Platonism was formed the conceptual vocabulary needed
for thought about the finitude of human existence.
Also the affinity which appeared between the Platonic
doctrine of Beauty and the idea of a universal
hermeneutics testifies to the continuity of this
Platonic tradition.12
In exactly what way the tradition of Platonism formed the con¬
ceptual vocabulary for thinking the finitude of human existence is
beyond the scope of this study. What is clear in this passage,
however, is that Gadamer sees his own philosophy as somehow rooted in
the confluence of the Christian and the Platonic traditions. But
what is not clear is precisely how this "other side" of the Platonic
understanding of aesthetic experience is related to the religious or
mystical experience to which Gadamer refers. The questions of how





AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AMD RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Unlike religious experience, aesthetic experience is one of the
central themes of Gadamer's writings. Gadamer treats it at length in
Part One of Truth and Method, which is entitled "The question of
truth as it emerges from the experience of art." And after having
extended the question of truth into the human sciences (Part Two)
and having attempted to ground the possibility of truth in the
universal-ontological function of language (Part Three), he returns
in the final chapter of the book to aesthetic experience when he
attempts to find the historical roots of his own universal hermeneutics
in Plato's doctrine of Beauty.
In fact the expression "aesthetic experience" is perhaps not the
most appropriate in this context, because the main thrust of Gadamer's
writings on aesthetics is to attempt to overcome the devaluation of
"the aesthetic experience" by modern aesthetics; • true aesthetic
experience is neither "aesthetic" nor an "experience""'" in the sense
given to these terms by modern subjectivistic thinking. Bearing this
in mind, we will however, for want of a convenient alternative, continue
to use the expression. What Gadamer is most concerned to combat is
what he sees as the "subjectivisation" of aesthetics which began with
"Experience"here translates "Erlebnis", which Gadamer gives a
specific meaning quite different from that of "Erfahrung" which is
the term we normally render by "experience". "Erlebnis" has more
subjective connotations and is used by Gadamer to refer to the sort
of experience which the Romantic aesthetic consciousness loves to
savour and to "collect". One might see a caricature of this meaning
of "aesthetic experience" in the Fin de Silcle decadent "aesthetes".
"Erfahrung" on the other hand implies the experience of an encounter
with reality which asserts itself, an encounter which changes us.
Unless otherwise stated, "experience" in this study always stranslates
"Erfahrung".
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Kant. In a long section devoted to Kant's Critique of Judgment,
Gadamer tries to demonstrate his claim that in Kant the scope of
the aesthetic judgment becomes limited from the more general role
which it played in the human sciences (including law and morality)
in the humanist tradition (MM 1-39} TM 3-39) to a more narroxirly
"aesthetic" role. Hand in hand with this goes the idea that the
aesthetic judgment is not concerned with knowledge and truth (which
are only to be found in the conceptual knowledge of the natural
sciences). The autonomy of the aesthetic judgment is secured only
at the price of subjectivising it, that is, of denying it all access
to objective knowledge. According to Gadamer, Kant is at the start
of the process of the elevation of the idea of genius and of
2
"aesthetic experience".
This is not the place to attempt a summary of Gadamer's
elaborate and subtle examination of this historical development.
Mhat it is important for our purposes to note is his intention to
overcome the subjectivism of modern aesthetics and to discover the
truth of aesthetic experience which this subjectivism has covered
over, Gadamer explicitly compares his attempt to "overcome aesthetics"
3
to Heidegger's attempt to "overcome metaphysics" and to allow the
truth of Being which it has concealed to shine forth. Indeed the
shining forth of Being which was the beginning and end of Heidegger's
way of thought is also in a quite literal sense the beginning and end
of Gadamer's way of thought in Truth and Method. For the truth of
the aesthetic experience which Gadamer says in Part One that he wants
2
For a summary of Gadamer's evaluation of Kant's position, see
MM 36-39; TM 37-9.
3 cf. MM TM 89f.
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to uncover emerges at the very end of the boot as the experience of
the beautiful,, of that which is most manifest (to ekpkanestaton),^
of that which has the mode of Being, of light. (MM h$7; TM ii39)
Gadainer wants to .take the truth of aesthetic experience, which
is the experience of the beautiful, as the key to his universal
henaeneutical ontology. That Beauty manifests itself in what is
<
beautiful while at the same time remaining quite distinct from it
(Beauty is not a quality of the beautiful object); that Beauty in
what is beautiful acts on us, luring us and. captivating us, rather
than being a subjective idea we impose on That is otherwise a "mere
object"| that this happens in history and is not an a-historical or
suprahistorical phenomenon (could an infinite Mind experience beauty
in the way we do? of. wM 1+61; TM Lh2); these considerations lead
Gadamer to take aesthetic experience as the key to understanding the
nature and movement of Being itself. The truth of the aesthetic
experience which Gadamer has sought to liberate from the constrictions
and distortions of modem aesthetics" has tunned out to be, according
to Gadamer, the most universal and the most profound truth of all.
^ phaedrus 2$0d.
£
Whether person, way of life or science, of. Symposium 210
^
And also from, what Fruchon calls the "ontology of measure", which,
in his view, all but covers over the truth of the Platonic doctrine
of Beauty. The latter is truly at home with an "ontology of light"
(see Fruehcn, op.ext., passim.), cf. Part 'One, Chapter 9(c) above,
where we questioned whether Platonism can or should be completely
"liberated" from its ties with the teleologies!, aspect of Platonism.
We also express doubts about "liberating" Christian theology from
its teleological "bonds" in Chapter 5(b) below.
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But what then is the relation between aesthetic experience and
religious experience? We find one clue in the first part of Truth
and Method where Gadamer is attempting to overcome the distortions
caused by the aesthetic consciousness with its confidence that it
can stand over against the work of art and reduce the latter's power
to "aesthetic qualities" which are really subjective "experiences",
or the connoisseur's own states of consciousness. Here Gadamer invokes
the aid of religious experience by describing the "claim" made on the
participant in the worship service by the sermon or the celebration
of the mass. He writes:
In this sense comtemporaneity is found especially
in the ritual act and in the sermon. The sense of being
present is here genuine participation in the event of
salvation itself. Ho one can doubt that the aesthetic
differentiation which talks of)"beautiful" ceremony or
a "good" sermon is out of place in face of the claim
made on us. How I maintain that the same is fundamentally
true of experience of art. Here too mediation must be
thought of as total. (WM 121; TM 113)
Less explicit than the above is the allusion to religious experience
(and this time not only to Western religious experience) which comes
at the end of the essay "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics":
The intimacy with which the work of art touches us is
at the same time in an enigmatic way a shattering and
an overthrowing of the familiar. It is not only the
"This art thou" disclosed in a joyous and frightening
shock - it also says to us: "Thou must alter thy life!"
(KSII p.8, PH 10U)
What we have in both cases is the use of aspects of religious experience
in order to highlight, to bring to light, the true nature of aesthetic
experience. This is not to say that aesthetic experience is in any
sense a species of the genus "religious experience"; it is to say no
more than that there is an analogy between religious experience and
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aesthetic experience. Indeed Gadamer sometimes seems to move as it
were in the opposite direction., when he says that his own description
7
of the experience of the work of art can have consequences for theology.
Apparently Gadamer thinks that his description of authentic aesthetic
experience can help to overcome the distortions with which theology
masks the true nature of religious experience. That there should be
such a two-way traffic is by no means a contradiction. That theology
and aesthetics should help each other to combat their own tendencies
to cover up. to distort, the respective experiences in which each is
8
grounded, might be no bad thing.
However our concern here is not so much with the relation between
aesthetics and theology, as with that between aesthetic experience and
religious experience. We are not so much interested at this point in
interdisciplinary dialogue as in the relation of aesthetic and religious
experience with regard to the ultimate grounding of Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics. We have described above how the truth of the aesthetic
7 See KSI 91f j PH 209ffj cf. Chapter 3(b) below.
8
That theology should by implication be portrayed as the attempt to
articulate religious experience by no means places us in the camp of
Schleiermacher. While acknowledging that Schleiermacher may have
something important and true to say, an emphasis on religious exper¬
ience no more ties us to Romantic theology than Gadamer's emphasis
on the hermeneutical experience ties him to Romantic hermeneutics.
Karl Barth's chapter on "The Word of God and Experience" (Church
Dogmatics l/l) with its opposition to "Christian Cartesianism" in
some ways" parallels Gadamer's stress on "Erfahrung" as opposed to
Romantic, subjectivised "Erlebnisse" and states-of-consciousness.
But the "otherness" of Barth's "Other," i.e. the Word, is meant in
an exclusive sense quite different from Gadamer's understanding of
the "otherness" we encounter in experience, cf. Chapter 3(c) below.
How precisely theology, philosophy and religious experience relate
to each other is far from self-evident. In pursuing this question
we might do worse than to take Hegel as "partner in dialogue", as
Gadamer does when working out his concept of experience (see Part
One, Chapter 3 above). For more on this topic see Chapter 6 below.
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experience which Gadamer attempted to uncover in the first part of
Truth and Method returns in the final chapter as the doctrine of
Beauty which Gadamer'Retrieves" from Plato. As we have seen, this
doctrine of Beauty provides for Gadamer the key to understanding Being
as such - Being which as language with its "speculative" structure
draws us into its historical play which is tradition. We must not
underestimate the fact that after k%0 dense and meticulously documented
pages Gadamer choses to rest his case with this doctrine of Beauty
which he has wrested from Plato. The experience of Beauty is for him
the experience in which we learn what reality is like. Our experience
of Beauty is that which must determine our basic relation to the world
9
and to ourselves.
The question which we must ask however is: what has happended to
religious experience in all this? What is striking (at least to the
student of theology) in this last chapter of Truth and Method is the
almost complete absence of any significant reference to religious
experience in general and to Christian experience in particular. This
absence is striking because the "speculative" structure of Being which
Gadamer finds in the experience of Beauty is so much more clearly
manifested in the Christian tradition. Gadamer himself has, as we
have seen, noted the importance of Christological thought in grounding
the hermeneutical experience (WM bP%> TM 388, quoted in previous chapter),
though he fails to develop the point. Fruchon, however, makes this
point strongly:
9 In the sense that this experience determines how we should understand
Understanding in its all-embracing sense i.e. as an "existential".
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The ontology wrested from Platonism does justice to
the central teaching of the Christian tradition, notably
to the affirmation that the manifestation of Being is
inseparable from the "kenosis" in which it puts itself
inside a finite form which it leads back to itself. Here
we recognize, and let it not be forgotten, under the
influence of Platonism, not only the essence of John's
Gospel but the characteristic rhythm of the hymn which
Paul used in the letter to the Philippians (2:6-11),
and on which Hegel gave an admirable commentary in the
study of "Manifest Religion" in the Phenomenology of
Spirit.10
Of course Gadamer has devoted a section of Truth and Method to the
study of the role which Christian speculation on the Word plays in the
development of the concept of language."'' But to limit the role of the
Christian tradition to its contribution to the history of the concept
of language is so to restrict the role that it is allowed to play that
Gadamer could almost be accused of going against his own phenomenological
principles of letting what is there show itself. It must also be
acknowledged that Gadamer makes many references throughout his writings
to all periods of Christian thought. What arouses comment, however, is
the lack of references in this critical final chapter of Truth and
Method. For it would seem easier to "retrieve" the notion of Being as
"speculative", the conviction that reality is self-giving and at the
same time demanding of unreserved commitment, from Christian tradition
than from Plato's doctrine of Beauty. Gadamer's reading of Plato may
not quite be strained, but it is at the least highly ingenious and
subtle. This is not to say that what Gadamer derives from Plato is
not important and true. Only how much more obviously important and
true would have been similar results derived from a reading of the




Of course one does not want to set the Christian and the Platonic
traditions against each other; it is not a case of "either-or". We have
already quoted at the end of our previous chapter the one important
reference to the role of Christianity which Gadamer makes in the final
chapter of Truth and Method, and we have seen how this reference comes
in the context of Gadamer's stress on the importance of the Platonic
tradition. This would seem to imply that for Gadamer the Christian
tradition plays its part in grounding his philosophical hermeneutics to
the extent that it is a part of the Platonic tradition that Gadamer sees
as so important. Christianity, it appears, is important insofar as it
is the subordinate member of the Christian-Platonic tradition.
At this point one can only ask whether Gadamer is not perhaps
putting the cart before the horse. One can agree withsGadamer that
there is a blend of Platonism and Christianity which is like an under¬
current accompanying the tradition of "official" Christianity and
12
scholastic metaphysics. After Nietzche and Heidegger it is the
apparent openness of Gadamer to the truth of Christian faith and the
13
"other side" of Platonism which is so appealing to Christian thought.
But we must nevertheless ask where in this Christian-Platonic tradition
the ultimate priority lies. In this tradition in iwhich Christian and
Platonic themes are interwoven and even fused together, where do the
real impetus and the real power lie? What Gadamer wants to say about
Being seems to derive from the Christian themes of Incarnation, Kenosis
and Grace; and while similar themes may no doubt be read out of Plato's
12
This latter partnership might well be identified with what Heidegger
called "onto-theo-logy".
13
Though, as we have suggested above in Part One, Chapter 9(c), the
teleological side of Platonism (and Christianity) may also have their
own truth, despite Gadamer's unwillingness to recognize this.
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doctrine of Beauty, one wonders how historically effective (to use
Gadamer's own terminology) these have been apart from the tradition
in which we find them interwoven with the Christian themes. Does the
experience to which the Platonic doctrine of Beauty points have the
power on its own to inspire a tough and an honest faith that this is
how reality is, that reality is gracious, the manifestation of the
Good? Is the self-forgetfulness of the experience of the beautiful
as radical as the dying and rising with the crucified and risen
Christ?"^4, It is of course artificial to set Christianity and
Platonism against each other in this way. As Nietzsche recognized,
in a certain sense they stand or fall together; such attempts as there
have been to affect a divorce have usually come from the "Biblical"
16
wing of the Christian tradition. "What we are questioning here is
merely whether the doctrine of Beauty which Gadamer derives from
Plato can alone bear the entire weight of his philosophical hermeneutics
and whether it should not rather be placed back in the bonds of its
historical marriage with the Christian tradition? Is it with Plato
that the last word should lie?
This is not to deny that there have in fact been Platonists, e.g.
Plotinus, whose experience of the "truth of Being" had unquestionably
been profound and authentic, and yet who have rejected Christianity.
It is merely to suggest that in the tradition it is the Christian
themes which have been powerful, have been in Gadamer's own terms
"at work" (cf. "die Wirkungsgeschichte") ♦ The texts from which Gadamer
derives his doctrine of Beauty were after all largely unknown for
much of the Middle Ages (only the Timaeus was well-known, according
to A.E. Taylor in Plato; the Man and his Work (3rd ed.j London:
Methuen, 1929), p.lj.36). The influence of Plato's doctrine of
Beauty was no doubtthepe, but mediated by Christian sources, e.g.
Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius, cf. Putnam, op. cit.
13
The problem with trying to maintain a purely "Biblical" theology is,
however, that almost from the beginning Christian faith has tried to
express itself in "non-Biblical" thought-forms. It is arguably as
schizophrenic for a first century Greek to try to think purely in
"Biblical" (or "Hebraic") terms as it is for a twentieth century
Scot. It is to be hoped that the spectre of a purely "Biblical"
theology has finally been laid. However it must be admitted that it






Perhaps the best way of leading into our discussion in the
remaining chapters of the relation between Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics and the Christian tradition is to give an account of
Gadamer's relation to the theology of Bultmann. Gadamer was a student
and a friend of Bultmann in Marburg in the 1920's and it was in this
context that he first worked out his relation as a philosopher to
Christian theology. The most important material on Bultmann is con¬
centrated in three essays and we shall deal with these in chronological
order.
(a) The firstjtext which is important for our understanding of
Gadamer's relation to Bultmann is "On the Problem of Self-Understanding"
/Zur Problematik des Selbstverstandnisse£7 (1962). (KSI 170-81; PH ljlj.-58)
In this essay Gadamer explicitly says that he hopes his philosophical
reflections may be able to contribute something to the theological
debate which was provoked by Bultmann's controversial essay "New Testament
and Mythology" (191RL)Gadamer's intention is to call in question the
notion of self-understanding as this is used in Bultmannian theology, and
to suggest its replacement by a notion of Understanding conceived in
terms of "play" or "the game". (KSI 70; PH 69) Gadamer is concerned
to stress the development in Heidegger's writings from "the transcendental
See Hans-Werner Bartsch (ed.), Kerygma and Mythl, trans. by R.H. Fuller
(London: SPCK, 1972), I-I1I4.. Gadamer's essay has the subtitle (ommitted
in English trans.) "A hermeneutical contribution to the question of
'demythologizing'" and appeared under the title "Understanding and
Playing" in the volumes devoted to the problems raised by Bultmann's
seminal essay, see Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 6,1.
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schema which still determined the concept of self-understanding in
Being and Time" (KSI 7k} PH k9) to the priority of language over the
"self" in the Understanding process. (KSI 7k} PH 5o) What Gadamer does
not say explicitly here (as he comes much nearer to doing in the next
essay we will deal with) is that he believes that this move on
3
Heidegger's part undermines Bultmann's theological position since the
latter is at one with (if not dependent on) the transcendental concept
of self-understanding which Heidegger has moved beyond. Here Gadamer
omits this explicitly negative conclusion and contents himself with
the positive suggestion that the concept of Understanding which emerges
for him from the writings of the later Heidegger is just as appropriate
for theology as it is for other hermeneutical disciplines. He writes:
... in Understanding there is a moment of selflessness
which is also relevant to theological hermeneutics and which
is to be investigated in terms of the structure of play or
the game. (KSI 75 j PH 5l)
Gadamer begins to spell out the relevance for theology of his
concept of Understanding as play by comparing the relation between mythos
and logos in ancient Greece with the relation between the Biblical tradition
and the work of the Christian theologian. (KSI 75ff} PH 5lff) The
Enlightenment programme of the systematic "de-magification" of the world,
and hence of a movement away from mythos to logos, is a prejudice which
is incapable of understanding the real relation of the Greek to his
myths.^ The Greek does not stand over against his myths in such a way
that he can extract whatever is "true" in them ("true", that is, in
terms of his own "logical" criteria) and reject all the rest as "mere
2
On this see Part One, Chapter 1 and passim.
3
A move which in his view is at most a change in emphasis rather than
any about-face. See Part One, Chapter 1(a) above.
^ For the Enlightenment and prejudice, see Part One, Chapter 1(b) above.
myth". It is not a case of his deciding just how much he is prepared
to believe and rejecting the rest. According to Gadamer the Greek
stands in a relation which is best understood as a game in which the
myth is so much part of who he is, so determines his consciousness,
that he cannot reduce it to a mere "object" to accept or reject. But
at the same time he enjoys a freedom to interpret the myth in his own
way. The question whether or not he "believes" in the myth is not one
which it is appropriate to ask, according to Gadamer. The concept of
the game does not allow this distinction, for while it has its own
kind of seriousness and its own kind of freedom, it does not permit
the "player" so to abstract himself from the play situation that he
or she can stand apart as an isolated self-sufficient judging subject.
To abstract oneself from the game is to disrupt the game, to be a
"spoil-sport". The distance between subject and object, interpreter
and myth, the freedom of the former with regard to the latter, is not
the distance and freedom of an autonomous judging subject over against
a mere object; it is a distance and freedom which is not at the disposal
of the subject or interpreter, but comes to him or her as a gift of the
game itself which embraces both participants in its movement to and fro.''
What is important for Christian theology according to Gadamer, is
that the "play structure" which holds between the Greek and his myths
The above paragraph represents an attempt to interpret, to put into
the present writer's own (no doubt very Gadameriani) words, this
passage on the relation of mythos and logos in ancient Greece. The
present writer is not at all confident that he has got to the bottom
of what Gadamer is saying here. He has interpreted the relation of
interpreter and myth in terms of what Gadamer says elsewhere about
the relation of interpreter and tradition (and as far as it goes this
seems to make sense of the passage). But specifically concerning
belief in myths the present writer is not clear what exactly Gadamer
is saying here. This is at least partly due to the rather cryptic
nature of Gadamer's references.
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also holds between the Christian theologian and Scripture. The problem
of the presence of myth in Scripture is no more to be approached from
the standpoint of the Enlightenment prejudice against "mere myth" than
is the relation of the Greek to his myths. And contrary to what some
people like to believe, Bultmann is very far from succumbing to this
Enlightenment prejudice; he wants rather to make sure that the truth
of myth makes its claim on us.
Beyond making this important but by no means original point
concerning Bultmann's attitude to myth, Gadamer makes no more specific
contribution to the theological debate. And this is understandable to
the extent that, according to Gadamer, the debate tends to be concerned
with dogmatic problems of demarcation rather than with general her-
meneutical principles (though, one might add, the former are no doubt
inextricably involved with the latter):
The theological problems have to do not with the
hermeneutical phenomenon of demythologizing as such, but
with its dogmatic implications; with whether or not, from
the dogmatic standpoint of Protestant theology, Bultmann
correctly draws the boundaries within which demythologizing
is to be applied.
Gadamer's contribution is thus limited to the proposal of a general
hermeneutical principle - that of understanding the relation of
scripture and interpreter not so much in terms of the interpreter's
self-understanding (as in Bultmann) as in terms of the game. The game
also provides the best way of presenting the relation of faith and
understanding (KSI 76; PH 53). It is worth quoting in extenso the
passage where Gadamer explains why he believes this to be so:
6 KSI 70; PH l|Ji. cf. WM 1^2; TM ii73.
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The self-understanding of faith is determined precisely
by the fact that from a theological perspective faith is
not a human possibility but is God's act of grace which
happens to the believer. But it is difficult to hold
fast to this theological insight and religious experience
to the extent that human self-understanding is dominated
by modern science and its methodology. The concept of
knowledge based on the latter can tolerate no restriction
of its claim to universality. Because of this claim all
self-understanding appears as a sort of self-possession,
which excludes nothing so much as the idea that something
can happen to it which separates it from itself. Here the
concept of play can be important. For absorption into the
game, this ecstatic loss of self, is not so much experienced
as a loss of self-possession but rather positively as the
free buoyancy of an elevation above oneself.7
What is notjentirely clear in this essay is exactly how Gadamer
thinks this contribution of his relates to Bultmann. The implication
is that Bultmann's concept of self-understanding is derived from an
understanding of Being and Time'which stresses the role of the self too
much to do justice to the experience of faith. That Bultmann's approach
is to this extent inadequate Gadamer does not explicitly say here
(though he comes nearer to doing so in a later essay, as we shall see).
But the implication is that Bultmann's conceptual apparatus is not such
as to allow an adequate theological presentation of the Christian
experience of faith. Whether beyond this Gadamer thinks that this
inadequate conceptual apparatus can have a distorting effect on the
experience of faith itself is not indicated. The relation between
theology and faith is no less ambiguous than the relation between
hermeneutics and the hermeneutical experience in Gadamer. Gadamer often
gives the impression that the hermeneutical experience (and presumably
the experience of Christian faith) are relatively independent of the
conceptual apparatus that tries to give a theoretical account of them.
He seems to appeal to that which always happens anyway which we could see
clearly if only we didn't keep getting ourselves and our methods in the
7 KSI 77f; PH 5k£
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way. But as we have suggested elsewhere, the relation between theory and
8
.
experience is more complicated than this. Theory only grows out of
hermeneutical experience and in turn affects hermeneutical experience.
Theology, presumably, only grows out of religious experience and in
turn affects (and perhaps also effects) religious experience.^
We are, however, already straying into an area which we shall return
to in our final chapter. For the moment let us note that Gadamer's
attitude in this essay seems to be that philosophical hermeneutics, as
a discipline external to and independent of Christian theology, can offer
help to theology which is the theory of the understanding of the subject-
matter of the Bible, an understanding which is appropriately described
10
as faith. Philosophical hermeneutics can help theology by offering it
the model of play for understanding Understanding, a model which is,
in Gadamer's view, more appropriate to theology's task than the outmoded
and inadequate concept of Understanding with which the latter has been
encumbered hitherto. However there seems to be a danger here (from a
"Experience" here is broad enough to include "praxis", for "experience"
is the experience made by the Underloading which (following Heidegger)
is a fundamental mode of Being of'Baseaat^and which is prior to the
opposition of theory and praxis, cf. WM 2h$i TM 230.
9
That theology should be seen as the theory of religious experience
(including praxis) and Christian theology as the theory of Christian
experience and praxis seems to the present writer to be no more than
is said in the phrase "fides quaerens intellectum." Though that this
phrase is open to more than one interpretation nothing shows better
than Karl Barth's book of that title 1
10
Whether "unfaith" can be described as a genuine understanding of the
content of the Bible remains an open question. But to fail to see the
need to choose between faith and unfaith is arguably to fail to under¬
stand that content. In this we are repeating the point made so force¬
fully by Karl Barth that whatever else Biblical criticism may be, it
is no substitute for a real understanding of the subject-matter of the
Bible. See especially the Preface to the Second Edition of Barth's
The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: OUP, 1968),
pp.:6ff.
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theological point of view) of reducing theological hermeneutics to a
department within the broader context of a universal philosophical
hermeneutics. Theology on this view seems little more than what we
might call a "regional hermeneutics". The student of theology may
well wonder whether the relation of philosophical hermeneutics to
theology can be such a merely external one., and whether Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics itself might not have a more intimate
connection with the religious experience of faith than this essay
would lead one to believe. It is in the context of our discussion
of the next essay that we may best pursue these questions.
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(b) The second text which informs us about Gadamer's relation
to Bultmann is the essay "Martin Heidegger and Marburg Theology"
(1961;). (KSI 82-92; PH 198-212) The essay is important not only as
a presentation of Gadamer's understanding of Heidegger and of Bultmann,
that is, as philosophical and theological document; it is important
also as an historical document in that it gives a first-hand account
of the turbulent philosophical and theological scene in Marburg in the
1920's."^" For example, Gadamer begins the essay by giving a sketch of
the meeting of the theological community at which the speaker was
Edward Thurneysen, "a first herald of dialectical theology in Marburg"
for the younger members of the audience (including Gadamer)He also
records Heidegger's contribution to that meeting, although this con¬
tribution has for Gadamer, as we shall see, a much more than "merely
historical" interest (it is rather of "effective-historical"
significance).
The centre of the essay is Gadamer's assessment of the conse¬
quences of Heidegger's "turn" for Bultmann's theological programme.
Here is made explicit what was implied in the earlier essay on Bultmann.
First of all Gadamer claims that Bultmann's theological position is
2
based on a particular interpretation of Being and Time:
For an evocation of this period (and in particular of Bultmann's
weekly "at homes" where the Greek classics were read, wine imbibed
and jokes recounted) see Gadamer's Philosophische Lehrjahre,
pp.1)1-59.
2
That the early Heidegger himself almost invited such an interpretation
Gadamer admits elsewhere, see KS III l58f; PH lip.-
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. . . under the influence of Heidegger's thought
Bultmann explicated his position by means of the concepts
of inauthenticity and authenticity. There-being which
has fallen into the world and which understands itself
in terms of what is at its disposal is called to con¬
version, and in the collapse /Scheitern7 of its self-
sufficiency experiences the turn to authenticity. To
Bultmann the transcendental analytic of There-being
seemed to describe a neutral anthropological basic
constitution /Grundverfassung7 in terms of which the
call to faith could be interpreted "existentially"
independently of its contents .... It was
therefore precisely the transcendental-philosophical
conception of Being and Time that fitted in with his
theological thinkin£T"3
But this interpretation of Being and Time is one which Heidegger
increasingly chose to reject:
Meanwhile Heidegger's way of thought went in the
opposite direction. This transcendental-philosophical
self-conception proved to be less and less suited to
the inmost concern of Heidegger's thought - the concern
which had moved him from the beginning. And the later
talk of the "turn" which eliminated every existentiell
sense from talk, of There-being's authenticity, and
hence from the concept of authenticity itself, could
no longer, in my opinion, be combined with the basic
theological concern of Rudolf Bultmann.
Of course Gadamer does not actually say that Bultmann.'s theological
approach is inadequate. While claiming that it is beyond his competence
to judge the exegetical fruitfulness of Bultmann's approach, he admits
that the existentialist interpretation of Paul and John brought the
kerygmatic meaning of the Hew Testament proclamation to its highest
fulfilment, (ibid.) But his own conviction that the only way to
interpret Being and Time is in terms of the later Heidegger means that
he is bound to see Bultmann's theological approach as at least one¬
sided.
3 KSI 89,' PH 206f
^ KSI 895 PH 207
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To understand in what sense Bultmann is "one-sided" we must go
back to that meeting in Marburg where Thurneysen spoke as "the herald
of dialectical theology". Gadamer records Heidegger's contribution
to the discussion:
After invoking the Christian scepticism of Franz
Overbeck, he said that it is the true task of theology,
which must be rediscovered, to see the word which is
capable of calling to faith and of preserving in faith.
A genuine Heidegger-sentence, full of ambiguity. These
words of Heidegger seemed to set theology a task, and
yet they went beyond that attack on the theology of his
time by Franz Overbeck which Heidegger had cited, for
they suggested despair about the possibility of theology
itself.
It appears that Heidegger is here expressing doubts about the
ability of dialectical theology to perform the task of theology. The
call to faith is one thing, and no doubt dialectical theology with its
Dada-istic zeal (if one may so put it) was rather good at shattering
complacency and opening men and women to the claim of the gospel. But
6
was it really theology? The preservation in faith, the continuity
and the expression of faith in word and deed were quite another matter.
It was all very well to insist on the immediacy of the encounter
between, on the one hand, the kerygma with its Absolute Paradox, and,
on the other, men and women with their continually foundering attempts
at self-justification, as dialectical theology did, following in the
long-forgotten footsteps of Kierkegaard. But this immediacy of the
encounter with the claim of the kerygma somehow had to be mediated,
i.e. preserved, spoken about ("brought to language"), handed on,
translated into "ethics" and so on 3 and this could not be achieved
merely by the perpetual "repetition" of the moment of immediacy when
the claim of the kerygma encountered foundering human pride.
^ KSI 82j PH 198
6
The development of Karl Barth testifies to an awareness of precisely
this question. The appropriateness of his answer is another matter.
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Whether some such thoughts were in the head of Heidegger when he
made the remark recorded here it is no doubt rash to speculate. But
certainly some such thoughts are in the head of Gadamer as he recalls
7
the remark. For Bultmann always remained faithful to his roots in
dialectical theology and the one-sidedness which Gadamer by implication
finds in Bultmann is precisely the one-sidedness of dialectical theology.
This emerges when, immediately following the passage quoted above in
which the incompatability of the concerns of Bultmann and Heidegger
are stressed, Gadamer writes:
Thus Heidegger was now really approaching for the
first time the dimension in which could be fulfilled
his early demand that theology should find the word
not only to call to faith, but also to preserve in
faith. If the call to faith, the claim which challenges
the self-sufficiency of the ego and compels it to self-
surrender in faith, can be interpreted in terms of
self-understanding, then perhaps a language of faith
which could preserve in faith was something else.
And it was precisely this language for which Heidegger's
thought sketched out a new basis ever more clearly:
truth as an event that contains its own error; unconceal-
ment /pntbergung/ that is concealment /Verbergung;7 and
also a sheltering /Bergung7; and also the famous phrase
from the Letter on Humanism, according to which language
is the "house of Being"; all this points beyond the
horizon of any self-understanding, no matter how
"foundering" and historical.^
However accurate this interpretation of the development of Heidegger
may be, what it is important for our purposes to note is that Gadamer
points his own philosophical endeavours in the direction that he
understands Heidegger to have taken. He writes:
7
Gadamer's Hegelian leanings place a much greater distance between
himself and Kierkegaard than would seem to have been the case with
Heidegger in the early 1920's.
8
KSI 90; PH 208
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However one can also advance from the experience of
Understanding and the historicality of self-understanding
in the same direction, and this is the starting point of
my own attempts at a philosophical hermeneutic.9
The implication of this is that Gadamer too is engaged in findiig a
language in which one could be "preserved in faith". We may leave
aside the question as to what extent Heidegger's work was implicitly
theological; what is clear enough is that Gadamer's work in some
sense is. But in precisely what sense Gadamer's work impinges on
theology is far from clear.
From one point of view it looks as if the relation of Gadamer to
theology is merely external. Gadamer's exploration of the experience
of art leads him to a concept of Understanding which can help theology
by providing it with an appropriate way of understanding its own
relation to the Bible. (KSI 90f j PH 208f) The difficulty with this
(from the theological point of view) is that theology then becomes what
we have called a "regional hermeneutics" within an all-embracing
universal philosophical hermeneutics. But this runs directly counter
to theology's own claim to universality. A theology which is reduced
to a department of a universal hermeneutics, to being a discipline
which studies religious texts as opposed to legal, historical or any
other sort of text, may call itself Biblical Studies, but it is arguably
no longer theology.
Of course Gadamer wants to model his universal hermeneutics on
the dogmatic approaches of theological and legal hermeneutics ("WM 29b}
TM 277), so there would be no grave danger of theological hermeneutics
being reduced to Biblical criticism, the danger to which Liberal
theology is commonly supposed to have succumbed. Gadamer insists that
all hermeneutics has to do with the content of the text it is engaged
9
KSI 90} PH 208
zzy
with. The trouble with the content of the particular text (or texts)
with which Christian theology has to do (i.e. the Bible) is that it
claims to have the first and last word about not only the claim that
it makes (i.e. the kerygma) but also the appropriate response to that
claim (i.e. faith). In other words, the Bible tells us about the
appropriate way in which to understand itself; it already contains
the hermeneutical principles in terms of which alone it demands to
be understood. Indeed one might even say that its specific content is
this hermeneutical principle, since (at least in the Protestant tradi¬
tion) the central content of the New Testament proclamation is that
faith (which is the appropriate way to understand that content) is the
gracious gift of God. The message does not also or incidentally tell
us how it is to be appropriated; the message is the gift of that
appropriation (i.e. grace-faith). The Christian experience then has
its own sort of "reflexivity" in which form and content, the "that"
and the "xirhat" (the "what" of the message and the "that" of its
appropriation) interpenetrate one another. This mysterious "reflexivity"
is usually ascribed to the workings of the Holy Spirit
It follows from the above that theology so understood will not
submit to any hermeneutical principle imposed on it from without. It
will always see such imposition as "Babylonian captivity". For this
reason Christian theology would do well to be suspicious when Gadamer
offers to help it out with a universal philosophical hermeneutics
which he has developed from his study of aesthetic experience, of
legal hermeneutics and, last and apparently least, pre-Schleiermacher
dogmatically grounded theological hermeneutics.
e.g. 1 Corinthians 2:9-12.
It is doubtless no accident that the reflexive philosopher par
excellence, Hegel, should have called his philosophy a philosophy
of Spirit.
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However, while for most of the time in these essays Gadamer seems
to envisage the relation of philosophical hermeneutics and theology as
external in the sense sketched out above, at other times he gives the
impression that his philosophical hermeneutics is not so much an external
aid with which the theologian may better pursue his own separate task
as it is the very truth which the theologian is groping after. Gadamer
writes in the previous essay "On the Problem of Self-understanding":
The self that we are does not possess itself. We
could rather say that it "happens". And this is what the
theologian is really saying when he says that faith is an
even in which a new human being is established. He also
says that it is the Word /Gadamer is here playing on the
ambiguity of "Wort" which can mean either "God's Word" or
"the word" i.e. Ianguage7 that is believed and understood
and through which we overcome the abysmal ignorance about
ourselves in which we live.11
We might well ask what Gadamer means when he says that what he says is
what the theologian "really" means. There is a suspicion that in some
sort of Hegelian fashion Gadamer thinks he is giving adequate philoso¬
phical expression to the truth that the theologian in his own way and
in his own rather picturesque images is groping after. This suspicion
is increased when we read in another essay "The Philosophical
Foundations of the Twentieth Century" :
This concept of Spirit that transcends the subjectivity
of the ego has its true counterpart in the phenomenon of
language, which has increasingly become the focal point of
contemporary philosophy. The phenomenon of language
possesses an advantage which is appropriate to our
finitude, and which distinguishes it from that concept of
Spirit which Hegel drew from the Christian tradition: it
is infinite like Spirit and yet finite like every event.12
11
KSI 78; PH 33
12
KSI H483 PH 128
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When we return to the essay under consideration in this section
it is perhaps with less confidence (at least from a theological stand¬
point) in the reassuring tone of voice with which Gadamer tells us of
Heidegger's and his own intentions of sketching out a new foundation
for the language of faith, for the language that would preserve one in
faith. For it is not clear whether Gadamer's (and Heidegger's) work
is to be seen as an external aid to theology, or is in some sense
itself performing the task of theology. Is the language that preserves
in faith a language which has still to be worked out by theology with
the help of Gadamer (and Heidegger); or is "the phenomenon of language"
which Gadamer (and Heidegger) is so anxious to place at the centre of
philosophy itself the language that preserves in faith? Is it the
13
specific language of the Christian tradition, properly appropriated
with the aid of Gadamer's universal philosophical hermeneutics, which
preserves in faith; or is it tradition as such, grounded in the gracious
play of "language itself", that supports, that is "saving"? That the
second member of each of these alternatives is the case is suggested
by the concluding sentence of the essay, a sentence which consciously
echoes the "Heidegger-sentence" quoted at the beginning:
Every answer to the claim of tradition and not only the
word which theology has to seek, is a word which preserves.
Evidently not only "Heidegger-sentences" are full of ambiguity!
That it is obviously an error (from the standpoint of Christian
faith) to attempt to express that faith in conceptual terms and so to
take Christian faith as the key to understanding all reality (i.e. to
make Christian faith the basis of a Christian philosophy) is by no
means self-evident. The intentions of Hegel, for example, should not
13
Fuchs would say: the language of Jesus.
^ KSI 92; PH 211
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in the present writer's view be dismissed as abruptly as they often
are by Christian theologians. That Gadamer may be doing something
similar is a possibility whioh we have already envisaged and will
15
discuss later. What emerges from these essays is that if he is
doing so, he is certainly not doing so explicitly. And the danger
of this lack of explicitness is that Gadamer's philosophical her-
meneutics (if it is not seen as an external aid to theology - a
position whichj as we have seen, has its problems) may be seen
16
merely as the replacement of theology.
See Chapter 6 below.
16
If Hegel is accused of such a replacement of theology when he made
his indebtedness to the Christian religion abundantly clear, how
much more can this accusation be made when the indebtedness is not
made explicit!
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(c) Gadamer's attitude to the theology of Bultmann can be seen
in a rather different light in the section of his essay "Hermeneutics
and Historicism" which he devotes to the discussion of the hermeneutical
problem in modern Protestant theology. It is interesting to note there
an indication that., while he may regard Bultmann's theological programme
as in need of supplementation, he nevertheless has a deep respect for
Bultmann and thinks that it is easier to see the limitations of the
latter's work than creatively to overcome them (as more than one
theologian has discovered, one might add):
Perhaps, indeed certainly, it is possible to
understand "more" in the New Testament than Bultmann
has understood. But this can only come about when
one understands this "more" just as well, that is,
one really understands it.2
These sentences are helpful in that they keep Gadamer's criticisms of
Bultmann in their proper perspective.
However the passage that is really important for our present
purposes is the one where Gadamer brings out the incompatibility between
what is by implication his own general philosophical hermeneutics and
Christian theology seen in Bultmann's terms. In this passage Gadamer
is attempting to show how the idea of self-understanding in Bultmann
is quite different from self-knowledge not only in any psychologistic
sense, but also in the "deeper, more speculative sense which determines
the concept of Spirit in German idealism, according to which completed
self-consciousness recognizes itself in the Other". (SM h96> TM I4.76)
In Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit consciousness only attains to self-
consciousness through recognition of the Other, (ibid.) Self-under¬
standing in Bultmann's sense is also dependent on the recognition of
Appended to the 2nd edition of Mahrheit und Methode (MM U77-5l2j
TM i).60-I|.9l) j for the section on hermeneutics and modern Protestant
theology see MM k92~b99; TM i4.73-l4.78.
2
MM ii93j TM ii73
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the Other; but this Other is different from Hegel's Other. It is the
3
"Wholly Other" , the "extra nos" of dialectical theology, and unlike
Hegel's Other it cannot be mediated, "aufgehoben", into the developing
totality; it is "unaufhebbar".
Thus Gadamer sharply contrasts the uniqueness of the Christian
self-understanding which comes in the encounter with the "Wholly Other"
with the self-knowledge which comes as the result of the experience of
the encounter with the Other, as this is described, for example, in
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Gadamer asserts the uniqueness and
the absolute nature of the Christian claim in the strongest possible
terms:
That self-understanding which we achieve in ever
new experiences with what is other and with other people
remains from the Christian point of view in an essential
sense non-understanding, (ibid)
The experience of coming-to-grief or "foundering" /Scheitern/ is not
confined to Christian experience; indeed it is this experience of
coming into violent collision with the Other which allows a new- and
deepened human self-understanding to emerge, (ibid.) But from the
Christian perspective, according to Gadamer, all such deepening of
self-understanding through what we might call "penultimate" coming-to-
grief is obliterated, annihilated, in the death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ. The salvation event is, from this particular theological
stance, the absolute end of "the old man", be he ever so learned in
the hard school of experience. This is the theological position which
Gadamer ascribes to Bultmann and his "eschatological event of faith"
Gadamer does not actually use the term "Wholly Other"; the closest
he comes is "the Other which is not at our disposal" /das unverfugbar
kudere/. But given the connection of Bultmann with dialectical
theology, it seems legitimate to use the phrase "Wholly Other" for
the sake of clarity of exposition.
ibid.
(correctly, in the present writer's view), and which in this passage
he assumes to he the Christian position pure and simple (which the
present writer would dispute),
At any rate, as will by now be apparent, the position which
Gadamer opposes to the exclusiveness of the Christian claim is not
only that of Hegel and German Idealism, but also his own.
Admittedly Gadamer does not say this explicitly; but there can be
little doubt that the phrases Gadamer uses to describe the deepening
of self-understanding through the experience of the Other, and the
experience of "coming-to-grief", could apply (and are intended to
apply) to his own "hermeneutical theory of experience" with its
central theme of "pathei mathos", of learning through suffering,
just as well as they apply to Hegel's "Science of the experience of
consciousness". Not, of course, that Gadamer is saying the same as
Hegel; as we have seen he endeavours to differentiate his own
position from that of Hegel. But insofar as Hegel has a radically
different view of the relation between experience and self-under¬
standing from that of Bultmann, Gadamer implicitly sides with Hegel.
What is remarkable, however, is that Gadamer seems to see
Bultmann's theological position as the only possible Christian
position, and in doing so by implication places his own philosophical
position in opposition to "the Christian position". Bultmann's
"eschatological event" would mean the end too of Gadamer's philo¬
sophical hermeneutics. If Bultmann's theological position were
"the Christian position" then clearly Gadamer is quite right thus
to distance himself from Christian faith and experience. However
Gadamer neglects to say that Hegel not only differs radically
236
from Bultmaan in his presentation of the relation between self-
understanding and experience; he differs just as radically in his
presentation of the relation between self-understanding and Christian
experience. For Hegel Christian faith and experience are not simply
the end, the obliteration, of all previous experience; they are rather
the fulfilment of all previous experience. For Hegel Christian faith
and experience do not mean the devaluation of all other experience;
they are rather the key which allows us to make sense of all other
experience. For Hegel Christian self-understanding does not reject
all other self-understanding as "essentially non-understanding"; it
sees it rather as the preparation, the embryo, the analogy, of itself.
For Hegel the world and history are not related to the Christian only
paradoxically, only "eschatologically"; they are "the laboratories of
the Spirit".
Hegel, of course, has his own perculiaT'form of "eschatology".
And Gadamer is quite right to suggest that the eschatological aspect
of the Christian tradition raises questions for a philosophy like his
£
own. But that this eschatological aspect should be identified with
Bultmann's interpretation of it is by no means self-evident. This
premature identification is a disturbing truncation of a subject, and
a tradition, which are worthy of a more patient and a more careful
exploration. Moreover such an attitude on Gadamer's part seems to
contradict his attitude elsewhere. Here he seems ready (for whatever
reasons) to identify Christian theology with the rather narrow and
exclusivistic concerns of dialectical theology which he rightly sees
informing Bultmann's concept of "faith as eschatological event"; and
See next chapter.
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in doing so he distances his own philosophical endeavours from ''theology".
Elsewhere (as we have seen) his concern seems to be to help Bultmann's
theology to escape from the narrow confines of dialectical theology,
and (in the company of Heidegger, we are told) to use his own philo¬
sophical endeavours to help that theology to perform its true task,
that is, to find the word that preserves in faith. Other scattered
references to all stages of the Christian tradition suggest that this
latter concern is Gadamer's real concern, and that in the passage we
have examined here he has allowed himself to be provoked by the
6
polemical edge of dialectical theology. But this latter concern is,
as we have seen, rather ambiguous. This ambiguity is characteristic
of the relationship between Christian faith and speculative philosophy,
a relationship to which we will return in our final chapter.
The appropriate (and no doubt in its own way provocative) reply of a
descendent of Hegel to the sometimes shrill invective of the descen-
dents of Kierkegaard is not "Xou are wrong" but "Of course you are
partly right".
CHAPTER FOUR
DEATH AMD DIALECTIC (GADAHER MP THE PROBLEM OF ESCHATOLOGl)
We have already noted Gadamer's implicit distancing of himself
from Bultmann's theological concept of "faith as eschatslogical event".
Now we must examine in a little more detail how Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics stands in relation to the question of eschatology. This
will involve a further look at the eschatology developed by Bultmann as
well as at its philosophical counterpart in the earlier writings of
Heidegger, and also a look at the eschatology of Hegel, the other modern
philosopher whose thought exerts a powerful influence on Gadamer
(section a). Then, after a brief discussion of whether we may legiti¬
mately talk of theodicy in connection with Gadamer (section b), the
chapter will close with a discussion of the two main types of escha¬
tology to be found in the Christian tradition, and of how these relate
to Gadamer's undertaking (section c).
(a) Gadamer and the eschatologies of Heidegger and Hegel
The end of history as this is envisaged in Bultmann's "eschato-
logical event of faith" means, as a glance at his Gifford Lectures will
show, not the consummation and fulfilment of world history, nor even
the consummation and fulfilment of an individual's history. It means
rather the sheer transcendence of history by the individual as he or
she encounters the Eternal in the kerygma of the crucified and risen
Christ. Universal history and personal history come to an end in the
death of Christ and his resurrection into the kerygma of the eschato-
logical community whose existence is at once and paradoxically beyond
and within history. As Bultmann puts it in a famous sentence from
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his Gifford Lectures, a sentence which, with its linking of history with
sin, has peculiar Platonic overtones:
The paradox that Christian existence is at the same
time an eschatological unwordly being and a historical
being is analogous with the Lutheran statement: simul
Justus, simul peccator.
Such a paradoxical connection of history and transcendence seems
to be present also in the work of Heidegger, with his notion of "finite
transcendence" (to borrow W.J. Richardson's phrase). Just as in
Bultmann transcendence is available to finite, historical human beings
in the encounter with the kerygma of the crucified Christ, so in
Heidegger transcendence is connected with an authentic relation to
one's own death, with what Heidegger calls "Being-unto-death". For
Heidegger, we might say, death is "the end of the world", but it is
only thus that the totality which Heidegger calls "World" is accessible.
This totality is also accessible in other ways, Heidegger tells us in
2
What is Metaphysics? , in moods of boredom and joy "in the presence of
the beloved"; but these (and particularly the latter) are not elaborated.
It is above all in dread /Angst/ that we encounter Ho thingness which
3
is "the veil of Being". That an authentic relation to our own death,
to our own Nothingness, which is revealed in dread, means both the
revelation of Being, of the totality of beings ("World"), and also
the transcendence of There-being, can be seen when Heidegger writes
that Being "is only revealed in the transcendence of There-being pro¬
jected into Nothingness" /in der Transzendenz des in das Nichts
History and Eschatology (Edinburgh University Press, 1957), p.l^ij..
2
W Met 30f; EB 333f.
3
W Met $2; EB 360
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hinausgehaltenen Daseins7. And a few paragraphs ealier Heidegger has
written:
The projection /Hineingehaltenheit7 of There-beinginto Nothingness on the basis /Grunde7 of hidden dread is
the overcoming of the totality of beings /das Ubersteigendes Seienden in Ganzery': transcendence.5
It does not seem entirely out of place to refer in this context /to
Heidegger's "eschatology", in that There-being in authentically
encountering its own end, its own death, its own Nothingness, achieves
a moment of transcendence in which the "World" in its totality is
encountered and is "overcome". There-being in its resolute encounter
with Nothingness moves beyond the "World" and, presumably, history.
Insofar as There-being, so to speak, goes out of Being into Nothingness,
and thus lets Being as Being appear, and insofar as Being for Heidegger
is time,^ we seem entitled to say that There-being, though essentially
finite and historical, moves beyond time and history insofar as it
projects itself into Nothingness, into its own death. To this it must
be immediately added that the "World" that is revealed, the Being that
is lit up, in Tliere-being's transcendence is itself in Heidegger's view
finite and historical.
What we want to stress here are the connections between Heidegger's
"eschatology" and the eschatology of Bultmann. Whatever metamorphoses
^
W Met J+Oj EB 3l|6
*
W Met 38 j EB 31J+
6
cf. WM 2i;3j TM 227f.
7
Heidegger's thought may subsequently undergo, there seems to be strong
analogies between the above sketch of Heidegger's notion of transcendence
by projection into death and Nothingness, and Bultmann's notion of the
eschatological event of faith in which the believer is taken beyond the
world and history by participation in the death of Christ in which the
world is overcome (though of course the believer remains "paradoxically"
related to the world and history). These connections between Bultmann
and Heidegger are important when we remember the implicit but decisive
rejection by Gadamer of Bultmann's eschatology. The question we must
raise is whether Gadamer's rejection of Bultmann's eschatology implies
a rejection of the "eschatology" we claimed to discover in Heidegger
and sketched out above. What Gadamer seemed to object to in Bultmann's
eschatology was that it tended to devalue communal and personal history
and experience. The salvation event was the end, the annihilation, of
all such history. History of course remained, but just as unredeemed
and meaningless as ever. It was only in the ever-to-be-repeated
moment of transcendence in which the world and history are overcome
that salvation and meaning lay. Much the same sort of thing could be
said about Heidegger's "eschatology" as we sketched it out above, and
it seems fair to infer that insofar as our sketch is accurate Gadamer
would have to distance himself from Heidegger also. Of course the
question is complicated by the so-called "turn" in Heidegger. However
the present writer sees no reason to believe that the "turn" makes a
7
The connection of death with the transcendence of There-being and the
revelation of "World" seems to remain throughout Heidegger's writings,
though of course it undergoes several metamorphoses. Heidegger writes,
for instance, in "The Nature of Language":
Mortals are those who can experience death as death. The
animal cannot do this. But neither can the animal speak .
The essential relation between death and language flashes
up before us, but is still unthought..
(Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.21f>,- On the Way to Language, p.107).
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decisive difference to the issue under discussion. It is just as
difficult to see how the ontological "event" /Ereignis7 of Being, in
which There-being is the passive partner, is related to his or her
other, ontic history and experience, as it is to see how the trans¬
cendence into Nothingness which reveals the "World" is related to
human history and experience within that "World". To put the matter
crudely, it is doubtful whether it is any easier to relate a quasi-
mystical surrender to the grace of Being revealed in the "shrine of
Nothingness" to ordinary human history and experience, than it is
to relate a quasi-existentialist encounter with Nothingness to such
history and experience. This is not to say that such a relation
cannot be made or should not be attempted, but only that to the extent
Heidegger fails to make such a relation he must be subject to the same
criticisms that Gadamer makes of Bultmann. For Gadamer is opposed to
any sort of transcendence or eschatology which annihilates our ordinary
human history and experience. He is committed to human history and
experience and any transcendence in his philosophy can only be trans¬
cendence within such history, not beyond it.
Transcendence within history (if such a phrase is permissable)
is a feature of the philosophy of Hegel. For Hegel a moment of trans¬
cendence, or overcoming, is possible within the immanent movement of
human history and experience. This human history no doubt includes
that of the individual, but Hegel is primarly concerned with the move¬
ment of World-history. The immanent movement which allows transcendence
0
See Poetry, Language, and Thought, pp.l78f.
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or overcoming is Hegel's notorious dialectic, in which "the power of
the negative" is at work. This movement of transcendence, like that
9
in Heidegger and Bultmann, is connected with death. But just as
Hegel's transcendence remains within the historical process, so
death is no longer understood as a movement beyond history into
Eternity (or Nothingness) but is transformed into a movement within
history. Death (aad in particular the death and resurrection of
Jesusis turned into an immanent principle with describes the
movement of human history and experience. Death is turned into
what we might call, to adapt Goethe's well-known phrase "Stirb und
werde",^" the "die and become" principle. Progress only comes through
negation, as human experience, according to Hegel, shows. We must, as
12
the Gospels tell us, lose our life to find it. But not, Hegel would
add, in some other world entirely beyond history.
For death and "the power of the negative" see PS 19 (HW II 25).
cf. J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, (London: George Allen
and Nnwin, 1958), p.61.
For Hegel's treatment of the death of Christ, and of the role of
death in the life of God see his Philosophy of Religion, trans.
Speirs and Sanderson, III (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and
Co., 1895), 86-100 (HW III 296-308).
See "Selige Sehnsucht" in the West-8stlicher Divan, cf. Penguin
Selection of Goethe's poetry, p.2Jj.O.
12
Edward Caird in his little book on Hegel has some pages on "dying
to live" and "Christian optimism" which are well worth reading, see
his Hegel, (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1883), pp.210-218.
However the finding of our own true self (which for Hegel is
Absolute Spirit knowing itself through us) which we achieve by first
losing itj comes only at the end, the fulfilment, of history. Hegel
may wish to recognise the value of history and experience, but the
immanent dialectic of history, the "die and become" principle, is
only guaranteed by the coming of the end of history - not the
annihilation, but the consummation of history in the parousia of
Absolute Knowledge. That the negative does lead to the positive,
that death does mean the becoming of new life, can only be known from
the standpoint of the totality. As in Heidegger and Bultmann,
eschatology means the emergence of the totality. But this totality
emerges not when we, as it were, drop out of it altogether, when we
are "outside" of human history and "beside" ourselves. Hegel's
totality is attained from within, it is worked out from the "inside"
in the immanent dialectic of history and experience, the key to which
is the principle "die and become". But this principle is only
validated by the attainment of the totality. The dialectical process
is only justified by the result. Hegel's "optimism", his conviction
that the negative dimensions of history and experience lead to a
positive result, that error is merely partial and implicit truth, that
"the darkness declares the glory of light", is based on his eschatology.
Gadamer, however, rejects Hegel's eschatology as firmly as he does
Bultmann's (and, we infer, that of the earlier Heidegger). That here
should be any end, any consummation, of his dialectic is for Gadamer
out of the question, not merely in fact but in principle. The dialogue
of question and answer and the play of language are, Gadamer tells us,
in principle infinite, without end. Heidegger's "ontologically
216 .
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positive understanding of finitude", that is, the view that finitude
belongs to the essence of There-being as does hiddenness to the essence
of Being (and "truth"), is taken by Gadamer to mean that it is
impossible in principle for the articulated whole of Being and of
history to be present and available for human inspection (as it is
for divine inspection, according to traditional theological ideas).
This is not, let it be emphasized, because human finitude prevents us
as a contingent matter of fact from getting such an articulated totality
in view;"^ human nature is by definition incapable of getting such a
totality in view, just as Being and history are by definition incapable
of being present and revealed as an articulated totality. There quite
simply is no such totality, since by definition Being includes Non-
being, "truth" includes "untruth", and revelation includes concealment.
Our concern here is not to discuss Heidegger's doctrine of the
finitude of Being. What concerns us the the "optimistic" conclusions
which Gadamer seems to draw from the doctrine. To talk of Heidegger's
"ontologically positive" understanding of finitude is no doubt an apt
enough way of referring to Heidegger's insistence that finitude is not
merely a privative determination but is the condition of the possibility
of Being. But it is important not to read too much into the term
"positive". It is, after all, used in the context of ontology and its
13
PH 2l5j cf. Gadamer's Introduction to the Reclam edition of Heidegger's
Per Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.l05>.
We emphasize "articulated totality" because although Heidegger says
in What is Metaphysics? that we can have an experience of Being, of
the totality of beings, this totality is prior to any logical deter¬
mination and is quite different from Hegel's "totality of the deter¬
minations of thought". Nor, strictly speaking, can we be said to
get Heidegger's totality'In view", since it is prior to "eide",
articulated forms.
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extension beyond that realm must be scrutinized with great care. In
particular, we must examine carefully whether Heidegger's "ontologi-
cally positive" understanding of finitude is capable of supporting a
quasi-Hegelian dialectic that has abandoned Hegel's eschatology.
That Gadamer retains a Hegelian "optimism" while dispensing with the
ground of that optimism there can be little doubt. It is worth quoting
de Waelhens on this point in extenso:
This immense effort completely to free philosophy, the
human sciences and human experience from the mortgages
and postulates of disembodied rationalism has retained
the latter's unfailing optimism. Thus to posit the
continuity of all our history ignores violence, breach,
accident, submersion, darkness and radical new beginnings.
In a word, this philosophy of finitude eliminates the
risks of contingency in the past and makes no mention
of those in the future. In this sense it is only too
clear that the crux of Gadamer's enterprise consists
in interpreting Heidegger in such a way as to transform
him into Hegel without a System. The transition from
Hegelian dialectic to Gadamer's hermeneutics via the
intermediary of Heidegger's "Welt-" and "Seinsoffenheit"
in no way gives up the claims of the former to take
charge of all that has been and to raise it to its
truth tbfough the truth of the whole.
One cannot help but share de Waelhens' implied scepticism about
the attempt to interpret Heidegger as "Hegel without a system", or to
use the terms of our own discussion, Hegel without the eschatology of
Absolute Knowledge. Heidegger may have given a convincing enough
description of Nothingness as the veil of Being, of the totality of
beings. But has he shown that negativity within human history and
experience, within the totality revealed by Nothingness, is"positive"?
Heidegger no doubt wants to ground the particular forms of negativity
15 —
"Sur une hermeneutique de 1'hermeneutique", Revue Philosophique de
Louvain, vol. 60 (1962), 590.
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which are found, within human experience (including logical negation)
in Nothingness, but he can hardly be said to have done so. He makes
a suggestion, he announces an intention; but, to the best of the
present writer's knowledge, this intention is never elaborated in any
detail. Moreover we must wonder whether Heidegger's intention of
grounding particular negativities in Nothingness would result in
giving them a "positive" meaning in anything like the "optimistic"
sense which Gadamer seems to want. Still less can we imagine that
Heidegger would ever have developed anything like a Hegelian
dialectic, in the way that Gadamer does. This is not to presume to
deny Gadamer!s right to go the way he does, but only to register
the present writer's doubt that this way is the way of Heidegger.
This doubt is supported by the views of Fruchon who emphasizes,
and indeed welcomes, the divergences of Gadamer from Heidegger. With
reference to Gadamer's strongly "positive" or "optimistic" reading of
Heidegger, Fruchon writes:
Perhaps we must admit that, transplanted by Gadamer,
Heidegger's work acquires on the whole a meaning which
is the inverse of its original meaning: it does not
emphasize that all manifestation is dissimulation, but
on the contrary that all dissimulation is latent
presence and virtual manifestation.17
In Gadamer hiddenness, breach and absence in tradition tend to be
viewed positively as implicit manifestation, continuity and presence.
This positive turn is achieved by the taking up of negative elements
into the dialectical play of language, of question and answer, where
16
See W Met 28f, 37; EB 330f, 3Ulf•
17
Fruchon, op cit., p.363-
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negativity is but the spur to ever new fullness of meaning. Here indeed
it seems appropriate to talk of the "die and become" principle, and to
invoke the "optimism" of Hegel.
But how, as we have repeatedly asked, can Gadamer justify a
Hegelian "optimism", a Hegelian confidence that totality and truth are
implicit in disruption and obscurity, when his dialectic is without
end? And, it must be added, not only without the already present end
of Hegel's "realized eschatology", but also without even the anticipated
end, the hoped-for end, of a future eschatology. Gadamer's dialectic
is, as we have seen, endless in principle. Nor does it seem that
Gadamer can derive support for his "optimism" by retreating (taking "a
step back") into Heidegger's ontology with its "positive" estimate of
finitude, because not only is that ontology only problematically
related to ontic history and experience (any departure from which
Gadamer appears to condemn, presumably as "anti-human"); it is also
"1 R
by no means as obviously "positive" as Gadamer appears to think it is.
Whichever way Gadamer turns, it seems that the apparent lack of satis¬
factory eschatology (or indeed of any eschatology whatsoever) casts
doubt on his ability to justify his "optimism".
'
cf. Part One, Chapter l(a) above on Gadamer's interpretation of
Heidegger's term "throwness". Indeed, one can argue that whatever
grounds there are for "optimism" in Heidegger are precisely in his
own kind of eschatology, his expectation of the dawning of a new
epoch of Being - an expectation which Gadamer explicitly refuses
to share; see WM xxiii; TM xxv.
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(b) Gadamer's "theodicy/"
It does not seem illegitimate to the present writer to pose this
problem of the relation between Gadamer's so-called "optimism" and the
negativity which pervades human experience^ in the widest possible
terms. Does Gadamer inherit from Hegel some sort of theodicy? Gadamer
of course would claim to be doing philosophy rather than theologyj but
inasmuch as Gadamer inherits Hegel's "optimism" he inherits also a
connection with theodicy, for Hegel's philosophical "optimism" is merely
2
theodicy transposed into the sphere of philosophy. Gadamer indeed
seems a little sceptical of Hegel's claim to demonstrate "the march of
God through the world". In Hegel's Dialectic he writes:
. . . Hegel taught how to recognize reason in history
even in spite of the terrible contradictions which the
confusion of human history and fate places before our eyes.
He brought into the realm of thoughtwhat had previously
been left to faith and trust in Providence because it was
impenetrable to human knowledge and insight.
Dialectic was the magic charm enabling him to find
necessity in the erratic, movement of human history . . .
The tone of this passage seems to place some distance between
Gadamer and Hegel, but it is perhaps significant that Gadamer does not
actually say in what respects he thinks Hegel's project was mistaken.
Gadamer's apparent reluctance in this passage to state clearly his own
position with regard to Hegel is perhaps because the relation between
Gadamer and Hegel here is rather ambiguous. For Gadamer too wants to
say that reason is at work in history, though reason for Gadamer is
Experience is essentially negative for Gadamer, see WM 335ff3 TM
3l6ff; also Part One, Chapter 3 above.
2
See Introduction to the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, in
J. Loewenberg (ed.), Hegel Selections (New York: Scribner's, 1957),
p.357 (HW 12 20).
3
HD 87,- HD (ET) 105.
intimately connected with language: "Language is the language of reason
itself" (WM 379; TM 363)» The nature of this mysterious intimacy is
never elaborated. However, from Gadamer's clear statement that there
is such an intimacy we may perhaps infer that when Gadamer talks of
language as grounding and validating the historical play of tradition
with its continual dialogue of question and answer, then reason and its
dialectical unfolding in history cannot be too far away. We must
regret that Gadamer allows the line dividing himself from Hegel on
these issues to be so fuzzy and uncertain.
But whatever the precise relation between Gadamer and Hegel with
regard to the question of reason in history, it seems undeniable that
the central problems of theodicy are "taken up" into Gadamer!s philo¬
sophy. It is Gadamer himself, after all, who at a crucial stage in the
presentation of his philosophy brings in the idea of "pathei mathos",
of learning through suffering.^ But without a satisfactory eschatology,
it is difficult to see how suffering, how a particular esqperience of
negativity, can be confidently asserted to be in any sense productive.
Gadamer may reject the "teleological" relation of experience to knowledge
(and in Hegel's case to Absolute Knowledge), and wish to exalt "experience"
as an end in itself. But how can he be so sure that the negativity of
a particular experience is not symply dysteleological?
^ See WM 339; TM 320; see also Part One, Chapter 3 above.
(c) Two t;/pes of eschatology in the Christian tradition
We must postpone further discussion of these questions until the
next chapter ("Providence and Play")* and conclude this chapter by
looking briefly at the problem of eschatology in Gadamer's philosophy
in the light of the Christian tradition.
It seems a pity that Gadamer indentifies the Christian postition
with Bultmann's eschatology, for the understanding of eschatology which
the Christian tradition contains is far richer and more complex than
such a one-sided understanding as Bultmann's would suggest.It would
be difficult to do justice to this aspect of the tradition in a whole
book, and to devote a few paragraphs to it is almost an impertinence.
However we will attempt to show one or two of the more obvious ways in
which the Christian tradition impinges on the problems we have indicated
in Gadamer's work.
■Whereas Gadamer rejects both types of eschatology we have dis¬
cussed, i.e. the end as sheer transcendence of "this world" and history
by the individual, and the end as consummation of the history of this
world, Christian faith traditionally affirms both of these (though often
one or the other may predominate).
The end as sheer transcendence of "this world" and history by the
individual belongs to what we may call the Platonic strand in the
Christian tradition. Plato's definition of philosophy in the Phaedo
as "training to die" (67 d,ej 80 e) can be seen as finding its fulfil¬
ment in the Heo-Platonic and Christian mysticism which, it will be
recalled, Gadamer claims as a preparation for his own philosophy. (WM
U6lj TM ljl+3) Heidegger too stands in a peculiar relation to this
This is not to suggest that Bultmann's concept of "the eschatological
event of faith" is not a profound insight as far as it goes.
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tradition. Like Plato, he places death at the centre of his philosophy.
Of course "death" has a rather different meaning for the two thinkers.
The "dying" with which philosophy is concerned according to Plato in
the Phaedo involves stripping off the accidents which encumber the
"essence" of man, so leaving the •unchanging immortal soul pure and
intact. There is no absolute Non-Being in anything like Heidegger's
sense. For Plato, as for any good "essentialist", Non-being is merely
2
Not-Being, is difference in this or that respect. "Death" for Plato
seems to mean the stripping off of particular accidents, not the
encounter with Nothingness itself. But despite these differences, and
3
despite Heidegger's view that in Plato "metaphysics" takes its rise,
there still seem (at least to the present writer) to be certain
affinities between these two thinkers who place death and transcendence
at the centre of philosophy.^" In fact Heidegger's philosophy has been
able to contribute to the further development of that style of theology
(predominantly Roman Catholic) which stresses death as of great importance
for the soul's achieving (or failing to achieve) transcendence^ - a
theme which is rooted in the Christian-Platonic mystical tradition
(though usually this tradition is, as Gadamer says (WM l|6lj TM Ui-3),
mediated through Scholasticism).
See the Sophist 2k9e-259e$ cf. Taylor, op.cit. pp.386-389$ cf. HD 21$
HD(ET) 22. Also helpful is G.R.G. Mure's "Introduction to Hegel"
(Oxford: Clarendon, 19U0), pp.ll7ff.
3
For Heidegger on Plato, see W.J. Richardson, op.cit. pp.301-308 and
J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. (New Yoi"k: Harper
Torchbooks, 1971), pp.Hj.7ff"
^ It is always easier to dismiss Plato's talk of the immortal seal than
to attempt the task it presents us with. The Phaedo may be"logically
odd" or "onto-theo-logical" but it makes (at least on the present
writer) a profound existentiell claim.
e.g. Karl Rahner and Ladislaus Boros.
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However this emphasis on death and transcendence is not limited
to Roman Catholic theology. Despite the coolness towards "Plato and
the mystics" in Protestant theology in general and dialectical theology
in particular,^ there seem to be certain affinities between, for example,
Bultmann's eschatology and the mysticism of the Christian-Platonic
tradition. This need not altogether surprise us given Luther's fami¬
liarity with and, to a certain extent, dependence on, the mystical
7
tradition. Indeed it could be argued that the affinities between
the Lutheran tradition revived by dialectical theology, and the mystical
aspect of the Roman Catholic scholastic tradition emerge in the thought
of Heidegger, the former Roman Catholic seminarian working in
0
Protestant Marburg. It is interesting to approach the faith versus
works question that has all too often polarised Protestant and Roman
Catholic from the prespective of the role of "death" in theology. The
question asked by the Protestant could perhaps be put in this way":'
Can the "death" of self ever be a "work"? Could one ever be "good" at
9
"dying"? Can "death" ever be a human "achievement"? However it is
not our business here to get embroiled in the faith versus the works
issue. Nor need we go to the monks and mystics to understand the role
One only needs to think of Brunner's The Mediator where "mysticism"
is used almost as a term of abuse.
7
See The Theologia Germanicaof Martin Luther, trans, with introduction
and commentary "by B. Hoffmann (London: SPCX, l?8o), p.xvi, pp.llj.-20.
0
Though (to parody Sartre) not every former seminarian working in
Marburg is Martin Heidegger! For the affinities between Bultmann and
Heidegger, see section (a) of this chapter.
9
One might surmise that some such question may have been involved in
the "turn" of Heidegger from Being and Time to the later works.
of "death" in Christian life. That belief that Christian life is "a
training to die" is to be found in ordinary Christian piety (though
not necessarily expressed in these words of Plato). The idea that
experiences of negativity in human life can be a way of sharing in
Christ's sufferings and death (and hence be "the way of transcendence")
is at least as old as Paul (2 Cor. 1:5 j Phil. 3:7-11) and as new as
the last time we heard the remark (often casually devoid of any
religious intention) that "we all have our cross to bear".
It is interesting to compare this positive evaluation of the
negative moment of experience in the Christian tradition with Cadamer's
stress on the role of the essentially negative moment of experience
which leads us to the "true experience" which is an end in itself."^
From a Christian perspective Gadamer's "positive" evaluation of the
negative moment of experience might be at least understandable if the
"true experience" from which it derives its value were in some way
understood as a moment of transcendence. We might picture to ourselves
some Heideggerian version of this where particular negative experiences
derive value from their relation to Nothingness as the veil of Beings
as the realm of transcendence."'""'" But Gadamer rejects any such trans¬
cendence. Indeed the "true experience" he talks of is precisely the
experience that there is no transcendence. Gadamer turns his back on
the eschatology of transcendence of the Christian-Platonic tradition
See Part One, Chapter 3 above.
There are in fact some hints in this direction in Heidegger's
evocative use of the term "sacrifice" in the Epilogue to What is
Metaphysics? (W Met lj.9ffj EB 3f>8f). Heidegger talks., for instance,
of the gift "of the noble poverty in which the freedom of the
sacrifice hides its own preciousness" (W Met $0', EB 359)-
and returns to what he says is the experience and insight which lies at
the heart of Greek tragedy. (¥M 339; TM 320). Gadamer is of course
perfectly entitled to go hack to what he sees as the fundamental insight
of Greek tragedy (and thus apparently to follow in the footsteps of
Nietzsche). But he seems thereby to forfeit his entitlement to share
12
the "optimism" of the Christian-Platonic tradition.
However in the Christian tradition the Platonic, mystical strand,
which can all-too-easily slip into a dangerous "otherworldliness", is
balanced by the faith that this world and human history are important
to God. The "this-wordly" strand of the Christian tradition is usually
traced back to the Old Testament, and is given its full theological
expression in the doctrine of the Incarnation. A strongly Incarnational
theology will usually stress the immanence of God, that is, the idea that
God as Spirit is at work in this world and in history. There is a
strong faith in Divine Providence, a conviction that there is a pattern
and meaning in history and that the world is moving towards a consum¬
mation in which God will be all in all. The most ambitious statement
(and for many the most arrogant over-statement) of such an Incarnational
theology is arguably Hegel's philosophy of history, which describes
"the march of God through the world". Like Gadamer, most Christians will
reject Hegel's claim to demonstrate the workings of Providence. Like
Gadamer they will reject Hegel's claim to Absolute Knowledge and will
12
For some penetrating (and highly subversive) insights into the
relation between "pessimistic" Greek tragedy and "optimistic"
Greek rationality, see Nietzsche's "Attempt at self criticism" in
The Birth of Tragedy (and The Case of Wagner), trans. ¥. Kaufmann
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp.21f.
stress human finitude. But unlike Gadamer they will understand that
finitude to mean that while we may not comprehend the pattern and
meaning in history, there nevertheless is such a pattern and meaning.
This pattern may not be as "logical" as the one Hegel (and for that
matter the Marxists) claim to discover, and it may have more to do
with the history of Jahweh and Israel in the Old Testament than with
the Greek logos or reason transposed into history. But there is
nevertheless believed to be meaning in the movement of history, and
this belief is grounded in the faith and the hope that this movement
is "teleologically" related to the fulfilment of history in the Kingdom
of God. Gadamer seems to share this Christian faith that the movement
of history is meaningful, only he rejects any "teleological" relation
of this movement to the end of history. But without such a relation
to the end, history, from the Christian point of view, is meaningless.
Detached from any eschatology of consummation, Gadamer's "optimism" is,
13
from the Christian perspective, quite groundless.
In the Christian tradition, these two eschatologies, the eschatology
of transcendence and the eschatology of consummation, are usually found
side by side, though each may carry traces of the influence of the
other. Often one predominates and it may even eclipse the other. How
precisely they are related to one another is not immediately clear, and
is certainly beyond the scope of this study. But at best, we may suggest,
13
For discussion of a legitimate "groundlessness" in Christian theology,
see the following chapter.
So-called "apocalyptic eschatology", for instance, seems to blend
together the two types of eschatology. History, is moving under
divine guidance towards an end, but this end seems to be more the
annihilation of "this world" and its history than its consummation.
they complement each other. And when it comes to theodicy arguably
both are needed. That the sufferings of this world may offer a way
to participate in the death of Christ and so to have a foretaste of
eternal life beyond time and space may be one Christian answer to
1<
the problem of human suffering. But on its own it can lead to a
dangerous and even morbid exaltation of suffering for its own sake.
In a peculiar way Gadamer eposes himself to this danger when he
makes experience (by definition negative) an end in itself. In
contrast to Gadamer, Christian faith holds that the experience of
suffering is "teleologically" related to something beyond itself.
Christian faith not only believes that suffering is a way of sharing
in the saving death of Christ; it also believes that particular
experiences of suffering have their place in the overall pattern of
the life of both individual and community. This does not necessarily
mean that God wills this suffering for an individual or a group "for
their own good". The faith is rather that this suffering is never
entirely meaningless, never sheerly dysteleological. That the contrary
often seems to be the case is the agony of any Christian theodicy.
In this chapter we have not been trying to suggest that Christian
faith has all the easy answers, nor that Christian theology has a well-
packaged theodicy on offer, with all the loose ends neatly tied up.
Christian theodicy is a difficult and perilous undertaking, even when
it has both the eschatologies we have outlined. We are merely asking
One thinks in this context of Simone Weil (also, in her own way,
quite a Platonist), see "The Love of God and Affliction", in
Waiting on God (London: Collins (Fontana), 1959), pp.76-91*.
how it stands with Gadamer's "optimism", his implicit theodicy, when
he has neither of these eschatologies. Our suggestion is that Gadamer
should either dare to go the way of Nietzsche and to abandon the "optimism"
he derives from the Christian-Platonic traditionj or he should take
another look at the types of eschatology within that tradition to see
whether they might not, after all, be given philosophical expression.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PROVIDENCE AMD PLAY (GADAMER AM) THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY)
(a) Philosophy and Play
The set of problems which we include under the heading of "Providence
and Play" has already been touched on in the previous chapter when we
wondered how Gadamer's "optimism" could stand up in the absence of an
eschatology of consummation. How, we asked, could Gadamer justify such
"optimism" when history was not "teleologically related" to its consumma¬
tion? The rejection of any such a "teleological relation" which takes
human history and experience beyond itself is a fundamental and recurring
feature of Gadamer's philosophy. The essentially negative movement of
experience (which Hegel rightly saw, according to Gadamer) is not, as in
Hegel, "teleologically related" to knowledge. Gadamer also rejects
teleology in his treatment of Beauty. According to Fruchon's interpre¬
tation of the final chapter of Truth and Method,^" there are two aspects
or sides to the Platonic doctrine of Beauty; one is orientated towards a
hierarchical "ontology of measure", while the other is orientated towards
what Fruchon calls an "ontology of light". The former is associated by
Fruchon with a teleological vision of reality inasmuch as the perception
of Beauty is the perception of the well-proportioned orderliness of the
forms which constitute reality - the supreme visible image of which is the
cosmos itself. Here, though ambiguously and only in germ, Fruchon sees
that anthropocentrism which can only approach reality in terms of the
^
See Part One, Chapter 9(c) above.
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ordering capacity of the human mind - irrespective of whether "nature"
is seen as intimately related to, or recalcitrantly resistant of, that
2
ordering capacity. As Fruchon says, Gadamer rejects this teleological
approach to Beauty and rediscovers in Platonism another, quite different,
approach to Beauty which sees it rather in terms of light. Like light,
Beauty is a radiance which is its own source (it is not conferred by us,
whatever modern subjectivistic aesthetics might say). It plays on what¬
ever is beautiful and captivates and enthralls us with this playing.
Beauty, like light, is always already playing before our ordering minds
can go to work.
Teleology, then, is connected by Gadamer with subjectivism; and
the overcoming of subjectivism which it is his intention to carry out in
aesthetics, the human sciences, and ultimately in the most fundamental
and universal sphere of all, that of ontology, involves also an over¬
coming of teleology. In all these areas teleology is replaced by the
concept of play, or the game /"Spiel" covers both7. The concept of play
is first elaborated in Part One of Truth and Method as the model for
understanding the relation between the work of art and both those who
perform it (if this is applicable) and those who enjoy it. Play also
emerges in the movement backwards and forwards, the dialogue , or inter¬
play which is the model for understanding the Understanding operative
in the human sciences. Play is also the model for understanding Under-
standing as such; it is/the play of language that Gadamer seeks to
ground his "hermeneutic ontology".
2
"Ordering" is a conveniently ambiguous term for it carries not only
the meaning of ^'arranging", but also that of "commanding"; and this
latter meaning hints at the desire of the "subjectivism" or "anthro-
pocentrism", which Heidegger and Gadamer seek to expose, to dominate
the world.
The concept of play is clearly of central importance to Gadamer's
philosophical project, and demands to be treated in a little more detail.
In the section of Truth and Method in which he explores the "ontology of
the work of art", Gadamer takes play as the "guiding thread" to his
ontological investigations, and devotes a chapter to the concept of
play. (D\IM 97-10?; TM 91-99). The main point that Gadamer wants to
make here is that play is wrongly understood if we approach it in terms
of the attitude of the playing subject - as it has been approached in
modern times, Gadamer claims, chiefly under the influence of Kant and
Schiller. According to Gadamer, the real subject of the game is not
the player, but the game itself. It is the game itself that makes a
game a game and dictates its movement, not the consciousness of the
3
player. Similarly, the game is not "teleologically" related to anything
outside of itself. It may have the "purpose" of relaxing the player, but
this "purpose" can only be achieved when it is forgotten by the player
and when he or she submits to the internal dictates of the game. The
player who says "It's only a game" or "I'm only doing it for the good of
my health" steps outside of the immediacy of the game and thereby spoils
the game. He or she is a "spoil-sport". The surrender of the self-
conscious subject with its aims and goals is the only way to experience
the joy of playing. As we saw above,^ the game gives enrichment through
loss of self; though whether this characteristic of the game allows of
a universal application we doubted, a point to which we shall return.
3
As evidence for Gadamer's claim there might be adduced what everyone
who takes part in a sport knows, and what has recently received a
certain amount of attention and even been put to practical use by
some coaches - the player's self-consciousness merely interferes with
his or her performance. If you are watching yourself playing you will
play less well.
^ See Part Two, Chapter 2.
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This overcoming of the self-conscious subject in play also means
a different attitude to nature. Nature is no longer the mere Other,
the "Non-ego", which we must subject to our goals and aims. In play
we come close to nature, we participate in its playfulness. Indeed,
as Gadamer says in a rather startling passage, it is not so much that
nature "plays" by analogy with our playingj the opposite is the case:
The fact that the mode of being of play is so close
to the moving form of nature allows an important methodo¬
logical conclusion. It is obviously not the case that
animals also /i.e. in addition to human beings7 play and
that one can say figuratively that water and light play.
Rather we can say the opposite, that man too plays. His
playing is also a natural process. The meaning of his
playing is also, just because and insofar as it is nature,
pure self-representation. Therefore in the end it is
quite meaningless in this realm to distinguish between
literal and metaphorical usage.5
The play of human beings as of nature Gadamer calls
"Selbstdarstellung". In the English translation this is rendered
"self-representation*"and while it is difficult to think of a better
alternative,^ it must be said that this hardly does justice to the
German term. "Selbstdarstellung" suggests the placing (stellen) of
oneself there (da) in the playing of the play. Just as for Heidegger
"Da-sein" is the "there" of Being, so Gadamer's "Selbstdarstellung"
suggests that the player places himself at the disposal of the game,
that he is the "there" of the game which after all cannot be
played without players. Where Gadamer seems to part company with Heidegger
is that whereas for Heidegger "being there" for the play of Being seems
to be a prerogative of human beings, Gadamer seems to want to identify
human beings with nature rather than to distinguish them from it. While
^ WM 100; TM 9b
^
"Self-display" might be one.
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Heidegger perhaps pays too little attention to the analogies between
the self-display of human play and of natural play, Gadamer in the
7
above passage seems to the present writer to underestimate the
differences between human and natural play. However although
Heidegger may emphasize the difference of man from nature rather
than their unity, there is nevertheless at least one passage where
g
he makes use of an image from nature to point to the authentic mode
of Being for human beings. This passage in particular and Heidegger's
use of the word "play" in general are worth referring to because they
can be presumed to have exerted a considerable influence on Gadamer.
In Per Satz vom Grund (the title refers to "the principle of sufficient
reason") Heidegger comments on the following couplet by Angelus Silesius :
Without Why
The rose is without why; it blossoms because it blossoms;
It cares not for itself, nor does it ask if it is seen.
g
According to Heidegger, the rose is first of all like Being as physis
9
in that it is the simple process of emerging out of itself. Secondly,
Heidegger says, "... man, in the most concealed ground of his essence,
8 10
never truly is until he is in his way like the rose - without why". w
7
Which, to the best of the present writer's knowledge, remains
unelaborated except for a rather cryptic paragraph in a later essay,
see PH 236 f; KS III 217f.
g
Whether the distinction between literal and metaphorical has broken
down the present writer would not like to say. The quotation from
Heidegger below suggests some sort of analogy of Being.
9
On this and what follows see John D. Caputo's two part article
"Meister Eckhart and the later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in
Heidegger's Thought", Journal of the History of Philosophy, III
(197U), h79-b9k and XIII (1975), 61-80, especially pp.67f.
Per Satz vom Grund, p.72f; quoted in Caputo, op.cit., p.68.
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Heidegger says later:
The because is swallowed up in a play. The play is
without why. It plays as long as it plays. There remains
only play: the highest and the deepest.H
Clearly we need not look much further for the origins of Gadamer's concept
12
of play. Helmut Kuhn remarks in his examination of Truth and Method
that Gadamer's concept of play "can only be understood in terms of its
13
implicit relation to Heidegger". Others too may have influenced
Gadamer, like Huizinga for instance, whose classic study Homo Ludens
Gadamer refers to. But Heidegger's attempt to overcome subjectivism and
his talk of the mirror-play /Spiegel-Spiel7 of the world"^ are clearly
the foundations of Gadamer's concept of play. And the rejection of
on
teleology which goes hand in hand with the attack ef subjectivism also
has roots in Heidegger for whom, as we saw, "the because is swallowed up
in play"
However it must be emphasized that Heidegger rejects the concept
of teleology (though he does not use that phrase) primarily with reference
to ontology. What he wants to stress is that Being is not "teleologically
related" to anything beyond itself. The "World" is not grounded in any¬
thing beyond itself, e.g. in a highest being. Being is groundless, and
Per Satz vom Grund, p.l88j quoted in Caputo, op.cit., p.68.
12




See Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.180.
13
The question how Heidegger's conception of There-being as the being
who asks "why the why?" (introduction to Metaphysics, p.3, see Part
One, Chapter 3 above) is related to the conception of There-being as
living "without why" takes us to the heart of the problem of Heidegger's
"turn". But it is beyond our scope to follow this up here.
to say even that it is self-grounding would still be to reduce it to a
being.As Mehta writes, "Being itself rests, not on anything that
can be described in terms of ground, reason or cause but in the mystery
17
of play . . . ". What this groundlessness of Being means for particular
beings is not entirely clear. What is clear is that the play Heidegger
is concerned with is the play of the "World", of Being, of the "totality
of beings"; and to live "without why" means an ontological comportment
of human beings (if we may be permitted to use such a phrase). The
playfulness which Heidegger talks of has to do primarily with a relation
to the totality of beings, to what is first and last, to "the highest
and the deepest"; it refers to the capacity of human beings to participate
in the play of the "World". It is only secondarily that this playfulness
might be discovered in our ontic comportment towards particular things,
events and people. This latter playing is, we suggest, an analogy, an
image, perhaps a reminiscence and a foretaste, of the play which is "the
highest and the deepest". But we must carefully distinguish these two
kinds of play, and insist on the difference between them despite the
fact that the play which takes place in our human history and experience
can become, through participation"^ in the "highest and deepest" play,
For a summary of Heidegger's Per Sat2 vom Grund see Mehta, op.cit.,
p.92, note 13.
17
ibid. cf. Heidegger's alteration in Per Satz vom Grund of Leibniz'
"Cum deus calculat, fit mundus" to "While God plays, the world comes
to be"; quoted in The Piety of Thinking, p.lUf).
Piscussion of the theme of "participation" in Heidegger is beyond our
scope here. But Heidegger seems to have something to offer to
Christian theology's discussion of analogy and idolatry.
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19
an analogy., an image, a reminiscence and foretaste of the latter. To
ignore the difference can lead to a confusion which does injury both to
the dignity of human suffering and striving, and to the majesiyof that
"highest and deepest" play.
19
We might suggest (adapting Tillich) that we should not say "merely
an analogy, image, reminiscence or foretaste", but always "not less
than an analogy, image, etc. . ~
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(b) Theology and Play
In our examination of the problem of eschatology in Gadamer, it
proved helpful to discuss the relation between Gadamer's philosophy and
the Christian tradition. This gives grounds for hoping that a dialogue
with Christian theology may prove equally fruitful in connection with
the problem of teleology and its relation to play. There seems to be
a certain amount of material on the importance of play both in Scripture
(the lilies of the field in Matthew 6:2f?ff seem to be the ancestors of
Angelus Silesius' rose) and in tradition] and it is on this material that
the "theologies of pLay" of recent times have built."'" Our discussion of
teleology and play in Gadamer will make particular reference to one of
these, Jurgen Moltmann's essay "The First Liberated Men in Creation",
to which the English publishers have added the title Theology and Joy.
Though he does not use the term "teleology", it is Moltmann's
intention in this essay to challenge both the subjection of theology to
the idea of purpose, and the precedence accorded to ethical categories
over aesthetic ones in theology. Christian life and theology can become,
as the jargon has it, too "achievement-oriented". Moltmann seems to
identify work with the "works" of the traditional Protestant antithesis
of "faith and works". Works as "works" is law, while play acquires the
attributes of the gospel, bringing grace, freedom and joy. The purposes
of God for his Creation are not purposes at all, according to Moltmann:
In the Christian way of thinking, the so-called final
purpose of history is then no purpose at all. It is the
liberation of"life which the law had made subject to purposes
and achievement, to the all-quickening joy of God.
""





Moltmann quotes approvingly the biologist and philosopher Buytendijk
(whom Gadamer also refers to) :
'The further we progress in the analysis of existence,'
writes Buytendijk, 'the clearer it becomes • . . that man
also has the possibility of being played with rather than
playing., of being the one who is sheltered by the game. This
leads to a mysterious transformation. Man becomes aware that
the encompassing, loving ground of his existence is playing a
wondrous game with him. It is - as the poet Charles Peguy ,
has shown us - the game of Qui perd Gagne, the loser wins.'
We quote in extenso this passage of Buytendijk which Moltmann quotes,
because it comes so close to Gadamer's message. Indeed Moltmann himself
can become almost Heideggerian at times:
Play as a world symbol /this phrase is actually the
title of a book by Eugen Fink/ does contain archaic con¬
ceptions but goes beyond_the idea of world as history, if
we extend this concept /i.e. play as a world symbol/ to
the eschatology of being . . . Play as a world symbol goes
beyond the categories of doing, having and achieving and
leads us into the categories of being, of authentic human
existence and demonstrative rejoicing in it.^
Heidegger of course would never oppose history and Being in this way. And
the antithesis of "being or having" is a commonplace of existentialist philo¬
sophy. But coming from a theologian whose usual philosophical allies are
Marxian thinkers and Hegel, this passage and others like it are worthy of
remark.^
However despite all his talk about play as the approriate theo¬
logical category for speaking about the life of God and the life of the
Christian community, Moltmann is well aware of the inadequacies of such
talk when confronted with the stark reality of the crucifixion of Jesus.




Though Erich Fromm, on whom Marx is a seminal influence, has recently
published a book entitled To have or to be? (London: Abacus, 1979).
We should probably not attach too much importance to Moltmann's apparent
change of partners. He tends to plunder philosophy for his own theo¬
logical needs rather than to engage in sustained and rigorous dialogue.
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then comments on a sentence by Hugo Rahner:
'What at the surface appears as fate, as suffering,
or - in the Christian sense - as participation in the
seemingly senseless destruction of the cross, is for the
mystic, whose vision penetrates all veils, the wondrously
conceived game of an eternal love, a game so painstaking
and manifold in its conception that only love could have
devised it.' Can we really talk about the cross of Jesus
just as a 'veil' of suffering, tortured flesh through
which we can see a pleasant sky illuminated by the
brilliant rays of the sun of God's love? I think we
should literally and sincerely leave the cross out of
the game. In spite of Bach, the dying agonies of Jesus
do not fit the categories of song.6
Whether or not Moltmann is being fair to Hugo Rahner, he certainly has
a vivid sense of how inappropriate certain ways of talking about "the
eternal play of God's love" can be when we remember the horror of
Golgotha. This sense Moltmann shares with a much greater German theo¬
logian whose thought also has at its heart a profound meditation on
Golgotha. Hegel writes in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit:
Thus the life of God and divine knowledge may indeed
be spoken of as love's playing with itself5 yet this idea
descends to the level of edification and even insipidity
when seriousness, pain and the patience and the work of
the negative have no place in it.?
Moltmann's solution to this difficulty is, as we saw, to take the
Cross"out of the game". He makes this point again a few pages later:
The cross of Christ does not therefore belong to theg




Hegel: Texts and Commentary, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Doubleday




It is beyond our scope here to pursue the theological implications of the
move Moltmann makes here - that of taking the Gross "out of the game".
What we must draw attention to is the fact that the game is now grounded
in the Cross. Without this connection with the Cross, with death, play
9
is reduced to mere frivolity, and to talk about it is "mere edification
and insipidity" - or even worse, as Moltmann says:
Apart from this harsh theological dialectic of death
and life, destruction and reconciliation, anthropological
and religious game theories always end up close to the
edge of faddism and snobbism. Since they do not take
death seriously, life does not really get into the game
of freedom.10
To what extent Gadamer is guilty of such an accusation must in the
end be decided by the individual reader. However it cannot be ignored
that (as we have pointed out on more than one occasion) Gadamer has
surprisingly little to say about death and "the power of the negative".^" This
is all the more surprising as death and negativity play an important
role both in the traditions in which Gadamer stands - those of Christianity
and of Platonism, and also in the thinkers from whom he derives the founda¬
tions of his own philosophy - Hegel and Heidegger. In particular, we
noted the reluctance of Gadamer to have anything to do with what we called
an eschatology of transcendence which places a strong emphasis on death as
C
the way of transcendence. It is perhaps no accident that the concept of
play should be especially at home in the mystical tradition with its
C
eschatology of trans^ndence. Perhaps authentic play is only possible on
9
To use a distinction N. O'Donoghue makes in the essay "Playfulness" in
his Heaven in Ordinarie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 197 9) •
10 Moltmann, op.cit., p.3U«
11
But cf. the essay "Der Tod als Frage" (1972) (KS IV 62-73). This essay
contains some interesting reflections on death, but it hardly makes
it the fundamental theme that it is for Christianity and Platonism, and
also for Hegel and Heidegger.
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the basis of such an eschatology, and to reject the eschatology is to
make us doubt the seriousness of the play.
But while "the game" might be justified on the basis of the cross,
while play may find its fulfilment in an eschatology of transcendence,
we must still ask what this means for teleology. Is teleology simply
annulled by play? In theological terms, is the law simply cancelled
out by the gospel? In this essay Moltmann seems to come very close to
answering these questions in the affirmative. Moltmann and Gadamer
seem to share what might be seen as an excessive rejection of teleology,
and this rejection carries with it dangers of its own. Just as we
suggested that Christian theology needs both types of eschatology, the
eschatology of consummation as well as the eschatology of transcendence,
if it is to begin to cope with the problems of evil and suffering, so,
we may suggest, the problem of evil and suffering demand not only the
category of play, but also that of teleology. The existential touch¬
stone of any theory of play is human suffering. Unless that theory
has a proper relation to teleology, to ultimate ends and purposes, then
we may find it offensively frivolous.
■While the accusation of frivolity could hardly be laid against
Moltmann, his exaltation of play at the expense of teleology does lead
him into what is, in the present writer's view, a dangerously one-sided
position. He writes:
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The history of the passion of the world . . . has
no purpose and does not lead to a theodicy .... The
tortured question in suffering and dying., "Why?", reveals
its dignity in that it does not permit an explanation.
It can be answered only by a new creation in which there
shall be neither mourning nor crying nor pain, for the
former things have passed away (Rev. 21:1;). The passion
of Christ in the midst of the world's passion ending in
the resurrection of the one whom the world crucified is
the incarnate assurance of the dawn of that other history
of joy in the very midst of the world's unanswered
suffering.
There seems to the present writer to be peculiar "otherworldliness" in
these lines which is a little unexpected from Moltmann. His eschatology
seems to approximate to the eschatology of transcendence which we
sketched out in the last chapter, particularly in its bringing together
human suffering and the passion of Christ. Actually Moltmann seems to
be drawing here on the tradition of "apocalyptic eschatology", but this
13
eschatology is,as we suggested above, really an eschatology of trans¬
cendence despite its reference to history. Transcendence is simply
located in an "absolute future" rather than an "eternal present". But
in both cases "this world" and its history are annihilated with the
parousia of the "other world", of "that other history of joy". But
talk of "another history" (which has a strongly Barthian ring) seems to
leave this history just as meaningless as it seems to be for Bultmann.
That transcendence is conceived in communal rather than individual terms
hardly affects the point at issue. Moltmann seems to have more in




Part Two, Chapter i;(c) note ll;.
cf. Moltmann's article "Theology of Mystical Experience", Scottish
Journal of Theology, vol.32 (1979), 501-520.
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of course rather ironical since the basic intention of Moltmann is to
stress this-worldly activity in the power of the Spirit, the taking up
of the pain and negation of this world into the life of the Crucified
God, in opposition to any pietistic (and quietistic) individualism.
What our brief examination of Moltmann's essay seems to show is
that to exalt play at the expense of teleology is to dispense with an
eschatology of consummation. Providence (that is, God's guiding hand
in this history) is replaced by play. And, as is clear from the last
quotation from Moltmann's essay, theodicy too is abandoned. There is
independent confirmation, from quite a different quarter, of this
tendency of an overemphasis on play to lead to the abandoning of theodicy.
In an essay^ on the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, whose concept
of play is derived largely from Nietzsche and Heidegger, Fergus Kerr
toys with the idea of dispensing with "onto-theo-dicy". Kerr talks of
"a joyful acceptance of the sheer gratuitousness - the 'grace' - of
what is and what happens".^* He continues:
The notion of playsomeness rather than the rationality
of the world is not unfamiliar in the Christian tradition.
Given that Kerr is here being rather tentative, one must nevertheless
ask whether this playsomeness of the world stands up in face of human
suffering. It is one thing joyfully to accept the sheer gratuitousness
of Creation] but it seems to the present writer to be quite another




joyfully to accept (and, more importantly, to exhort others joyfully to
accept) the sheer gratuitousness of particular events, and especially
particular negative experiences of suffering. That the world and
history happen is doubtless the "wonder of wonders"; what happens in
the world and history can make us wonder, not that it all means, ■feat
but what it all means.
There seems to the present writer to be a great temptation for
Christian theology in our time to re-interpret Providence in terms of
play, to transmute the God-givenness of particular historical events
(Providence) into the God-givenness of the world and history as such
(Creation). And it seems to the present writer that Gadamer has,
despite the subtlety of his attempts to avoid doing so, nevertheless
succumbed to the philosophical equivalent of this theological temptation.
Gadamer's "optimism" seems to depend on the transference of the
"graciousness" of ontological givenness (which he derives from Heidegger)
to the ontic givenness of particular events which befall people and
texts. However our criticism both of Gadamer and of those theologians
who seem to succumb to this temptation does not intend to underestimate
either their sincerity or the power of this temptation. The doctrine
of Providence, the doctrine that God is at work in the particular events
of our history and experience, is one of the most difficult to uphold in
our age. There is a real danger that we may avoid the temptation
mentioned above only at the price of the sacrifice of our intellectual
honesty. However the present writer can only register his conviction
that Christian theology and philosophy must, despite the enormous diffi¬
culties involved, stick to the task of interpreting the doctrine of
-Providence and refuse to trasmute it into play. Only thus can there
be that authentic theodicy which is the inescapable burden of any
Christian theology. And here, perhaps, we can still learn from Hegel.
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(c) Teleology and Play
The preceding pages may give the impression that, in the present
writer's view, we are obliged to choose between either teleology or
play. This short section will attempt to show that a complete theology
or philosophy will contain both teleology and play. Reality, we will
suggest, may begin and end in play; but there must always be room in
the middle for purpose, for work, for teleology. Teleology, we will
suggest, is that which mediates play.
Much of the Biblical material which had to do with playfulness
seems to be concerned with the End, the consummation, of God's history
with his people. At the risk of committing exegetical naivetes, we
might mention first of all the association of the banquet or feast
with the arrival of the Kingdom in the Mew Testament. Then there is
Jesus' saying that to those who are child-like belongs the Kingdom of
God (Mark I0;l5)j one of the suggestions of this richly evocative
pericope is that there is an element of playfulness in the Kingdom.
In the Old Testament some of the material concerning the glorious End-
time depicts an innocent playfulness where all creatures live together
in peace and harmony (Isaiah 11:6-9). And given the closeness of human
play and natural play which finds expression in Jesus' lilies of the
field and Angelus Silesius' rose, it is worth quoting Isaiah 55:12:
The mountains and the hills before you
shall break forth into singing,
and all the trees of the field shall
clap their hands.
There is less Biblical material to suggest a connection between play and
Creation, though Proverbs 8:30f can be taken to suggest this."'" But apart
1
See Moltmann, op.cit., p.i+O; Kuhn, op.cit., p.388.
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from the Biblical material, it is interesting to note that when Moltmann
sketches out his theology of play he tends to concentrate on the play¬
fulness in Creation and in the New Creation. This world and its history
tends, as we saw, to disappear, dragged down by the bondage of the law
and the futility of "works".
Our contention, however, is that there must be room left for the
goals and purposes, for the striving and the labour, of human history
and experience in this world. The play of Creation may open a space
for the realm of teleology, and the play of the New Creation may be the
telos of that teleology; but these beginning- and end-games are only
real and serious because of "the labour of the negative". Aesthetics
may provide the categories for the beginning and end of things; ethical
striving may be grounded in, and ultimately taken up into, the joyful
play of aesthetics; but if we are to avoid regression into an infantile
"dreamful ease" we need what we might call "a teleological middle" to
breach and hold apart beginning and end. To paraphrase Paul, the law
is not a nasty cosmic accident, but is our pedagogue (Gal.3:2lj.) until
the in-breaking of the End-time in the person of Jesus Christ. The law
is part of God's plan (Rom.7 :7ff) • No doubt we must become like children
to enter the Kingdom of God, but must we not first become grown men and
women and put away childish things (l Cor.l3:ll)? No doubt death is the
way of transcendence, but it may take us a lifetime to learn to die. The
gospel, to sum up, does not simply abolish the law, but takes it up into
itself (the law is "aufgehoben"). Christ is the end (telos) of the law
(Rom. 10:1|) in the sense that in him it is not simply annihilated, but
consummated and fulfilled.
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This "teleological middle" is also in evidence in a writer who
in other ways seems very far away from Paul - Plotinus. Plotinus is
a complex and profound thinker, and to devote only a few lines to him
is perhaps rather foolhardy. However we must take this risk, and
suggest that for Plotinus the whole, purposive, teleological realm of
nous is surpassed, but not annihilated, by the superessential One.
2
The One or the Good can be described as "the primary Beauty". However
this Beauty is no longer Beauty seen in terms of an ontology of measure
O
(it is "greater than all measure" ), but rather, to use Fruchon's dis¬
tinction4", in terms of an ontology of light.3 Plotinus seems to contain
both sides of Platonism distinguished by Fruchon, that is, Beauty as
measure and form, and Beauty as ineffable light, and the former aspect
of Beauty seems to be as it were in the service of the latter. The One,
the Good, the "primary Beauty", may draw us ultimately beyond the realm
of nous, of order and purpose and form. But that realm of order and
purpose and form is not merely superseded; it has its role to play in
allowing that light to shine and thus in mediating that light to us.
In the moment of ultimate transcendence it is fulfilled and consummated,
not merely annihilated.3 The most frequent images for the relation of
2
Enneads 1.6.9. As we can see from this passage, however, the precise
"relation" between Beauty and the Good is not clear. As A.H. Armstrong




See Part One, Chapter 9(c) above.
3 For Plotinus• use of the metaphor of light see Enneads 1.6.9 and V.3.17.
3
It has been argued (e.g. by B.A.G. Fuller in The Problem of Evil in
Plotinus (Cambridge University Press, 1912)) that there is in Plotinus
an irreconcilable conflict between a tendency to acosmic mysticism on
the one hand, and a tendency to affirm the importance of the teleologi-
cally ordered cosmos on the other. But it is just as possible to argue
that, despite the many difficulties, these tendencies can and should be
held together in tension.
the One and nous are the emanation of light from the sun and the over¬
flowing of water from a well or fountain. For our purpose the image
of the fountain is particularly apt since it includes the idea of the
water which has gone forth returning to its source.
In Plotinus we are of course in a very different world from
that of Paul. Most importantly, the "outward journey" of Creation and
Fall and the "return journey" of Redemption through Christ Jesus are
in some sense historical, whereas emanation and homecoming in Plotinus
are not seen as movements in time (although this difference can be
overestimated since Creation and the New Creation are hardly events in
time). The One of Plotinus is very different from the "personal" God
of Old and New Testaments (although the "personality" of God can, in
the present writer's view, be overemphasized). And as Augustine dis¬
covered, despite the affinities between the Christian religion and Neo-
Platonism, the latter is always prone to harbour the secret worm of
7
pride, that most devastating of all sins. However despite these and
other differences, Paul and Plotinus seem to share the conviction that
while the penultimate (Law or nous) can, if taken as ultimate, hinder
Q
our approach to the true ultimate, it is nevertheless "teleologically
related" to the ultimate. The breach of the primal Unity is finally
for the best; whether or not Fall is identified with Creation, it is a
blessed fault (felix culpa) which by opening up the realm of human
freedom and striving leads in the end to the enrichment of the divine
life.
7
This recalls the question raised in Part Two, Chapter i;, above: How
can the death of self ever be an achievement?
Paul and Plotinus seem to share an acute awareness of the dangers of
idolatry, i.e. self-absement before the divinity (or beauty) of a
creature rather than of the Creator.
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These affinities between Paul and Plotinus, and between the
Christian and the Platonic traditions, receive their most ambitious
expression in the philosophy of Hegel. The Platonic metaphor of
emanation is fused with the Christian doctrines of Creation, Incarnation
and Redemption. The overflowing of the One into the many and the ascent
back to the One becomes imbued with the Judeo-Christian emphasis on the
9
community and on history. This is of course a dangerous oversimplifica¬
tion of a thinker who after all claimed to take up all previous thought
into his own system. But it is Hegel who gives the most powerful
expression of the idea that the divine life is enriched by being mediated
through the history of human consciousness and freedom. The play of the
trinitarian life of the Godhead before Creation is enriched and mediated
by the Spirit going to work in this world and its history (the famous
Hegelian "seriousness, suffering, patience and labour of the negative").
And in"-the End, for which the whole Hegelian cosmos is "groaning in
travail", there is a con-summation and as it were a re-play of all the
pain and striving that has gone before, only now in the security of
Absolute Knowledge.
This theme of the "creative breach" in the absolute simplicity of
Being appears also in Heidegger."^ Heidegger both comes close to and
also sharply diverges from Hegel. To discuss the relation between them
This is not to suggest that the Christian and Platonic traditions
come together for the first time in Hegel; but only that Hegel seeks
to work out to its logical conclusion (and it is here perhaps that
he transgresses) the Christian-Platonic tradition whose riches he
was heir to.
e.g. Heidegger's discussion of the line: Schmerz versteinerte die
Schwelle (Pain has turned the threshold to stone) from Trakl's poem
"Ein Winterabend", Poetry, Language, Thought, pp.203ff. The theme
also appears in a distorted and nihilistic form in Sartre.
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is far beyond our present scope. But we may perhaps risk the following
brief remarks. In both there is an emphasis on the need for difference
to mediate identity."^ But Heidegger's basic criticism of Hegel is, if
we may venture to put it in our own words, that he remains in the sphere
of logic and of essence, and has forgotten the groundless ground of this
sphere, Being. To make an enormous historical leap that is fraught with
dangers, but also seems to be suggestive, Hegel appears to remain in the
realm of Plntinus' nous, and sets up an identity-in-dlfference relation
between nous and soul which is at work in the material world. He does
not make the final leap into the superessential One. On the other hand,
Heidegger's "leap" into the groundless supra-logical "identity", which
12
for him is a way of speaking of the event /Ereigni£7 of Being, seems
to have something in common with Plotinus' moment of ultimate transcendence
Whereas in the case of Hegel it is the status of the One which is question
able (it seems to lose its transcendence of nous and become the highest
Idea) ,1^' in the case of Heidegger it is the status of the realm of essence
For Heidegger's thoughts on this subject, and also his thoughts on
Hegel's thoughts on the subject, see his Identity and Difference.
12
See Identity and Difference, p.39 (p.lOij. for German); also Mehta,
op.cit., pp.212ff.
13
Such a comparison must be hedged about with reservations. Some
support, however, may be gleaned from Mehta (op.cit., p.213) who in
discussing the passage from Identity and Difference mentioned in the
previous footnote cannot resist using the Platonic phrase "beyond
Being". Heidegger's affinities with the mystical tradition and parti¬
cularly with Eckhart (for which see Caputo, op.cit.,) could be seen as
linking him in some respects with Plotinus (who according to Joan
Stambaugh in the introduction to Identity and Difference, pp.8f, stands
"on the borderline of Western thought") and perhaps ultimately with
"the other side" of Platonism to which Gadamer refers.
It is interesting to note how Hegel tries to tone down the "ecstatic"
aspect of Plotinus lest the latter be thought a "fanatic" like "crazy
Indians, Brahmins, monks and nuns". For Hegel on Plotinus see The
History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane, II (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Go., I89I+), U0JL4.—U31 -
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of logic, of nous, that is questionable. If ontology is misconceived
in terms of logic in Hegelian thought, in Heidegger the problem is what
the experience of Being means in terms of logic. It is interesting to
note how the tension between Hegel's logic and Heidegger's ontology seems
to reappear in the tension between Hegel's eschatology of consummation
and Heidegger's eschatology of transcendence; and to reappear yet again
in the tension between Hegel's teleology and Heidegger's "play". For
teleology seems to triumph over play in Hegel. The "philosophia
Germanica perennis" of Eckhart, Angelus Silesius and Boehme may reappear
in Hegel,^ but, like the ecstatic dimension of Plotinus, it is
curiously transmuted into terms of logic. In Hegel the themes of
mystical thought are rationalized.^" The true heir of the perennial
17
philosophy of the German mystics is perhaps rather Heidegger, for
whom the groundless play of Being is prior to, and also perhaps at the
18
end of, the whole realm of reason and logic with its ends and means,
and is only problematically related to the latter.
We have indulged in this long digression because it is out of
the Christian-Platonic tradition in general, and out of Hegel and
Heidegger in particular, that Gadamer's philosophy grows. It is out
of that tradition that Gadamer's philosophy must be understood, criti¬
cized and if necessary amended. Hegel and Heidegger seem to represent
15>
See Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, pp.lj.8f.
See Copleston's essay "Hegel and the Rationalization of Mysticism"
in Hew Studies in Hegel's Philosophy, ed. Warren E. Steinkraus
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971)j 187-200.
17
See Caputo, op.cit., pp.lj.83f and passim.
lg
For Heidegger this realm is also an historical epoch, stretching
from Plato to the present reign of technology (and nihilism).
the working out of different aspects of that tradition (though in
Heidegger's case we should perhaps talk of an undercurrent in that
tradition). Hegel represents the culmination of the teleological
view of reality that finds expression, for example, in the Logos
philosophy of the ancient world. He also tries to include elements
19
that belong to the mystical undercurrent, but these, we suggested,
loose their real meaning by being absorbed into the all-embracing
realm of reason and logic. This mystical undercurrent seems to re-
emerge in Heidegger, for whom the idea of play becomes central, but
who seems to have a dangerously negative attitude to the world of
reason, logic, science and technology. It is this negative attitude
in Heidegger that Gadamer tries to mitigate by attempting to show
how Heidegger's ontology can form the basis of the human sciences.
In this attempt he draws close to Hegel by introducing his own version
of dialectic (a "hermeneutical dialectic"). The question we have
persistently raised is how even a modified dialectic can ever be
detached from the teleological context it has in Platonic and
Hegelian thought. If dialectic is not "teleologically related" to
the whole, to the unified world of Ideas, in what sense is it
dialectic at all, and not merely a surrender to the flux? "Surrender
to the flux" is of course an option (Nietzsche took it), but it
entails the abandonment of that "optimism" which is guaranteed by a
"teleological relation" to the Christian-Platonic "true world" (which
Nietzsche, with terrible logic, rejected). The notion of play cannot,
in the absence of this "teleological relation", guarantee such "optimism",
19
See WM I4.6I5 TM kk3.
such faith in dialectic, because it derives from the mystical tradition
(or counter-tradition) and is used in connection with the groundless
ground which may be the origin and destiny of reason, but is beyond
any involvement in its dialectical workings. Gratuitousness within
the world is, we suggested, very different from the gratuitousness of
the world. Play seems an inadequate category with which to describe
the pain, the striving and the "labour of the negative" which
characterizes the history of this world - a pain which can only be
supported in the hope of fulfilment beyond but via history (i.e. by
the painful road of history, the via dolorosa, the via crucis).
What we appear to learn from our discussion of Hegel and
Heidegger, and Gadamer's attempt to reconcile them, is that neither
teleology nor play can manage on its own or do the job of the other.
Both seem to be needed for a satisfactory theology and philosophy.
« %
How exactly they are related is a matter profound and obscure, perhaps
a mystery. It is a matter which lies at the heart of Christian specu¬
lation on the mystical play of the Godhead, the suffering, death and
resurrection of the Incarnate Word Christ Jesus, and the working of
the Holy Spirit in our world and our history as they groan in travail
with the Christian hope.
CHAPTER SIX
TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
(a) Philosophy and Religious Experience
In our concluding chapter we will try to give a brief summary
of the conclusions which our study of Gadamer's philosophy has
arrived at. We will also try to relate these conclusions to some
more general questions concerning the nature of philosophy and
theology. The suggestions we will make will be of necessity rather
sketchyj however it is hoped that this will be balanced by the more
detailed textual analysis which was prominent in the earlier chapters
of this study, especially in Part One.
It was argued above that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics
is ultimately grounded in religious ejqperience in the sense that his
"optimism" about the historical process is dependent on the Christian-
Platonic tradition. We saw that Gadamer to a certain extent admits
this; however he limits his indebtedness to the irystical strand of
that tradition, and stresses the origin of this strand in the "other
side" of the Platonic doctrine of Beauty. We argued however that
in order to justify his "optimism", his confidence that there is
truth in the historical process, not only must the "other side" of
Platonism be replaced in its context within the whole of Platonism
(with its stress on order and teleology); Platonism itself must also,
we argued, be replaced in its context of Christian Platonism where
there is not only teleology in the cosmos but also in history. We
doubted whether Gadamer's confidence that there is truth in the
285
historical process could be justified solely on the ground of an
a priori^ ontological identity-in-difference of word and thing.
Only a view of truth as a Whole in terms of which the appropriate¬
ness of particular statements about reality can be known in their
factual truth and falsity could justify Gadamer's confidence; we
suggested. This Whole is the Whole of World-history. Thus we
came close to Hegel; though without making the assumption; as
Hegel may be said to have done; that this Whole is present in
his own thought. We agreed with Pannenberg that justice could be
done both to the demand for such a Whole; and to human finitude;
by the provisional anticipation of (or hope for) such a Whole at
the end of history.
Can we then see Gadamer as offering a contribution to the
development of a contemporary Christian Platonism? Such a Christian
Platonism would be heavily influenced by Hegel; who himself can be
seen as one of the greatest thinkers in that tradition. The present
writer believes that Gadamer can make such a contribution; provided
that his position is supplemented in the ways suggested above.
Gadamer himself of course would most probably reject any such sup¬
plementation; his allegiance to Heidegger would seem ultimately to
outweight his attraction to Hegel. But in that case we must ask
how he can justify the "optimism" which he owes to Hegel rather than
to Heidegger. The present writer may have certain reservations
about Fruchon's interpretation of Heidegger; but he agrees with the
former's contention that the real source of Gadamer's philosophy is
the Christian-Platonic tradition which goes back above all to John's
Gospel and perhaps also to the kenotic passage in PhilippianS; and
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which received such, a powerful restatement in the thought of Hegel.
To what extent Gadamer's philosophy would survive such a heightening
of the Hegelian aspects and a "toning-down" of certain of the
Heideggerian themes (particularly the "ontologically positive" under¬
standing of finitude) must remain an open question. But at the very
least the remains of his philosophy would offer a contemporary
Christian Platonism much food for thought.
But what would be the relation of such a Christian Platonism to
Christian theology? It is probably safe to generalize that for the
Christian Platonist it is difficult to hold apart philosophy and
2
theology. This is because in his view an important part of the
total human experience of which the philosopher is trying to give
an account is precisely religious experience. Religious experience
or faith is not for him southing additional or e:xtra which is beyond
the scope of philosophy, as it is for both scientific positivists and
"positivists of revelation". Just as for the "idealist" (in the
broad sense of the term) the fact that the universe has produced a
being capable of understanding the universe tells us something import¬
ant about the nature of the universe, so for our philosopher the
See Fruchon, op.cit., p.5>5>8
2
See, for example, Dean Inge's essay "Philosophy and Religion" in
Contemporary British Philosophy, (First Series), ed. J.H. Muirhead
(London: George Allen and TJnwin, 192k), pp. 189-211. But whereas
Inge says he is unable to distinguish between philosophy and
religion we are suggesting the difficulty of distinguishing between
philosophy and theology.
3
This "broad" sense of idealism could also perhaps be referred to as
metaphysical or "objective" idealism, in contrast to epistemological
or "subjective" idealism, cf. H.B. Acton's article "Idealism" in
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See also ¥. Temple's Nature, Man
and God (London: Macmillan, 1935)i p.U90.
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phenomenon of religious experience must be allowed to play its full
part in his account of reality. Our Christian-Platonist philosopher
will of course take religious experience as the key phenomenon in
his attempt to understand the nature of reality.^ But this key
position is not due to some supernatural validation or special reve¬
lation; it can be justified only because, for him, it allows us to
account for our total experience better than any other way. Such a
Christian-Platonist account of reality would of course remain pro¬
visional, not least because the verification of its teleological
understanding of the world would have to wait until the end of
history. While being sufficiently convincing (or as Ian Ramsay
would say, disclosive) as to demand commitment, its provisonality
would hold it open to new experiences and to other accounts of reality.
In particular it would be open to the contribution of non-Western
religious traditions. As A.H. Armstrong has suggested, Christian
Platonism seems uniquely fitted for such a role.^ He first quotes
a sentence from R.C. Zaehner's At Sundry Times; "Since Christianity
claims to be a universal faith, it can only survive by showing that
it can assimilate not only what is digestible to the Christian con¬
stitution in Plato and Aristotle, but also whatever in Oriental
religion seems to point the way to Christ". Armstrong then comments:
^
For a similar conception of Christian philosophy, see Leonard
Hodgson's The Doctrine of the Trinity (London: Nisbet, 19U3),
pp.21ff.
<
See his essay "Platonism" in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ian
Ramsay (London: George Allen and -Unwin, 1961), p.97•
d.00
To me it seems that an open-minded and unsystematic
Christian Platonism offers the best help at present
available in our Western tradition for doing this,
and also for dealing with those currents of thought
in the West, vague and hard to describe but sometimes
very powerful, which have some affinities with
Oriental religion and cannot, as far as I can see,
be effectively understood or controlled by either
Thomism or contemporary English philosophy.6
In the present writer's view, Gadamer has much to offer such an
"open-minded and unsystematic" Christian Platonism.
As was implied in the previous paragraph, a negative attitude
to the relation of philosophy (including Christian Platonism) and
theology often presupposes a particular view of revelation in which
naturally available truths of reason are opposed to supernaturally
revealed truth. In extreme cases (Pascal, Kierkegaard, early Barth)
truths of reason are dismissed as irrelevant to faith and the idea
of a "Christian philosophy" is anathema. This is not the place to
dispute the concept of revelation. The present writer can only
declare that he cannot, and sees no need to, accept such a narrow
view of revelation. There is another view of revelation, perhaps
given its most powerful expression by Hegel, where revelation is not
the miraculous imparting of information about supernatural reality
inaccessible to, and perhaps incompatible with, human reason, but
is rather the manifestation in the form of religion of the true
nature of reality and of reason (for the real, on this view, is
n




See the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. Speirs and
Sanderson, II, 328-346 (HW XII 192-207)• See also Peter C. Hodgson's
translation based on the Lasson edition of the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, Part III, published by the American Academy
of Religion under the title The Christian Religion (Missoula:
Scholar's Press, 1979), pp.1-26.
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of the Idea of Beauty being "revealed" in our experience of the beauti¬
ful, and of the nature of God and his relation to the world being
"revealed" in the primitive Christian community's (and our) ersqperience
of Jesus, without being in the least committed to that view of
revelation which in its zeal for the freedom and transcendence of
God risks turning him into a capricious despot, and in its zeal for
denouncing the sinfulness of humanity risks denying the very essence
of that humanity. This is not to deny that for Christian Platonism
Christian experience will be the primary "revelation" of the nature
of reality, though other experiences would also be accepted as
"revelatory". Our criticism of Gadamer was not that he gave an
important place to aesthetic experience as a manifestation of the
nature of reality; it was that he gave primacy to aesthetic experience.
If we soften the sharp distinction between supernaturally
revealed truth and the natural truths of reason, then the sharp
distinction between theology and philosophy tends to dissolve. It
then becomes difficult to distinguish Christian theology from
Christian philosophy^ both are disciplines which take Christian
experience as the keystone of their account of reality. Of course
in such a situation there would still be a place for the other dis¬
ciplines which normally make up a Faculty of Divinity, e.g. Biblical
Studies, History of Christian Doctrine, Christian Ethics, etc. All
we are arguing is that in such a situation Systematic or Philosophical
theology would be hardly distinguishable from Christian Philosophy.
Again, Christian Philosophy would take its place in the University
alongside the other kinds of philosophy which would normally be
studied in the Faculty of Philosophy. This digression, if digression
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it bej is merely an attempt to express the present author's conviction
g
that the Christian world-view, perhaps best described as Christian
Platonism, must take its place in the intellectual market-place of
our time rather than withdraw into the illusory security of what
Bonhoeffer called "the positivism of revelation" with its narrowly
"Biblical" theology.^
However, as we remarked above, it is in our view philosophy and
theology that may become indistinguishable for the Christian Platonist t
and not philosophy and religion. The present writer is opposed both
to any identification of philosophy and religion as well as to any
Hegelian "Aufhebung" of religion by philosophy. Although "religion"
is by no means precisely the same as "religious experience", we will
attempt to address this question of the relation of philosophy and
religion by venturing some remarks on the relation of philosophy and
religious experience.
This is not to reduce Christian faith to a "mere world-view", i.e.
to a theory about the nature of reality. But it is to suggest that
such a Christian world-view (which is distinct from, and grounded
in, Christian experience) is an inescapable task of Christian faith.
In the present writer's view to cling to some pure Christian
experience uncontaminated by philosophy is a dangerous illusion,
despite what Kierkegaard, Heidegger (W Met 20) and their followers
have to say.
o
See Bonhoeffer's letters and Papers from Prison, (Enlarged Edition)
ed. E. Bethge (London; SCM, 1971)> pp.280, 286, 328f.
On the "positivity" of the Christian religion, see Hegel's Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. Speirs and Sanderson, pp. 335-
31)6. cf. The Christian Religion, trans. Hodgson, pp.16-26.
291
First of all, it must be said that, as Gadamer holds, philo¬
sophy itself is an "experience of thought". The idea that philo¬
sophical thought is a sort of experience is common to both Hegel
and Heidegger (though there are great differences in what they mean
by this). At least one of the things that Hegel meant was that
philosophy is not the mere application of an abstract logical pattern
to all reality. Thus in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit
he criticizes the "monotony and abstract universality" of Schelling's
"monochromatic formalism"."^ Philosophy for Hegel is not the sub¬
sequent application to anything and everything of a formula intuited
in some quasi-religious experience of the Absolute; it is rather the
surrender to the "immanent rhythm" of the "things themselves". Of
course Hegel has often been accused of the very thing which he
criticizes in Schelling, that is, forcing one formula (in Hegel's
case, the "dialectic" of thesis-antithesis-synthesis) on all reality.
This caricature of Hegel's method has been repudiated by most students
of Hegel. Be that as it may, what is important for our present pur¬
poses is the idea (only partly, let it be clearly said, derived from
Hegel) that on the basis of religious experience (and particularly
the Christian experience of faith) we may surrender ourselves to the
phenomena themselves, trusting that what emerges will not contradict
our experience that reality is self-giving, and hoping that our
religious experience of Divine Providence will in the end be.confirmed
by the facts. This of course is close to what Gadamer seems to be
doing implicitly, with the important differences that (l) for Christian
experience Gadamer substitutes the "other side" of the Platonic
10
See PS 8f (HW II 12ff)
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experience of Beauty; and (2) there can be for him no final confirma¬
tion of his "optimism".
Yet despite the consideration that philosophy is in some sense
a mode of experience, the fact that it is ultimately directed towards
knowledge distinguishes it from experience. Gadamer of course rejects
any "teleological relation" of experience to knowledge. But there
are many difficulties in such a position, as we tried to show in our
chapters on Gadamer's concept of experience.^" Hegel, on the other
hand, wanted to elevate all experience (including religious experience)
into philosophical knowledge. If we focus on the relation of religious
experience to philosophical knowledge, then the present writer must
(+k« urit-rr")
go along with Hegel to the extent that he^/believes (in contrast, for
example, to Kierkegaard) that the philosophical or theological task
is ineluctable. In the present writer's view it is highly dangerous
from many points of view consciously to refuse to attempt to compre¬
hend our religious experience in thought - an activity traditionally
described as fides quaerens intellectum. This is not to say that all
Christians must be philosophers or theologians (though in an important
sense that is so, as Luther remarked); it is only to say that for a
Christian to repudiate theology is a theological activity, and a
highly dangerous one at that. Nevertheless the present writer would
part company with Hegel insofar as in our view the truth of religious
experience ultimately transcends rational thought; it is not to be
equated with reason itself (as in Hegel), but is rather the origin
and destiny of reason. We might say that reason mediates experience,
See Part One, Chapters 3 and lj. above.
just as we might say that for Hegel experience mediates reason.
This would not be to end. up in Gadamer's position, since for him
experience never attains to the level of knowledge, whereas for
us religious experience ultimately goes beyond, but by no means
invalidates, rational knowledge. The origin and destiny of the
World may be beyond reason (and hence "playful"), but it is the
meaningful or in the broad sense "rational" pattern of the World
and its history which most fully displays that supra-rational
source, just as in Plotinus it is nous that displays the One, and
in the metaphysics of light it is order and form that allow light
to play. This seems to connect with the "aesthetic" theme in
12
theodicy (which John Hick has pointed to) in that it is only the
pattern and meaning in World-history which allows it fully to
reflect the Divine glory.
But is it really possible to distinguish "supra-rational"
from "irrational", it might be asked. And what sense does it make
to talk of an experience beyond reason, beyond language? Are not
reason and language the conditions of the possibility of experience
In response to the first question we can only suggest that our
stress on reason as that which most fully mediates its supra-
rational source, a source which in itself can only be experienced,
not comprehended, may perhaps go some way towards reassuring the
reader that we are not advocating a surrender to irrationalism.
In answer to all these questions it can be said that in a sense
it is most rational to locate (if we may use a spatial metaphor)
12




the source or principle^reason beyond reason, as Plotinus did, thus
13
remaining true to Plato's description of the Good in the Republic.
And as Heidegger has pointed out, language itself cannot be spoken
about - though we can have "an experience with language"."^ Such
experience which goes beyond reason and language can be described
as "ecstatic". However such ecstasy can (again to use a spatial
metaphor) be either an "upward" or a "downward" ecstasy."^" We may
experience the breakdown of reason and language either, so to speak,
by coming out the top or failing out the bottom. The former will be
the briefest moment of ecstasy as we glimpse the source of reason
and language and meanings the latter will be a "season in hell" as
we glimpse the disintegration of reason and language and meaning
into primal chaos, into Plato's flux of Becoming, the apeiron or
unlimited, which reappears in Plotinus' Non-being. How we might
"relate" (if it is possible to use such a term here) what is
experienced in these two different kinds of ecstasy is beyond the
capacity of the present writer to say. However what is most import¬
ant in his opinion is that we attempt to maintain a distinction
between them so that the experience of a Nietzsche and of a Sartre
and perhaps of a Heidegger does not somehow acquire the characteristics
13
See J.N. Findlay's Plato; The Written and Unwritten Doctrines,
pp.369f, lj.09-
"^See "The Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, pp.f>7-108,
esp. pp.f?7ff ("Das Wesen der Sprache", Unterwegs zur Sprache, pp.
157-216, esp. pp.l59ff).
15
Gilson talks of a "downward extasis" in Being and Some Philosophers,
p.208; pp.208f are helpful on the distinction we are trying to make
here.
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of the experience testified to by the Christian-Platonic mystical
tradition. The Divine play which begins and ends beyond reason
must be carefully distinguished from the concept of "play" which
is so often used to undermine and disrupt the belief that there
is rational meaning in the cosmos and in history. Gadamer may be
accused of failing to observe this distinction, and of transferring
to the second concept of play an "optimism" which belongs only to
the first, and which has, as we argued, been bought with a price,
the price of the via crucis, "the labour of the negative".
Rather than being itself a kind of irrationalism, the natural
tendency of the Christian-Platonic position we have been sketching
out is to identify irrationalism with evil. Evil is seen as that
which is recalcitrant to reason, which resists any elevation into
the realm, of reason, order and meaning.^ Hence the Christian
Platonist would be implacably opposed to any kind of Nietzschean
irrationalism. While reason separated from its Supra-rational
grounding can become daemonic, with the terrifying consequences we
in the twentieth century must face, nevertheless the answer is not
to attack reason itself. To try to ground reason in some pre- or
sub-rational dimension, or even to abandon reason altogether, as
Nietzsche and his followers (including perhaps Heidegger) appear
to do, is from our perspective to play a dangerous game. For as
17
Mephistopheles says in Goethe's Faust, to seek to disrupt and
There are of course problems in saying that any such "non-being"
actively "resists" order, as Hick points out with regard to
Plotinus (see op.cit., p.l±6ff). Human thought and language




destroy the world-order is to seek to disrupt and destroy that alone
which allows light to shine, and so ultimately to seek to destroy
light itself. This does not mean that the Christian Platonist is
committed to the "world-order" in the sense of the "status quo"
(though regrettably that has often enough been the case). On the
contrary, it is to say that the Divine Light cannot fully display
itself as long as the "world-order" is imperfect, as long as
injustice, oppression and inequality mar the order and rationality
of the world. The Divine Light cannot fully dis-play itself until
such inequalities and disorders have been worked out in the power
of the Spirit.
Nevertheless, without becoming involved in a discussion of
sin and the problem of evil, we might suggest that there is a role
for creative disorder in the world-process in that it makes possible
life, growth and, above ali, freedom. Growing pains are doubtless
necessary, and even sin can have an ultimately creative result, as
18
the tradition of "felix culpa" from Augustine to Hegel testifies.
But that "ultimately" must be taken with full seriousness. The
power of the negative can only be known to be creative from the
standpoint of the end of history when the Whole is known (though
we may no doubt anticipate or hope for the Whole). This means
that now we must take all forms of negativity with utter seriousness
and must struggle against them, while nevertheless trusting that
ultimately they are part of the pattern and meaning of history.
This is not to deny that such a trust can be agonizingly difficult
in face of the apparent meaninglessness of suffering and of human
-j^Q
On the phrase "felix culpa" see Hick, op.cit., p.l82f and p.2S0,
note 1.
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perversity. However we would disagree with the view that sin (both
in the understanding subject and in what is to be understood) invali¬
dates all attempts to understand the world rationally or "speculatively",
19
as Kierkegaard puts it. In our view it is rather that the world
can only be understood rationally or "speculatively" from the stand¬
point of the end of history. Then the world will, we believe, fully
reflect the Divine glory. The real charge that must be made against
Hegel is not that he thought that sin and suffering can ultimately
be known to be part of the pattern and meaning of history. Hegel
quite correctly (in our view) saw that such a pattern could only be
known at the end of history. The charge against Hegel is rather that
he seems to have thought that in some sense history came to an end in
his thought, and that therefore he could know the pattern and meaning
of history.
It is Gadamer's position which in our view is much more dangerous
than Hegel's. Hegel's error is comparatively straightforward in its
sublime hubris, and for that reason more easy to correct. Gadamer's
undertaking is much more ambiguous. He wants to understand history
20
as being in some sense "rational" (which for him is the same as
21
"linguistic" - whatever that may mean) and "speculative", but without
the standpoint of the end of history (and hence of the Whole) being
19
See The Sickness Dnto Death, pp.l^Off.
20
cf. the passage by de Waelhens quoted in Part Two, Chapter l+(a) above.
21
See WM 379j TM 363-
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a possibility even in principle. He seeks to introduce a secularized
version of the Divine play of the "end-game" into the workings of the
historical process, but he does little to show that this is not in
reality a surrender to aimless flux and thus to a kind of irrationalism.
And since he does not seem ready to acknowledge the price of his con¬
fidence in the historical process (that price being in religious
terms the Cross and in philosophical terms "the labour of the negative"),
it is Gadamer rather than Hegel who could be accused of not yet having
considered the great weight of sin and suffering in the world.
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(b) Philosophy and Religious Language
The final pages of this study will be devoted to the contri¬
bution of Gadamer to the problem of language in theology (or, as we
have suggested, a Christian-Platonic philosophy). As we saw above,
Gadamer stresses the priority of what we termed "ontologically
evocative language" in contrast to "the language of the statement".
This contrast corresponds to a contrast within modern theology
between two very different styles of theology. To Gadamer's "onto¬
logically evocative language" corresponds that kind of theology
which, to use John Macquarrie's phrase, uses "the language of exis¬
tence and Being". Much of this style of theology is heavily
influenced by Heidegger, for whom as we saw language is essentially
poetic. In this context one thinks above all of the so-called "New
Hermeneutic" theologians (Ebeling, Fuchs and perhaps Ott)"^" and of
2
Macquarrie himself. However we should like to include under this
heading all theologies which lay stress on the function of symbols
(e.g. Tillich). Such a stress on symbols ultimately goes back, we
would suggest, to that Christian-Platonic mystical tradition deriving
(at least in part) from the "other side" of Platonism which Gadamer
has pointed to (one thinks in this context particularly of Pseudo-
Dionysius). That the same theology often makes considerable use
both of the concept of symbol and of the "language of existence and
See Ernst Fuchs' Hermeneutik (Bad Cannstatt: R. Milllerschbn,
1953+) 5 also New Frontiers in Theology, I (The Later Heidegger and
Theology) and II (The New Hermeneutic), ed. James M. Robinson and
John B. Cobb (New York] Harper and Row, 1963-1;) •
2
See especially his God-talk (London: SCM, 196?), especially chapter
12.
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Being" (e.g. Tillich and Macquarrie) perhaps sheds light on Gadamer's
rather cryptic remark that "in this tradition of Platonism /i.e.
Christian-Platonic mysticisny7 was formed the conceptual vocabulary
needed for thought about the finitude of human existence". (WM 2+61j
TM i4i+3)
In contrast to this style of theology stands Pannenberg1s
insistence on the "objectivity" or "factuality" of language, and
his demand that statements about historical events should be
capable in principle of being known to be true or false. Pannenberg
seems to want to tether all theological language to statements about
historical events - specifically the historical "events" of Jesus'
life, death and resurrection. Certainly he tries to leave room for
what he calls "doxological statements" which intend primarily to
speak of God's eternal essence, as opposed to "kerygmatic statements"
3
which speak of definite earthily events that come from God. But
for Pannenberg "doxological statements are statements about God on
the basis of events that have been experienced as having occurred
from him. They speak of the way in which God has shown himself in
specific occurrences".^ Of course no theology that is authentically
Christian will want to lose its connection with "the historical
Jesus" (even if the connection remains only in the form of the "that",
the,
as in Bultmann). But few, especially in^other style of theology
^ See Jesus - God and Man (London: SCM, 1968), pp.l81|ff. cf. the
essays "What is a dogmatic statement?", sees, £ and 6, and
"Analogy and Doxology" in Basic Questions in Theology, I.
^ Jesus - God and Man, pp.l8i;f.
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we have mentioned, will want to base all theology on "objective"
verifiable statements about historical "events" in the manner of
Pannenberg.
Gadamer is of relevance to this theological debate because,
starting from the side which holds "ontologically evocative language"
to be fundamental, he wants to do justice, as far as is possible,
to the "factuality" /Sachlichkeit7 of language. As we saw, language
is not for him merely the expression of personal, existential mean¬
ing. Gadamer seems to go as far as it is possible to go towards
satisfying the demand for "objectivity" while remaining entirely
within the sphere of "ontologically evocative language". The
"objectifying statement" has doubtful status, if it has any at all,
for Gadamer. Moreover the lack of an eschatology in Gadamer means
that such steps as he does take in the direction of the "objective
statement" can have no criterion of the latter's truth or falsehood
since there is no Whole in terms of which it could be known, even if
only in principle, to be true or false. The Whole that Gadamer does
invoke seems to be not so much an unexpressed Hegelian totality as
an inexpressible Heideggerian totality; it is not so much "the unsaid"
as"the unsayable". Thus Gadamer can help us to plot the limits of
the range of the "non-objectifying language" about which certain pro¬




For Heidegger's reaction to this see his contribution to the theo¬
logical conference on the theme of "The Problem of a Non-Objectify¬
ing Thinking and Speaking in Today's Theology" which took place at
Drew University, New Jersey, in 1961).; see The Piety of Thinking,
ed. Hart and Maraldo, pp.22-31.
302
But as we suggested above, it is doubtful whether Pannenberg
with his stress on "objectifying statements" can do justice to that
dimension of theology which the proponents of a symbolic, "non-
objectifying" theology rightly (in the present writer's view) point
to. Are we left then with an either/or between Gadamer and Pannenberg?
Since neither (in the present writer's view) can do justice to the
whole truth, must we simply opt for what seems to us the lesser of
two evils? Perhaps. But might it not be possible to combine the
insights of both? Perhaps the Whole of the history of the world
could be both poetically and symbolically evoked and provisionally
anticipated in statements, in the sense that particular events of
our history can not only be symbols which lead us to, and perhaps
beyond, the Whole, but also have their place as part of the over-all
pattern and meaning of the Whole. This suggestion is obviously con¬
nected with what was said at the end of our chapter on "the speculative
structure of language" about combining the insights of Heidegger and
Hegel.^ However this is not the place to elaborate the all-too-brief
and sketchy discussion given there. At this point all we can do is
repeat our suggestion that, to the best of the present writer's under¬
standing, the insights of Heidegger and Hegel (and the modern theo¬
logies which correspond to these insights) are not in principle
incompatible, though there would no doubt have to be much accommoda¬
tion on both sides. Or to put the matter in Hegelian terms, this
opposition is not "unaufhebbar". To put the matter thus betrays a
preference for Hegel only to the extent that, in the present writer's
See Part One, Chapter 8(c) above.
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view, for a Christian philosophy Hegel's "both/and" must in the end
(a phrase to be taken with the utmost seriousness) triumph over any
"either/or".
Thus as far as "God's dealings with the world" are concerned,
we would suggest that, while there is an independent and valuable
7
place for faith in its own right, nevertheless faith is in the end
(a phrase again to be taken seriously) "teleologically related" to
knowledge. The present writer is not interested in "faith for
faith's sake", as sometimes seems to be the case in the first style
of theology mentioned above (especially Ebeling). Such knowledge
is for us, in contrast to what Hegel seems to have thought, still
future. In contrast to the Heideggerians on the other hand, we would
hold that faith is in the not-yet-known Whole, not in some unknow¬
able Whole. However it must be stressed that what is not yet known
is not God in his essence, but God "in his dealings with the world",
not the ontological or immanent Trinity (which is in the strict
sense unknowable) but the economic Trinity. We may perhaps in the
end apprehend beyond God's "relation" to the world the depths of
the Godhead, beyond the economic the ontological Trinity. But the
only way of talking about such a possibility is in symbolic
language, in "ontologically evocative language". The Whole of the
history of God with the world may be the best symbol we have for
the Being of God, but it is still only a symbol. The realm of
7
This seems faintly to echo Aquinas' position that certain truths
are available both to faith and to reason. We will also suggest
below (though in a sense very different from Aquinas) that the
profoundest truth is available, to faith alone.
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beings may be left behind in the movement towards Being itself; but
the "relation" of Being to beings as the latter are gathered together
into a harmonious Whole is the best hint we have as to the nature of
Being itself. To use Plotinian terms (though this is not to suggest
that Plotinus actually said what we are about to say), the One or the
Good is beyond nous, but nous is the best symbol or image we have,
for the One or the Good. Or as Plato put it: "both knowledge and
truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either
with the Good is wrong. The Good must hold a yet higher place of
honour."*^ (Republic $08, Cornford translation). Or as John says
at the end of the Prologue to his gospel: "No one has ever seen God;
but God's only Son, he who is nearest to the Father's heart, he has
made him known" (John 1:18, NEB).
This verse from John's Gospel brings to mind that "speculative"
structure which we have described elsewhere. Indeed the "speculative"
structure, which we have also characterized (though Gadamer does not)
as the "identity-in-difference" structure, pervades John's Gospel -
though it is the author of Hebrews who comes closest to speaking of
this "speculative" structure in so many words: "He reflects the glory
of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe
In the Heideggerian and perhaps the Thomist sense of "Being", not
the Platonic; but we could perhaps say the same thing in Platonic
terms by talking of transcendence towards the One, the Good, the
Primal Source, as we do below.
9
Whether we are thus by implication straying into some form of "sub-
ordinationism" is beyond the scope of this study. But certainly
any Christian-Platonic philosophy would have to study carefully
the development from the second century Apologists and their Logos
Christ ology through Origen and Alexandrian theology to Arius.
There is perhaps more in pre-Nicene theology to "retrieve" than
orthodoxy generally allows.
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by his word of power" (Hebrews 1:3, RSV). As Fruchon says, the
"speculative" ontology which Gadamer claims to derive from Plato
derives just as much, if not more, from John's Gospel and perhaps
from the "kenotic" passage in Phillipians. These are the real
fountainhead of Christian Platonism, a stream from which Gadamer
has perhaps drunk more deeply than he admits. This tradition of
Christian Platonism tends to be in the broad sense "mystical" and
sacramental in character. By this we mean that the Primal Source
of Being comes to meet us in a concrete being which is his image
(the sacramental movement), and that through this concrete being
or image we are led ultimately beyond all concrete beings and
images back to the Primal Source (the mystical movement). This
double movement is typical of Platonism, and can be seen with
particular clarity in the Platonic doctrine of Beauty (the "Sacra¬
mental" movement is described in the Phaedrus passage we have
discussed above, and the "mystical" movement in the Symposium).
What turns this Platonism into Christian Platonism is the convic¬
tion that in the man Jesus God comes to meet us in a special way,
that Jesus "reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of
his nature", and that through Jesus we have access to the Father
in a special way. But because Jesus is in a special way the
"Mediator" of Divine transcendence, because Divine transcendence
dwells in Jesus in a special way, we must not assume that God cannot
be present to us in other beings. On the contrary, the New Testament
itself pushes us in the direction of saying that God is present to
us in other beings in the way that he is present to us in Jesus.
Thus God is present to us in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper,
and indeed every time we eat and drink together in Jesus' name. God
is present to us in those whose need demands our attention, for
inasmuch as we respond to them we respond to Jesus himself."^ The
natural consequence of this line of thought (and way of life) is the
conviction that through Jesus, through the Spirit of Jesus, all
things can, and in the end will, become a manifestation of the
presence of God. Through the Spirit of Jesus all things will in
the end, the Christian believes, display the glory of the Father.
Thus we might say that in the end the very essence and structure of
the world will be recognized as "speculative" in that it reflects
or mirrors the Divine glory. It is in this sense that the Christian
theologian may want to speak of "the sacramental universe"
There has always been a debate as to whether the influence of
Platonism has helped or hindered the presentation of this Christian
12
vision of reality. The most obvious danger which the influence of
Platonism could lead to is that Jesus is seen ultimately as merely a
stage in the ascent of the soul to the Father, a stage which the
"Christian gnostic" ultimately goes beyond (a view ascribed to
See Matthew 25:311-36. See also Simone Weil's essay "Forms of the
Implicit Love of God" in Waiting for God, pp.9lj.-l66. Weil says
that God is really though secretly present in religious ceremonies,
in the beauty of the world, in our neighbour and also in friend¬
ship (p.95)- In the essay she gives a fairly lengthy discussion
of each of these.
As W. Temple entitles Lecture XIX of his Mature, Man and God.
12
For a recent discussion, see J.P. Mackey's Jesus: the Man and the
Myth (London: SCM, 1979), pp.217ff. " ~~~
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13
Origen by H.R. MacKintosh). It is this "subordinationist" tendency
which is often blamed, for leading directly to the errors of Arius.
Whether this is so it is beyond our present scope and capacity to
discuss, though it is perhaps worth remarking that in the present
writer's view an idolatry of Jesus is just as dangerous from a
Christian point of view as anything promulgated by those who stand
condemned of "subordinationism".
Whatever the erros of pre-Nicene Christian Platonism, the tradi¬
tion itself has continued down through the centuries.^ It might be
argued that this current of thought reached its high point (thus far)
in the thought of Hegel, in the sense that, whatever objections must
be made to his philosophy, it nevertheless exercised a decisive and
inescapable influence on all subsequent thought. Thus, for example,
however much they may try to distance themselves from Hegel, the
philosophers and theologians influenced by the Idealist movement
which flourished in Britain for thirty years either side of the turn
of the twentieth century are permeated by the influence - direct and
indirect - of Hegel. This rather neglected movement also saw a
renaissance of the Christian-Platonic tradition (though as has often
been suggested, there seems to be an inherent Platonism in the
Anglican tradition - if not in "Anglo-Saxon" philosophy, as J.H.
\lf?
Muirhead thought I) Whatever the short-coming of this Christian-
See The Doctrine of the Person of Christ (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1912), pp.l66f.
For an excellent summary of the Platonic tradition (and a defence
of the view that Aquinas was essentially a Platonist) see the
final chapter of J.N. Findlay's Plato: The Written and Unwritten
Doctrines. ~~
If?
See MuirheadTs The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931).
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Platonist revival in British thought., it is in the present writer's
view a better point of departure (or"partner in dialogue") for con¬
temporary Christian thought in the English-speaking world than the
forms of "realism" and "empiricism" which eclipsed it."^ If, as
G.J. Warnock says, the citadel of British Idealism was never taken
by storm, but was "quietly discovered one day to be no longer
17
inhabited", then perhaps it is time the squatters moved in.
This is not, however, to advocate any uncritical return to
British Idealism. It is the general themes of this style of philo¬
sophizing and theologizing which the present writer finds relevant
rather than the way these themes are presented. Sometimes, especially
in the case of the theologians (e.g. Temple), the presentation arouses
the impatience one is quick to dondemn in the "positivists". There
seem to the present writer to be many points of contact between the
themes of this style of philosophy and theology and Gadamer's enter¬
prise. Both seek to give an "optimistic" or in the broad sense of
lQ
the term "idealistic" account of reality; in both there is a stress
on religious and aesthetic experience as key factors in that account;
both are strongly "sacramental" or "Incarnational"; both could perhaps
Though precisely the opposite view is attributed to Donald MacKinnon
by Fergus Kerr in his review of the former's contribution to the
series Explorations in Theology; see New Blackfriars, vol.60. No.
708, May 1979, pp.235-8. In fact all the books reviewed by Kerr '
in this issue of New Blackfriars relate in one way or another to
this probleiji.
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English Philosophy Since 1900, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press,
1969), p.8.
l8
Gadamer would seem to be on the "idealist" side of the divide
which 'tuns like a fault across the whole range of modern thought"
according to MacKinnon; see Kerr's review, p.236.
be accused of underestimating the price at which their optimism is
bought^ of failing to appreciate the full radicality of the Cross
and "the labour of the negative". It is these affinities which
suggest to the present writer the possibility of a restatement of
some of the main themes of the British versions of Idealism and
Christian Platonism in terms of Gadamer's philosophy - with the
amendments to the latter that we have suggested. It might also
be possible to give an authentic presentation of that optimism
19
which is the birthright of all Christian Platonism by grounding
it in the Cross and "the labour of the negative" - a task to which
a closer examination of both Hegel and Heidegger might be able to
contribute.
In such a Christian Platonism; then, the symbolic or "specu¬
lative" function of language would have the first and last word.
Is William Temple says in his Christus Veritas ; "Symbolism is thus
20
the supreme philosophic principle". By "symbolism" Temple does
not mean the use of conventional symbols; he has in mind rather
the symbolism of great art where; he says (quoting Emerson) "the
21
word is one with that it tells of". In a footnote on the follow¬
ing page he writes: ". . .a poem can itself be the very embodiment
and vehicle of a value which is found in (not only on occasion of)
19
Though not all Christian Platonism has been "optimistic". Dean
Inge ("the gloomy dean"); for instance; attacked the prevailing
"optimism" of his day. However this seems to have been both
because that "optimism" was superficial and facile; and also
because he was so much under the influence of Neo-Platonism.
20





the apprehension of the words". While it would be unwise to place
too much weight on the similarity between sentences such as this and
Gadamer's position, there does nevertheless seem to be a genuine
correspondence. Moreover Gadamer shares with the style of theology
which Temple epitomizes a conviction that "poetic truth" is philo¬
sophically (and theologically) important. But while we agreed below
that symbolic and poetic language may evoke the Whole, and may
ultimately point us beyond the Whole into the depths of the Godhead,
we nevertheless suggested that to abandon the language of statements
altogether is a dangerous step to take. For symbolic language and
poetic truth can all too easily lose touch with "the prose of the
world" and hard (if not brute) facts. Christian Platonism is what
Tillich calls in his Dynamics of Faith an "ontological type of faith"
and thus has an inherent tendency to be "romantic-conservative",
23
especially in politics. One of the main reasons the present
writer has for clinging to the language of the statement is the
need for objective statements in order to criticize the factual
state of the world. The perennial danger which threatens Christian
Platonism is that it may lose touch with concrete circumstances.
Suffering and degredation can easily become only a mode of partici¬
pation in the sufferings of Christ (and thus a way of transcendence)
and not also a negative state of affairs which we must talk about
22
Ghristus Veritas, p.18, note 1.
23
See Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1958), pp.58-61).. Although Tillich does not mention Christian
Platonism by name, it is perhaps significant that under the
heading of "Ontological types of religion" he deals with
"sacramentalism" and "mysticism".
in unambiguous terms and must struggle to overcome. As Gadamer says
at the end of Truth and Method, the language of the poem is essen¬
tially ambiguous and we must not try to understand it too literally.
But if it is right that poetry and all art should be richly ambiguous,
as should all symbolic language in religion (most importantly because
it is at once icon and idol), there must also in the present writer's
view be room for statements of fact which are as unambiguous as
possible and which must be taken quite literally. Unless this is so,
the sacramentalism and mysticism of the Platonic tradition can all
too easily lose (and have all too frequently lost) contact with the
contingent facts of history which are the distinctive concern of the
Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is because of this tendency of the eschatology of transcen¬
dence in the Platonic tradition to lose touch with history that, in
the present writer's view, Hegel's version of Christian Platonism
must exert an influence that is in some sense definitive. In our
discussion of "Providence and Play" above we associated the idea of
play particularly with the mystical tradition and with the eschato¬
logy of transcendence, while the idea of "labour" (in all its
senses) was associated with the eschatology of consummation. Thus
we might also express the danger indicated in the previous paragraph
by talking of the danger of misapplying the category of play, which
properly belongs to the ontological realm of the eternal Being of
God and his "relation" to the world, to the innerworldly realm which
is properly the realm where the divine Spirit is at work. The danger
here is that human degradation and suffering are not really taken
312
seriously when they are not seen as objective facts to be struggled
with as well as opportunities to participate in the sufferings of
Christ and so in the play of the Divine Life. Thus, in the present
writer's view, the eschatology of consummation with its idea of the
"labour" of the Spirit, which was given philosophical expression by
Hegel and which through Marx influences the modern theologies of
liberation, maintains an essential dimension of Christian Platonism.
Without this dimension Christian Platonism is all too exposed to the
criticisms levelled at it by Marxian thinkers that it is mere
mystification, mere ideology masking hard (economic) facts. Con¬
versely, the theologies of liberation need, in the present writer's
view, an awareness of the dimension of transcendence in human
experience lest they forget the ontological depths of the Divine
Life, and, like the Marxists, turn the Whole towards which history
is labouring, and which is the greatest symbol or icon of that Life,
into an idol. For as Goethe says in the "Chorus Mysticus" at the
end of Faust: "Alles Vergangliche/ist nur ein Gleichnis". In the
end, everything in time is only an image.
APPENDIX
It is necessary to say something about the second section of
Part Three of Truth and Method, entitled "The emergence of the con¬
cept of language in the history of Western thought /Pragung des
Begriffs ,Sprache' durch die Denkgeschichte des Abendlandes7"• Our
attempt to give the gist of Part Three of Truth and Method has omitted
this historical section which traces the development of the concept
of language from Plato to Nicholas of Cusa. This omission was made
for the same reasons that we omitted the sections on the history of
aesthetics and of hermeneutics. First of all, it is beyond the scope
of this study, and the competence of its author, to give a critical
account of these historical excursions. Secondly, it is in the
present writer's view possible to give a reasonably adequate account
of the core of Gadamer's philosophy without following him in these
valuable and erudite historical surveys. As we said above, Gadamer
has a tendency to revel in historical exegesis almost for its own
sake, and while this no doubt makes fascinating reading, it has the
result that his argument at times meanders rather than flows. To
change the metaphor, Gadamer's central argument can survive a con¬
siderable pruning of its more luxuriant foliage.
We will, however, attempt to summarise the main points of the
section in question. The first part of the section is called "Language
and Logos" and is mainly a discussion of Plato's Cratylus. The upshot
of Gadamer's discussion is that "the legitimate question whether the
word is nothing but a 'pure sign' or has after all something of the
'image' about it is thoroughly discredited by the Cratylus". (WM 391;
31U
TM 37k) This result of the Cratylus - a result which Gadamer admits
is not particularly emphasized - lies at the start of Western thought
about language. Knowledge is located beyond language in the intel¬
ligible realm, and language is seen in terms of the sign rather than
the image, (ibid.) Language as sign tends to become an instrument
or tool which allows us to manipulate what we know already in a non-
linguistic way, whereas language as image allows to come-to-presenta-
tion that which otherwise would remain unknown. Thus the triumph of
sign over image which we see in the Cratylus is an epoch-making
decision, (ibid.)
The second part of the section ("Language and Verbum") is a
discussion of the effect of Christological and Trinitarian speculation
on the concept of language. The Christian idea of Incarnation "pre¬
vented the forgetfulness of language in Western thought from being
complete". (WM 393 j TM 378) However the Church's affirmation that
the Word is with God from all eternity and its repudiation of all
forms of subordinationism placed the problem of language entirely
in the inner world of thought, Gadamer says, and tended to devalue
the external, spoken word. (WM 397; TM 380) Thus the gains (from
Gadamer's point of view) brought by the idea of Incarnation are
mostly lost. However Gadamer does see some hopeful signs in Thomas
Aquinas' discussion of language. His discussion of Thomas is based
mainly on Comm. in Joh. cap. 1 ("De differentia verbi divini et
humani") and on "the difficult and substantial opusculum, compiled
from genuine texts by Thomas, called 'De natura verbi intellectus'
(WM 399 note Ij TM 329 note U2) As we have said, it is beyond the
present writer's scope and competence to give an account of Gadamer's
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discussion here. What seems to be the most important result of this
discussion is Gadamer's view that while Thomas stresses the differences
between the divine Word and the human word, and sees the natural con¬
cept formation /Begriffsbildung/ of human language as imperfect and
inferior to the logical order of essence /Wesensordnung7 with its
concepts of substance and accident, nevertheless he recognized pecu¬
liar advantage in this imperfection - "the freedom to form an infinite
number of concepts and to penetrate more and more into what is meant".
(WM l|.OJ+f5 TM 387)
Gadamer seizes upon this recognition of a positive significance
in finite human language and concept formation which he claims to
find in Thomas, and in the third part of the section("Language and
Concept Formation") he discusses this "constant process of concept
formation by means of which the life of a language develops". (WM k0%;
TM 388) This natural concept formation depends on the metaphorical
use of language, and it is only because of the prejudice of a logical
theory which is alien to language that the metaphorical use of language
is devalued. (WM I4.O65 TM 389) Gadamer claims that "classificatory
logic starts from the logical work that language has done for it in
advance", and that this is confirmed by an examination of its pre¬
history, especially in the Platonic Academy, (ibid.) There follows
another historical excursion, the result of which seems to be that
"the Aristotelian critique has robbed the logical achievement of
language of its scientific justification. It is recognized only from
the point of view of rhetoric and is understood there as the artistic
device of the metaphor". (WM ij.09 j TM 39l) The achievement of lan¬
guage begins to be recognized by mediaeval thought, but it was only
when the scholastic combination of Christian thought with Aristotelian
philosophy was supplemented by a new element that the problem of
language could come into its own and the difference between divine
and human thought could be viewed positively, Gadamer tells us. This
new element was the idea that human thought is, by analogy with
divine thought, creative. (WM ; TM 393) The emergence of this
new . element is connected with the rise of nominalism, and Gadamer
turns his attention to Nicholas of Cusa whose theory of knowledge
combines Platonic and nominalist elements. (WM Ip_35 TM 396) Nicholas
was able to recognize the significance of the variety of the verna¬
cular languages which began to assume importance in the Renaissance,
(ibid.) We cannot follow Gadamer in his discussion of Nicholas.
"What interests Gadamer above all in Nicholas is the idea that the
variety of words in different languages for the same thing are not
merely variations of expression, but are "variations of the view of
the thing and of the concept formation which follows it; that is,
there is an essential inexactness which does not exclude there never¬
theless being in all the variations a reflection of the thing itself
(of the forma). This kind of essential inexactness can be overcome
only if the mind rises to the infinite". (WM )p )| j TM 396) In the
following section Gadamer will move on to the modern period and, after
a discussion of Humboldt, will begin his own presentation of language.
Precisely how this presentation relates to his understanding of
Nicholas is not clear. Gadamer obviously feels a strong affinity with
Nicholas, but his discussion of him (and the section as a whole) ends
on an ambiguous and perhaps rather coy note: "Despite all the diffe¬
rences /between the various languages/ agreement is still preserved
317
and this is what the Christian Platonist is concerned with. What is
essential for him is the relation to the thing /der Sachbezug7 in all
human language and not so much the linguisticality /die Sprach-
gebundenheit/ of human knowledge of things. The latter represents
only a prismatic refraction in which there shines the one truth".
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